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ABSTRACT 
NETWORKS OF INFLUENCE:  IMPLEMENTING POLITICALLY 
SUSTAINABLE MULTINATIONAL STAKEHOLDER STRATEGIES 
Lite Josephine Otoo Nartey 
Witold Jerzy Henisz 
 
In a bid to gain stakeholder support for their operations, multinational firms operating in 
politically uncertain environments often inappropriately apply a rational financial 
approach to a sociopolitical problem. Using the tools of network theory, I present an 
alternative sociopolitical approach to gaining stakeholder support by engendering 
cooperative relations and increasing tie formation while minimizing conflict. This 
dissertation comprises three paper chapters. The first, theory, paper chapter outlines a 
theory of influence exploring how the firm’s strategic position within the network of 
stakeholders affords it positional benefits of information and reputation, while also 
highlighting the costs of exposure to pre-existing conflict and the fostering of conflict 
through asymmetric relations. The second, empirical, paper chapter explores how firms 
can best manage altercentric and egocentric uncertainty in the nonmarket environment 
and compares the efficacy of the ex ante strategies that the firm can use to manage both 
types of uncertainty. I hypothesize and find that through strategic network positioning 
that affords it information, the firm can manage its egocentric uncertainty; and, by 
managing how it is perceived through its associations, the firm can also manage 
stakeholders’ altercentric uncertainty. When both strategies are assessed together, I find 
greater returns to firms in terms of engendering cooperation, minimizing conflict and 
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forming ties by managing altercentric uncertainty through strategic associations. In the 
third, also empirical, paper chapter, I use insights from structural balance theory to 
explore the relationship between dyadic structure and triadic closure among networks of 
actors in the sociopolitical context. I outline and test hypotheses of four types of 
structural homophily of the actors in the triad—access to resources, status, likeability and 
number of ties (popularity)—on the likelihood of the closure of that triad. I find that a 
link that closes an open directed triad is more likely when the actors of the triad have 
different access to resources, different status, and similar numbers of ties to other actors. I 
also find that likeability among actors in the triad has no impact on the likelihood of 
closing that triad. My empirical papers test the relationships among firms and 
stakeholders in a novel hand-coded database of 51,754 stakeholder events linking 4,623 
unique stakeholders of a population of 19 publicly-traded gold mining firms which 
operate 26 mines in 20 largely emerging economies. 
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PREFACE 
 
We need to understand the complex interconnections between 
economic and social forces. Isolating “social issues” as separate from the 
economic impact which they have, and conversely isolating economic issues 
as if they had no social effect, misses the mark both managerially and 
intellectually (Freeman, 1984:41) 
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Introduction 
Navigating uncertainty in the nonmarket environment (Baron, 1995; Baron & 
Diermeier, 2007) has been a long-standing focus of scholarship at the nexus of 
international business and multinational strategy. While the market environment includes 
“typically voluntary” economic and property-based transactions and exchanges between 
firms and “other parties that are intermediated by markets or private agreements,” the 
nonmarket environment “consists of the social, political, and legal arrangements that 
structure the firm's interactions outside of, and in conjunction with, markets” (Baron, 
1995:49). Further, 
The nonmarket environment includes those interactions that are 
intermediated by the public, stakeholders, government, the media, and 
public institutions. These institutions differ from those of the market 
environment because of characteristics such as majority rule, due process, 
broad enfranchisement, collective action, and publicness. The interactions 
in the nonmarket environment may be voluntary, such as when the firm 
adopts a policy of developing relationships with government officials, or 
involuntary when government regulates an activity or activist groups 
organize a boycott of a firm's product (Baron, 1995:47).  
 
The importance of the nonmarket environment for firms can be distinguished by the 
“control of a firm’s opportunities” by governments and “direct challenges” against the 
firm by activists and interest groups (Baron, 1995:49). Examples of control and 
challenges from actors in the nonmarket environment that creates uncertainty for firms, 
include hostile relations and adverse interventions by governments—such as, sudden 
stop-work orders, denial of security and work permits,  adverse tax or regulatory changes, 
or outright expropriations of assets—through interventions orchestrated by actors from 
civil society—such as, sophisticated political strategies of nongovernmental coalitions, 
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violent and nonviolent protests, employee strikes and walkouts, or acts of sabotage. 
These adverse interventions by both governments and civil society actors can have 
detrimental impacts on firm operations—often resulting in closures and operational 
delays—and can cause irreparable damage to that firm’s reputation, thus adversely 
affecting the firm’s financial returns. Such nonmarket uncertainty, while well 
documented against firms in the extractive industries (i.e., oil, gas and mining), impacts a 
much wider array of firms in a diverse set of industry and country environments. A 
successful nonmarket strategy therefore “must … be tailored to the firm's nonmarket 
competencies and the characteristics of its market and nonmarket environments” (Baron, 
1995:48). 
Scholars of multinational firm strategy seeking to understand how firms can 
strategically navigate uncertainty in the nonmarket environment have focused primarily 
on two market-based strategies: (1) developing offsetting managerial or organizational 
capabilities and advantages (Buckley & Casson, 1976; Caves, 1982; Mezias, 2002), and 
(2) imitating the practices of local firms (Zaheer, 1995) and competitors from the same 
host country (Guillen, 2002). However, the path-dependent nature of capabilities-
development limits the effectiveness of managerial capabilities in highly complex and 
dynamic political environments. Further, many resource-rich regions are in emerging 
countries with few, if any, local firms (with the exception of state-owned enterprises), 
thus limiting opportunities for imitation. In addition, in those nonmarket environments 
with local and other foreign firms, imitation is further limited by the subjective and 
relational nature of “political and social capital” accumulated by these firms. That is, 
political and social capital is based not solely on the characteristics and actions of the 
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competing firm, but also on their ties and connections to the political, social and 
economic actors, i.e., stakeholders, within these environments. Seeking to obtain this 
political and social capital, firms have sought to form strategic joint ventures with local 
firms. But the deployment of such a strategy is untenable when asset specificity is high, 
in that local counterparties can, given a firm’s high sunk costs, use their connections with 
the government against that firm (Henisz, 2000). Because the business environment is 
“composed of market and nonmarket components, … any approach to strategy 
formulation must integrate both market and nonmarket considerations” (Baron, 1995:47). 
With the exception of exploring the strategic formation of joint ventures with 
local businesses in a bid to mitigate uncertainty in the nonmarket environment from 
largely political actors (i.e., governments and their associated actors), multinational 
strategy research has paid little attention to the integrated strategy of managing how firms 
choose and develop relationships with not only local firms and strategic businessmen but 
also with various political, social and economic stakeholders in countries where they 
invest. Such an integrated strategy, with a focus on the firm’s strategic formation of ties 
with the political, social and economic stakeholders who can affect and are affected by 
that firm (Freeman, 1984:46), is the focus of this dissertation. The goal of the strategic tie 
formation is to engender cooperation and reduce conflict with stakeholders in order to 
maximize shareholder value.  
Firms operating in hostile nonmarket environments have understood the need for 
a nonmarket approach through the strategic formation of ties with stakeholders that 
engenders cooperation or reduces conflict with stakeholders in a bid to obtain 
reputational benefits and secure the social license to operate (Gunningham, Kagan, & 
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Thornton, 2004) and thus reduce the occurrence and impact of adverse interventions 
orchestrated by political, social and economic stakeholders that can impact the firm’s 
financial and operational returns. These firms often engage in corporate philanthropy or 
corporate social responsibility, such as the building of noncritical infrastructure including 
hospitals, schools, libraries, town halls, as well as the more politically-motivated and 
controversial expenses such as the building of private residences and palaces for 
government officials, and the loan of private planes to strategic political actors, in a bid to 
“win the hearts and minds” of external political, social and economic stakeholders. This 
strategy can result in significant outlays of financial and other resources—for example, 
firms in the extractive industries reportedly spent upwards of $500 million annually on 
corporate social activities and expenses (Wells, Perish, & Guimaraes, 2001) and more 
recently, Goldman Sachs considered a $1bn donation to a charity during the height of the 
financial crisis in 2009 in a bid to quell furor over executive bonuses.
1
 These significant 
outlays of financial and other resources however often have uncertain financial and 
operational returns.  
One difficulty for firms seeking to link their stakeholder interactions to financial 
returns is the fundamental disconnect between the financially-based exchange mechanism 
of firms and the sociological exchange mechanism of stakeholders. Drawn from the 
firm’s knowledge of market-based mechanisms, the financial mechanism of exchange for 
firms is largely rational with objective quantifiable costs, benefits and inputs and outputs. 
To mitigate nonmarket uncertainty in hostile environments, firms have merely extended 
this rational exchange approach to the pursuit of social and political support from 
                                                          
1
 “Goldman Sachs ponders $1bn charity donation” in The Telegraph, by James Quinn, 13 Oct 2009. 
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stakeholders through a series of financial and operational transactions, with a focus on 
quantifiable outputs such as the number of houses built, people relocated, schools built, 
desks bought, amounts donated, and the financial cost of social infrastructure. However, 
the socially-based exchange mechanism of stakeholders is not monetary nor quantifiable 
and often not rational but rather based on subjective intangible factors such as trust, 
social capital, reputation, expectations and biases (Zandvliet, 2004). Often business in 
nonmarket environments fraught with uncertainty is contingent on transforming 
perceptions of identity from foreign extractor to local community member. Such a focus 
leads to very different recommendations on which stakeholders to approach and how to 
engage with them. It leads to less greenwashing
2
 or window dressing and to more 
substantive efforts targeting the greatest legitimate needs of the local community. Calling 
for an integrated approach to understanding economic and social forces which are largely 
considered dichotomous, Freeman (1984:41), states: 
We need to understand the complex interconnections between economic 
and social forces. Isolating “social issues” as separate from the economic 
impact which they have, and conversely isolating economic issues as if 
they had no social effect, misses the mark both managerially and 
intellectually. 
 
I seek to bridge the divide between the rational and social exchange perspectives not 
through a limited and often ineffective corporate social responsibility approach, but rather 
through a stakeholder influence strategy by which the firm’s strategic formation of ties 
with stakeholders can protect and enhance the firm’s reputation and cooperation with 
stakeholders, while minimizing or undermining conflictual stakeholder relations.  
                                                          
2
 The term “greenwashing,” coined by environmentalist Jay Westerveld in 1986, is defined as 
“disinformation disseminated by an organization so as to present an environmentally responsible public 
image” by the Oxford Dictionary.  
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A stakeholder is any individual or group which can affect or is affected by the 
actions of the firm (Freeman, 1984). The stakeholder view of the firm (Freeman, 1984; 
Post, Preston, & Sachs, 2002a) advocates for the deepening of ties between firms and 
their stakeholders. Instrumental stakeholder theory holds that stakeholder relationships 
are the ultimate sources of the firm’s wealth-creating capacity, and that in order to 
leverage this wealth-creating capacity firms need to recognize and understand the 
multiplicity and diversity of stakeholder relationships within the environment. Post et al 
(2002), state that “the corporation is a network of linkages with and among stakeholders 
and requires their support for its existence and operation” (Post, Preston, & Sachs, 
2002b:29). Here, the focus is on firms recognizing that stakeholder relationships form a 
complex web of relationships among and between stakeholders themselves, and that 
dyadic firm-stakeholder links provide a limited view of, and ability to manage, 
stakeholders. Deepening ties between the firm and its stakeholders and the creation and 
strengthening of relational, and not merely transactional, stakeholder engagement is a 
“core competence” (quotations in original) for management, “a means of enhancing the 
enterprise’s value and earning capacity and of improving its ability to respond to 
problems and challenges” (Post et al., 2002a:22). While bargaining models in 
international business and non-market strategy (Fagre & Wells, 1982; Kobrin, 1987; 
Nebus & Rufin, 2009; Teegen, Doh, & Vachani, 2004), the literature examining the 
design and implementation of corporate social responsibility activities (Carroll, 1999; 
Egri & Ralston, 2008; McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright, 2006), and the stakeholder view of 
the firm (Boutilier, 2012; Clarkson, 1995; Doh & Teegen, 2002; Donaldson & Preston, 
1995; Freeman, 1984; Post et al., 2002a; Rowley, 1997; Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003), 
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all argue for a richer understanding of a firm’s relationships with its stakeholders and 
often appeal to network theory or metaphors, the development of a positive theory 
providing insight into with whom to engage, how and the potential costs of this 
engagement, remains nascent.  
 I use the tools of network theory, as well as insights from the entrepreneurship, 
social psychology, and civic or political participation literatures, to specify strategic 
choice variables of stakeholder networks that foreign firms can alter, and thus improve 
the nature of their relations with individual stakeholders by engendering cooperative 
relations and increasing tie formation while minimizing conflict. The “purpose of a 
nonmarket strategy is to shape the firm's market environment, as when a firm lobbies in 
support of legislation to lower trade barriers” (Baron, 1995:48). By enhancing the firm’s 
reputation, increasing cooperation and minimizing conflict through strategic tie formation 
with stakeholders, the firm favorably “shapes” its market environment such as reducing 
the cost of operations, obtaining favorable regulatory policies, and mitigating adverse 
activist action. 
The appeal of social network analysis is the ability to examine the 
interrelationships (e.g., direct and indirect ties and the nature of these ties) among social 
and political actors and entities (Scott, 2000; Wasserman & Faust, 1994), understand the 
“implications of these relationships” (Wasserman et al., 1994:3), and empirically 
examine these interrelationships at both the network and actor-node levels (Borgatti & 
Foster, 2003). Speaking to the impact of network research in political contexts, Knoke 
(1993: 23) asserts that “by combining reputational, positional and decision-making 
measures, researchers delineate the networks of communication ties and resource 
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exchanges, which shape collective actions that attempt to influence the outcomes of 
political controversies.” Recent work applies network theory to international politics 
through the primary views of networks as both structures and collectives of strategic 
actors (Kahler, 2009). Addressing the important contributions of network applications to 
international politics, Kahler (2009: 32) states:  
Although network analysis will continue to justify itself through its ability 
to explain significant features of contemporary international politics, its 
theoretical contribution should not be overlooked. Networks offer a means 
to investigate the relations between agents and structure in an empirically 
convincing manner. Networks force attention to dimensions of power that 
conventional views of international politics neglect. Networked 
governance is an alternative to hierarchies and markets with its own 
roster of strengths and weaknesses. 
 
In recent work exploring the contributions of network tools and concepts to the study of 
international relations, Hafner-Burton, Kahler, & Montgomery (2009) argue that network 
concepts “challenge conventional views of power,” network actors can increase their 
power by “enhancing and exploiting their network positions,” and that the power of 
network actors is “fungible” in that power in networks can be used to “off-set or 
supplement other sources of power” (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009:573). Further, 
“cooperation and conflict are strongly influenced by network dynamics” and network 
analysis offers “a method for measuring the sources of socialization and diffusion of 
norms” among state actors (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009:569). An important factor of the 
application of network tools and concepts to the study of political environments is that 
network tools and concepts offer alternative structural reasons to explain outcomes 
among political and state actors (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009). 
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Despite the substantial advances in social network theory and analytical tools, 
scholarship using network applications in the context of international business is limited. 
Early work by Moran (1973) explored multinational firms’ strategic use of transnational 
network alliances to effectively mitigate political risk by creating a coalition of diverse 
external political, financial and economic stakeholders to influence the extent of adverse 
government interventions. Despite the efficacy and rich complexity of this transnational 
network alliance, the network-based approach to understanding firm political strategy has 
remained largely unexplored.  
Early work in the international business and multinational strategy area explored a 
largely dyadic approach to multinational “political behavior” (Boddewyn & Brewer, 
1994) with a focus on the often hostile relations between firms and host country 
governments (Caves, 1996; Dunning, 1998; Encarnation & Wells, 1985; Fayerweather, 
1969; Prahalad & Doz, 1987; Vernon, 1971). Scholars of political strategy have sought to 
understand the dyadic relations between firms and governments primarily through 
bargaining models exploring the change or transfer of relative power between these 
actors over the course of the firm’s investment (Fagre et al., 1982; Kobrin, 1987; 
Ramamurti, 2001; Vernon, 1971). Rich theory explores the complexity of broader 
relations among foreign firms, governments and civil society actors (Boddewyn, 1988, 
2003; Boddewyn et al., 1994), and more recent scholars argue that the increasing global 
reach, value creation, and impact of nongovernmental and other civil society 
organizations dramatically changes the global policy and economic environment 
requiring a move from a focus on the “two-sector” dyadic bargaining model between 
firms and governments to a “three-sector” bargaining model which includes actors from 
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civil society (Teegen et al., 2004). Work including civil society actors has augmented 
traditional understandings of bargaining models between firms and governments  (Henisz 
& Zelner, 2005). While recent work has again turned to network approaches to examine 
the bargaining models among multinational firms, governments, and nongovernmental 
organizations (Kahler, 2009; Nebus et al., 2009),  none theoretically or empirically 
leverages network concepts and tools to explore the complex relations between firms and 
stakeholders, outlines strategies firms may use to favorably influence these political, 
social and economic stakeholders, and explores the costs of such influence strategies. 
In this application of network theory to the international business context, I follow 
prior work in the area of strategic networks, termed the “relational approach” to 
understanding strategic performance (cf. Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Gulati, Nohria, & 
Zaheer, 2000; McEvily & Zaheer, 1999), that posits significant performance benefits may 
be gained from a firm’s strategic network position. Specifically, “the conduct and 
performance of firms can be more fully understood by examining the network of 
relationships in which they are embedded” (Gulati et al., 2000: 203). Recent scholarship 
in this area has further extended this work on static strategic networks to include the 
dynamic longitudinal perspectives of network emergence and evolution. As stated by 
Dagnino et al (2008 : 69): 
To the extent that the processes underlying network emergence and 
evolution may be systematically influenced by the intentional actions taken 
by pivotal firms,…, it becomes of interest for firm executives to identify a 
limited number of variables which may be leveraged and managed in 
order to direct the evolution of the network they participate in towards a 
specific strategic aim and coherently with the requirements of the 
competitive domain in which they compete. 
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I similarly apply a longitudinal perspective to identify and understand key strategic 
variables that managers of multinational firms can leverage to direct the evolution of their 
stakeholder networks and enhance firms’ ability to engender cooperative ties and 
minimize conflict with stakeholders and thus enhance reputation, with implications for 
financial and operating returns. 
I use the concepts and tools of network theory to explore the links between the 
existing network structure of relationships between a foreign firm and stakeholders in the 
nonmarket environment, or the strategic choices made by the firm to alter that 
stakeholder network structure, and the subsequent development of the stakeholder 
network. These drivers of the relations between firms and stakeholders are dynamic, 
interdependent and inter-temporal and together form components of an integrated (Baron, 
1995) influence strategy firms can use to improve stakeholder relations in both the 
market and nonmarket environments. Network theorists and empiricists have consistently 
demonstrated the importance of network ties and structure for economic outcomes. Thus 
I examine not whether network concepts matter, but rather how, when and most 
importantly why network concepts matter for firms navigating politically uncertain 
environments. The goal of this stakeholder influence strategy for firms is to strategically 
form cooperative ties while minimizing or undermining conflictual ties with stakeholders, 
which enhances the firm’s reputation and has important financial and operational 
implications. The stakeholder influence strategy I outline is a move from the normative 
primary focus of work within the stakeholder literature to the less-explored focus on 
instrumental stakeholder theory—that the “contracts (relationships)” or behavior between 
firms and stakeholders that is “trusting, trustworthy, and cooperative” will provide the 
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firm with a competitive advantage as this trusting behavior helps to “solve problems” 
related to opportunistic behavior (Jones, 1995:432). I explore the strategic relations 
between firms and stakeholders in three paper chapters (one theoretical and two 
empirical). The theory paper is the foundational article in this dissertation which outlines 
an integrated nonmarket stakeholder influence strategy for firms. I test the propositions of 
this foundational article in the two empirical papers. 
The first paper chapter, titled: “Networks of Influence: Balancing Positional 
Benefits and Costs in Stakeholder Engagement Strategies,” is a theory paper in which I 
develop a network-based theory of influence for firms to strategically form ties with 
stakeholders. This stakeholder influence strategy includes specific testable propositions 
that link firm, stakeholder or network characteristics to the degree of conflict and 
cooperation exhibited by stakeholders towards the focal firm or each other. This 
stakeholder influence strategy is positioned within the stakeholder, civic and political 
participation literatures and uses network theory and concepts to explore how the firm’s 
strategic position within the network of stakeholders affords it positional benefits of 
information and reputation, while also highlighting the costs of exposure to pre-existing 
conflict and the fostering of conflict through asymmetric relations. 
The goal of this paper is to outline a sociopolitical influence strategy for firms to 
navigate complex political environments and improve relations with stakeholders. I 
ground this influence strategy using three metaphors: (1) networks as pipes (Podolny, 
2001) (i.e., that the firm’s position within the stakeholder network affords it information 
benefits and impacts the firm’s subsequent relations with stakeholders), (2) networks as 
prisms (Podolny, 2001) (i.e., that the stakeholder with whom the firm connects and the 
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nature of the firm’s engagement with stakeholders, affords it reputational benefits and 
impacts that firm’s subsequent relations with stakeholders) and (3) networks as structures 
(Kahler, 2009) (i.e., that because of the interdependencies and endogenous network 
evolutionary dynamics among stakeholders themselves, firms seeking to gain such 
information and reputation benefits should be wary of exposing themselves to preexisting 
conflict among stakeholders or fostering conflict by forming asymmetric relations with 
and among stakeholders).  
This paper seeks to augment our understanding of how firms can strategically 
manage stakeholders and thus favorably shape their nonmarket environments. While 
scholars of nonmarket strategy and international business have employed market-based 
mechanisms to mitigate uncertainty in the nonmarket environment, scholars of 
stakeholder theory have sought to understand relations between firms and stakeholders 
from a largely normative position, and firms themselves in practice have sought to 
mitigate nonmarket uncertainty through acts of corporate social responsibility and 
philanthropy without a full understanding of how to engage with stakeholders. In this first 
paper, I use the literatures on civic and political participation, and the tools and concepts 
of network theory to identify non-market strategies that generate the greatest returns to 
firm corporate social responsibility activities and stakeholder engagement practices in 
terms of information and reputation benefits as well as garnering political and social 
support. 
The second empirical paper chapter, titled: “Networks of influence: Pipes and 
Prisms of Political Influence,” explores how firms manage the two types of uncertainty 
within the nonmarket environment—egocentric uncertainty (where the focal firm is 
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uncertain about the qualities of the stakeholders within the environment), and altercentric 
uncertainty (where stakeholders are uncertain about the qualities and products of the 
firm) (Podolny, 2001). I use tools and insights from network theory to build upon extant 
insights and understandings of how best to manage egocentric and altercentric  
uncertainty (Podolny, 2001) and I compare the efficacy of the ex ante strategies that the 
firm can use to manage both egocentric and altercentric uncertainty. I hypothesize that 
through strategic network positioning that affords it information, the firm can manage its 
egocentric uncertainty; and, by managing how it is perceived through its associations, the 
firm can also manage stakeholders’ altercentric uncertainty. Of course, the management 
of both types of uncertainty is not without cost and therefore, an important issue is to 
understand which type of uncertainty should be the primary focus of firms in highly 
uncertain nonmarket environments. My findings suggest that the key determinant of an 
increase in cooperation and tie formation within the stakeholder network is the focal 
firm's ability to mitigate altercentric uncertainty by forming ties with high status, 
cooperative stakeholders and ensuring reciprocity in these relationships through joint 
activity. 
This second paper builds upon extant work exploring factors that mitigate 
egocentric and altercentric uncertainty (Podolny, 2001) and empirically tests these factors 
within the global gold mining industry—an industry rife with political and social tension 
among firms and diverse stakeholders. Egocentric uncertainty is mitigated by access to 
information through structural holes while altercentric uncertainty is mitigated by high 
status (Podolny, 2001). I use a network lens to explore additional factors of the firm that 
afford it information benefits (structural holes and network range), and I also explore 
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factors of the stakeholders with whom the firm is associated that may afford the firm 
reputational benefits of high quality (i.e., the degree of cooperation, status and 
reciprocation in joint activity of the stakeholders to whom the firm is connected). The 
dependent variables of interest in this paper are (1) the degree of cooperation or conflict 
between the focal firm and stakeholders and (2) the number of ties formed, and thus the 
level of analysis is at the level of the dyad. The insights from this paper contribute to 
extant work on strategies to mitigate egocentric and altercentric uncertainty by exploring 
network-based information and reputation mechanisms on the mitigation of these two 
types of uncertainty.  
In the third empirical paper chapter, titled: “Networks Of Influence: Homophily 
And Triadic Closure In Stakeholder Networks,” I use insights from Simmelian (Simmel, 
1950) and Balance (Cartwright & Harary, 1956; Heider, 1958) theories to explore the 
relationship between dyadic structure and triadic closure among networks of actors in the 
sociopolitical context. For each triple of actors forming an open triad, I explore how the 
homophily (or similarity) of the structural characteristics of the three actors comprising a 
triad impact the likelihood of that triad closing. I outline hypotheses of the homophily of 
four characteristics of the actors in the triad—access to resources, status, likeability and 
number of ties (popularity)—on the likelihood of a tie forming that closes the open triad. 
These four characteristics differ on whether their derived benefits are contingent on 
dependence between actors and are therefore zero-sum outcomes (i.e., access to resources 
and status) or are not contingent on dependence and are therefore not zero-sum outcomes 
(i.e., likeability and popularity).  
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I hypothesize that triadic closure is more likely when the actors of a triad have 
greater difference in the characteristics contingent on dependence (access to resources 
and status), and greater similarity or homophily in the characteristics that are not 
contingent on dependence (likeability and popularity). Holding constant the quality of 
existing ties (i.e., strength of the ties), symmetry of relations in the existing dyads, 
reciprocity of relations in the existing dyads, and the number of common others actors in 
existing dyads are connected to (i.e., for a triple of actors i, j, k, how many actors l, m,…z, 
actors ij or jk or ki are connected to), I find that a link that closes an open directed triad is 
more likely when the actors of the triad have different access to resources, and different 
status, but that link is more likely when actors have similar numbers of ties to other 
actors. I also find that likeability among actors in the triad has no impact on the 
likelihood of closing that triad. 
By exploring how the characteristics of actors in a network affect network 
dynamics, the insights of this third paper exploring triadic mechanisms add to our 
understanding of the contingent factors and mechanisms that affect network evolutionary 
dynamics. The outcome I explore in this paper, triadic closure, is also an underexplored 
network outcome which is of strategic importance to firms seeking to understand and 
manage their relations with stakeholders and the dynamics among stakeholders 
themselves as a firm that does not understand evolutionary dynamics may find its 
attempts to influence specific stakeholders thwarted or undone by unexpected changes in 
the structure of ties. 
My empirical papers test the relationships among firms and stakeholders in a 
novel database of 51,754 stakeholder events linking 4,623 unique stakeholders of a 
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population of 19 publicly traded gold mining firms listed on the Toronto Stock 
Exchanges (TSX) which operate 26 mines in 20 largely emerging economies. The gold 
mining industry is a particularly salient context for this study because gold mining is 
widely considered one of the most socially irresponsible and environmentally rapacious 
industries (Humphreys, 2001) and therefore stakeholders (e.g., multilateral agencies, 
multiple levels of governments, NGOs, cultural or religious groups and firms or 
individuals with an economic stake in the mine or the community) are relatively more 
active in their relations with firms. Thus, the impact of firm strategic network-building 
and stakeholder engagement strategies may be greater in this industry. While this study is 
conducted in the global gold mining industry, the theories underlying the strategies are 
garnered from a wide range of literatures and have been applied in various contexts. I 
therefore argue that the findings of this dissertation are generalizable to both foreign and 
domestic firms whose operations are highly subject to stakeholder control and action, i.e., 
foreign multinational firms operating in politically hostile environments who are often 
plagued by the liabilities of foreignness, as well as domestic firms operating in 
environments and industries characterized by high nonmarket uncertainty and risk.  
While the network literature and network concepts are well-established, the 
networks I explore are conceivably and possibly structurally different from those used by 
network scholars. Extant work employing networks in the strategy literature primarily 
employ alliance data, while social network scholars often use email data, friendship data, 
and simulations to understand network dynamics. Conversely, the networks I explore in 
this dissertation are based on media-reported, dynamic, multiplex relations among diverse 
political, social and economic stakeholders within the global gold mining industry and 
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are thus structurally different from the networks explored by alliance, strategy, and social 
network scholars. The application of network tools and concepts within this dynamic 
environment is an important means to explore the contingencies and antecedents of 
network concepts in highly uncertain nonmarket environments.  
In the stakeholder networks I explore, I conceive of a “tie” as any link or 
connection between and among firms and political, social and economic stakeholders in 
the network that depicts an action, statement or expression of sentiment towards or 
relation between actors in the network. These ties are “events”—i.e., any media-reported 
action or statement by any actor that connotes cooperation or conflict between actors. 
These ties can be conflictual, cooperative or neutral in nature. In their work on negative 
relationships, Labianca and Brass (2006:607) broadly define negative relationships as 
embodying “elements of cognition and perception (judgments and enduring negative 
person schemas), affect (feelings), and behavioral intentions.” I apply this definition to all 
the relations in the event data and thus define a tie within my networks as capturing the 
positive, negative or neutral relationships (events) that embody “elements of cognition 
and perception (judgments and enduring positive, negative or neutral person schemas), 
affect (feelings), and behavioral intentions” among actors in stakeholder networks. 
Because direct actions are outward visible and audible demonstrations of these implicit 
constructs, I capture the outward expressions of agency (as expressed in inter-stakeholder 
and firm relations) in this dissertation. I therefore conceptually follow the work of 
Snijders et al. on dynamic actor-based network evolution processes where the foreign 
firm, to an extent, determines or defines the next set of ties in its stakeholder network 
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(Burk, Steglich, & Snijders, 2007; Snijders, 2001, 2005; Snijders, 2006; Snijders & 
Baerveldt, 2003; Snijders, Steglich, & van de Bunt, 2008).  
Together these three papers create a theoretical and empirical base for strategic 
analysis of firms’ interactions with stakeholder networks. They combine a firm-centered 
perspective of outreach to stakeholders with a structure-centered perspective of triads and 
balance together forming the building blocks of an understanding of how a firm can best 
improve its position in a dynamically evolving stakeholder network. The importance of 
such a strategic analysis of stakeholder networks and relations with firms is due to the 
important financial and operational implications of these strategies. By understanding 
who the stakeholders are and strategically forming ties to engender cooperation and 
reduce conflict with these stakeholders, the firm favorably shapes its nonmarket 
environment to facilitate market-based operations and benefits. 
In the international business field, Kobrin (1979: 77) has called for “better 
definitions of the [political risk] phenomena, a conceptual structure relating politics to the 
firm and a great deal of information about the impact of the political environment” to 
move the literature forward. Within the realms of political science and policymaking, 
although network methods applied to research on political power has “refocused the 
substantive issues…, raised provocative theoretical questions, and addressed important 
empirical relationships” (Knoke, 1993: 24), Knoke argues there is room for further 
“creative theoretical and methodological efforts” (Knoke, 1993: 42). I seek to jointly 
address the calls of Kobrin and Knoke by using the tools and concepts of network theory, 
as well as insights from the entrepreneurship, social psychology, and civic or political 
participation literatures, to outline an influence strategy for firms to strategically enhance 
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cooperation with stakeholders by forming cooperative ties while minimizing conflictual 
ties.  
I contribute to the political risk and international business literatures by applying 
network tools to better define the political nonmarket environment for firms in terms of 
the political, social and economic stakeholders who can adversely impact, or benefit the 
firm and put forward and test hypotheses for firms to favorably manage their nonmarket 
environments. I contribute to the network literature by exploring established network 
tools and concepts in an understudied and novel network environment defined by 
complex and dynamic relations among a diverse set of actors. I contribute to the 
stakeholder literature by offering a network-based theoretical approach to instrumental 
stakeholder theory, and test this within a novel empirical setting. Further, through the use 
of this novel stakeholder relations dataset, I move from measuring at a corporate level 
whether a company is categorized as being more or less responsible according to some 
(self-reported) standards, principles or audits to a more objective measurement approach 
using event data at the stakeholder level on how stakeholders themselves perceive the 
firm. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Networks of Influence: Balancing Positional Benefits 
and Costs in Stakeholder Engagement Strategies 
A firm’s performance, reputation, and sometimes survival, is contingent upon that 
firm's ability to strategically form ties with the individual actors and organizations that 
have a political, social or economic stake in its operations, i.e., that firm’s stakeholders, 
so as to favorably influence the preferences, opinions and actions of these stakeholders. 
The set of ties between the firm and its stakeholders forms that firm’s stakeholder 
network. Within a network, actors are interconnected and interdependent (Balkundi & 
Kilduff, 2006; Kahler, 2009). By forming ties to stakeholders and thereby bringing 
together actors of diverse expectations, needs, requirements, and demands, the formation 
of a firm’s stakeholder network may foster conflict within the network itself. Firms 
therefore face a quandary: the strategy to influence stakeholders and thereby create value, 
protect assets, and manage reputation, requires the formation of ties with stakeholders; 
however, by forming ties with stakeholders, firms can incur a cost—the creation of 
conflict among these stakeholders and with the firm, thereby risking the firm’s ability to 
favorably influence stakeholders, create value, protect assets, and manage reputation.  
I use the concepts and tools of network theory and insights from the civic and 
political participation literatures to specify components of a network-based strategy firms 
can use to influence their stakeholders, and also outline the potential costs of this 
influence strategy and the means for the firm to mitigate these costs. I apply the 
metaphors of ‘networks as pipes’, ‘networks as prisms’ and ‘networks as structures’ to 
inform such a strategy calling attention to the positional benefits of information and 
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reputation as well as the positional costs of exposure to pre-existing conflict and the 
fostering of conflict due to asymmetry in the structure of relationships.  
In contrast to the primary normative focus of extant stakeholder research, I 
explore an instrumental stakeholder approach for firms to favorably influence 
stakeholders in a bid to enhance that firm’s reputation among these stakeholders, secure 
important information to guide the firm on how best to navigate among diverse 
stakeholders and thereby protect the firm’s assets, facilitate operations, and improve 
performance. The outcomes of interest for the firm in this stakeholder influence strategy 
are the fostering of cooperation and the mitigation or minimization of conflict with 
stakeholders through strategic tie formation and the management of these ties.  
Understanding the networks of stakeholders is important to a firm’s ability to 
strategically influence these stakeholders. Influence is the relational ability to alter or 
change the beliefs, opinions or actions of an individual or group through communication 
or action often applying the use of persuasion or a demonstration of power. The adoption 
of a network approach that enables the mapping of actions, communication ties, resource 
exchanges and power dimensions among coalitions of stakeholders (Kahler, 2009; 
Knoke, 1993), in addition to well-established metrics regarding the characteristics of 
stakeholders, pairs of stakeholders or groups of stakeholders within that map, can provide 
useful analytic insight into the development of influence strategies. Despite the clear 
practical applicability of network concepts and analytical tools for the examination of 
stakeholder relations (Scott, 2000; Wasserman et al., 1994) and their implications 
(Wasserman et al., 1994:3), few examples of a network application exist within the 
nonmarket strategy and international business, corporate social responsibility and 
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stakeholder management literatures (for exceptions see Moran (1973) and Nebus & Rufin 
(2009) within the nonmarket strategy and international business literatures; Kahler 
(2009), Thomson & Boutilier (2009), Boutilier (2007), in the international 
relations/political sphere; and Rowley (1997) within the stakeholder management 
literature).  
An important area of scholarship using network relations and ties is the alliance 
literature within the strategy field. Early work explored the nature or strength of ties and 
their attendant performance implications (Granovetter, 1983; Granovetter, 1973; Powell, 
1990), the various structural factors of networks and their implications for performance 
(Burt, 1992) as well as the implications of direct and indirect ties (Ahuja, 2000a). A 
concept of importance to this discussion of a stakeholder influence strategy for firms to 
form ties is the inducements-opportunities framework underlying the process of strategic 
network-building and tie formation (Ahuja, 2000b). Within this framework, the 
probability of tie formation is contingent upon the inducements facing the firm (i.e., why 
the firm should or needs to form a tie) as well as the complementary concept of 
opportunities or resources (i.e., what the firm offers to potential partners). In this nuanced 
view, strategic network-building and tie formation is contingent upon the dual and 
complementary concepts of the multinational firm’s internal strategic needs and external 
stakeholder requirements. Importantly, within the alliance-strategy arena, cooperative 
strategies among competitors referred to as co-opetition (simultaneous cooperative and 
competitive behavior) has been identified as an important source of competitive 
advantage (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; Gnyawali, He, & Madhavan, 2006; 
Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 1997). Recent work by Gnyawali 
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& Madhavan (2001) on structural embeddedness explores the impact of co-opetition on 
structural network factors and competitive dynamics. Further, within the alliance and 
network literature, Rowley, Behrens & Krackhardt (2000:370) explore the joint relational 
and structural characteristics of network ties on firm behavior and performance arguing 
that the interaction between relational and structural factors is “an important explanatory 
variable:” and that “whether firms should form their strategic alliances through strong or 
weak ties depends on how it is structurally embedded in the network.” For firms seeking 
to manage their nonmarket environments through the strategic formation of ties, the 
relational and structural factors of stakeholders and their networks is indeed important. 
Several factors are important to this discussion of a strategy for the firm to 
influence its stakeholders through strategic tie formation and management that affords the 
firm information and reputational benefits and also explores the possible structural costs 
of such a strategy: first, identifying the boundary of the firm’s stakeholder network; 
second, determining the individuals comprising the stakeholder network; and third, 
understanding the pool from which stakeholders are drawn. 
First, in adhering to the classic definition of “stakeholder” as any actor who can 
affect or is affected by the firm (Freeman, 1984), I conceive of the firm’s stakeholder 
network as comprising those stakeholders who are directly or indirectly connected to the 
firm and the ties and interactions among and between these direct and indirect 
stakeholders. Stakeholders directly connected to the firm (i.e., that firm’s ego network), 
can directly impact the firm through their relations with the firm (Frooman, 1999). 
Stakeholders indirectly connected to the firm, can still indirectly affect the firm through 
interactions with intermediate actors who are themselves directly connected to the firm 
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(Frooman, 1999). For example, an international nongovernmental organization with ties 
to a community in which the firm operates can indirectly affect the firm by changing the 
opinions of the community against the firm. While Frooman (1999:198) defines these 
“indirect strategies” as “those in which the stakeholder works through an ally, by having 
the ally manipulate the flow of resources to the firm,” I generalize both the direct and 
indirect relations among firms and stakeholders to include all actions of influence and 
power including the manipulation of resources, manipulation of information to generate 
adverse opinions (Keck & Sikkink, 1999), persuasion (Watkins, 2001), bargaining, 
coalition formation and the informal and formal use of power and influence tactics 
(Barach & Lawler, 1980).  
Second, because the formation and maintenance of a network is costly, a firm’s 
stakeholder network comprises (or should comprise) select stakeholders who are 
important to both its operations and its reputation. Scholars have long sought to identify 
who important stakeholders are. Clarkson (1995) categorizes stakeholders as primary and 
secondary. Primary stakeholders are those stakeholders without whom the firm cannot 
operate including customers, suppliers, employees, shareholders and government, and 
secondary stakeholders are those actors who are not critical to the value chain of the firm 
but who have the ability to positively or negatively impact the firm, e.g., the media 
(Clarkson, 1995). This distinction between primary and secondary stakeholders is 
conceptually important to a firm strategically seeking to influence stakeholders within its 
environment and to the dynamic nature of the structure of this stakeholder network.  
I consider the development of the firm’s stakeholder network, and thus the 
dynamic nature of the firm’s ability to influence these stakeholders, as a two-level 
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process. First, because the firm cannot operate, and thus survive, without the primary 
stakeholders required for operations, the firm’s initial stakeholder network comprises 
direct ties to all stakeholders required for market-based operations (usually customers, 
suppliers, employees) as well as those stakeholders indirectly connected to the firm 
through ties with the actors who are directly connected to the firm. The second level of 
the firm’s stakeholder network is the strategic formation and management of both direct 
and indirect ties with those secondary stakeholders not necessary for operations but who 
can directly or indirectly affect the firm’s reputation, operations or performance, i.e., 
those stakeholders willing to engage for or against the firm on myriad factors, such as 
stakeholder rights (Donaldson et al., 1995), issues (Boutilier, 2012), interests and 
identities (Rowley et al., 2003). Actors in a network influence each other, and therefore, 
the firm’s primary stakeholders (necessary for operations) may be influenced positively 
in favor of, or negatively against, the firm by the firm’s secondary stakeholders. Thus 
secondary stakeholders may indirectly impact the operations of the firm and not just the 
reputation of the firm.  
For many firms, the entry or development strategy comprises only the first 
level—the establishment of ties to those primary or key stakeholders that are necessary 
for the firm's operations, e.g., employees, customers, suppliers. For these firms, forming 
ties or relations with secondary external stakeholders is considered only during times of 
conflict or adverse intervention by these stakeholders. Under these conditions, firms 
assume a short-term “fire-fighting” approach to mitigate the impact of these stakeholders 
rather than foster long-term cooperative relations or a long-term strategy to mitigate 
conflict with stakeholders. Few firms consider the strategic second step of whether and 
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how to include those secondary stakeholders who are not necessary to the firm's 
operations but who may have the ability to positively or adversely impact the firm. 
However, for those firms operating in highly uncertain nonmarket environments (Baron, 
1995), the second level of stakeholder network development and management is a critical 
step to shaping the market environment in which it jointly operates with its primary 
stakeholders. 
Third, a firm’s stakeholder network is drawn from a broader and more diverse set 
of stakeholders within the country or industry environment in which it operates. No firm 
is an island. Every firm enters, or is created in, an existing country or industry network of 
stakeholders comprising, governments, nongovernmental organizations, competitors, 
customers, suppliers, investors and communities. Depending on the country environment, 
the industry, the firm, and the issues surrounding the firm, ties are formed between the 
firm and specific stakeholders drawn from the external environment.  
The firm’s primary stakeholder network necessary for operations, those key 
secondary stakeholders who can affect the firm’s reputation, and the broader network of 
stakeholders, may differ by country, industry and by firm. For example, the myriad 
social, political and economic actors in a developing or emerging country environment 
may differ from similar actors in developed country environments in number, resources 
and characteristics and ability to affect the firm such as the power, urgency and 
legitimacy (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997) of these stakeholders. The stakeholders in the 
stakeholder network of a technology firm may comprise only those primary stakeholders 
necessary for operations and possibly only a single strategic secondary stakeholder such 
as the media. However, the stakeholder networks of firms in politically salient industries 
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such as the extractive industries (oil, gas, and mining) are much more diverse. Primary 
stakeholders in the extractive industries may include the head of the local community 
within which the mine is located, the relevant government body issuing the permit or 
license (e.g., Ministry of Mines and Energy), in addition to suppliers, customers, and 
investors. Secondary stakeholders of firms in the extractive industries often include other 
government entities and ministries (e.g, Ministries of Health, Education, Environment 
and Local Development), local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
politicians, legal entities and practitioners, other governments (e.g., the home country 
government and governments of countries proximate to the host country), multilateral 
organizations such as the United Nations, human rights activists, environmentalists, 
community-based organizations, and various factions and groups of people within the 
community who may disagree with their mayor, chief or leader.  
Ties between firms and stakeholders may be initiated by the firm or by the 
stakeholder, and thus may be voluntary or involuntary (Baron, 1995). The ties may be 
formed due to inducements or opportunities (Ahuja, 2000b) by either the firm or a 
stakeholder. Further, these ties may be cooperative in nature (i.e., comprise statements or 
actions that connote positive relations) or conflictual in nature (i.e., comprise statements 
or actions that connote negative relations or tensions). Within the nonmarket 
environment, a firm expands its network by the creation of cooperative ties to 
stakeholders including, making donations to NGOs, political campaigns and other 
philanthropic and socially responsible activities. A firm expands its stakeholder network 
through the creation of conflictual ties such as the initiation of a law suit against a 
particular stakeholder. A stakeholder, such as an NGO, can expand the firm’s network 
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through several means. An NGO that initiates an adverse campaign against the firm is 
considered to have formed a conflictual tie with the firm and becomes therefore, a part of 
that firm’s stakeholder network. An NGO who lodges a complaint against the firm with a 
third party stakeholder from the broader environment who is not tied to the firm, such as 
a court or the United Nations or other multilateral entity, has taken a step that could 
potentially expand that firm’s stakeholder network. If that court or the United Nations 
takes an action for or against the firm, that third-party stakeholder becomes a part of the 
firm’s stakeholder network. Indeed, a strategic means of mitigating the actions of the 
conflictual NGO would be for the firm to establish a tie directly with the third party 
(court or United Nations) in a bid to directly obtain the support of this third party actor. 
Therefore, the firm’s stakeholder network can be expanded positively through the 
creation of cooperative ties by the firm or by a stakeholder (i.e., a stakeholder praising the 
firm), and can alternatively be expanded adversely through the creation of conflictual ties 
by the firm or conflictual ties by a stakeholder (i.e., a stakeholder initiating an adverse 
campaign against the firm).  
The expansion of the firm’s stakeholder network through the formation of both 
cooperative and conflictual ties from both the firm and stakeholders brings together 
diverse actors who the firm must manage and who may have adverse impacts on those 
stakeholders who are already connected to the firm. For example, while the ministry of 
mines (which may support the mine) may be in conflict with the ministry of environment 
and environmental NGOs (which may be against the mine), the firm operating that mine 
must engage with both ministries and the NGOs in order to protect its operations. By 
associating with both supporters and opponents the firm brings together diverse 
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organizations and must therefore manage or mitigate any existing or historical conflict or 
prevent the fostering of potential new conflict between these stakeholders. 
For many firms, the formation of ties with primary stakeholders is often strategic, 
whereas the formation of ties with secondary actors is often initiated by the stakeholder 
(i.e., accusations of poor practices and harmful effects from the firm’s operations) and 
frequently conflictual in nature. Ties with secondary actors, when initiated by the firm, 
are often ad hoc such as a firm’s philanthropic work in times of crisis. For the politically 
savvy firm, the formation of ties with both primary and secondary stakeholders is part of 
its long-term strategy. Such politically savvy firms monitor the potential stakeholders 
within the broader external environment and strategically seek to form cooperative ties 
with these stakeholders. Because expansion of the firm’s stakeholder network may itself 
have detrimental effects on the network by bringing together diverse stakeholders, I 
explore how firms expand their stakeholder networks to include secondary stakeholders 
and I also explore the potential cost of this tie formation strategy on relations between the 
firm and its stakeholders, and relations among stakeholders themselves. 
I develop a network-based theory of stakeholder influence strategy including 
specific testable propositions that link firm, stakeholder or network characteristics to the 
degree of conflict and cooperation exhibited by stakeholders towards the focal firm or 
each other. I explore two themes of relevance to firms seeking to influence the 
stakeholders in their network and those potential stakeholders within the external 
environment: first, the network advantages afforded by the firm’s strategic positions and 
relationships, and second, the concurrent network costs of these strategic positions and 
relationships.  
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The firm’s ability to favorably shape its nonmarket environment by forming ties 
with stakeholders is contingent on that firm obtaining a rich understanding of who the 
actors in the environment are (Bernays, 1947; McVea & Freeman, 2005; Schoemaker, 
1991; Watkins, 2001; Watkins & Rosegrant, 1996). Thus the firm requires information 
on and an understanding of the actors directly and indirectly connected to it as well as 
those potential actors within the environment who may be important links to mitigate 
existing conflict or may be possible sources of new conflict. By forming ties to 
stakeholders, firms obtain information and reputation benefits. However, a strategy to 
influence stakeholders requires the firm to obtain information on many actors within the 
environment by forming ties with diverse stakeholders. These diverse stakeholders may 
themselves hold preexisting or historical conflict (e.g., an important factor for firms 
navigating foreign environments is an understanding of historical, ethnic and political 
tensions among stakeholders) and therefore the firm must be careful not to exacerbate 
existing conflict between feuding stakeholders. Indeed how the firm behaves towards 
specific stakeholders can foster conflict among stakeholders. For example, within the 
extractive industries, the practice of only heeding the concerns of communities within the 
immediate vicinity of the mine or asset fosters inter-community conflict by creating a 
superficial “insiders versus outsiders” (or host and non-host) distinction between “host” 
communities that receive material benefits (such as infrastructure, schools, and hospitals) 
and “non-host” communities which do not receive benefits from the firm. An example of 
community strife narrated to Frynas (2005) in his study of the engagement activities of 
oil firms in Nigeria, the closest non-host community to the firm’s operations burnt down 
the “host” community to benefit from “host community status themselves” (Frynas, 
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2005:593). Forming diverse ties to stakeholders will also bring together stakeholders, 
who may not already be in conflict, but how the firm manages these relations or the 
existing asymmetries between these actors may foster conflict. Lastly, the structure of the 
network itself may foster conflict. Because actors within a network are interdependent 
and interconnected (Kahler, 2009), conflict within the network may destabilize the 
network or change previously cooperative relations to conflictual relations. Of course, 
while ties to some primary stakeholders who are critical for the firm’s operations may 
themselves be hostile toward firms, i.e., traditional or historical relations between 
multinational firms and host country governments (Vernon, 1971), the strategic formation 
of ties to diverse secondary stakeholders may minimize the degree of conflict, i.e., strong 
ties to host country governments and other strategic political, social and economic actors 
(Moran, 1973). Thus strategic tie formation can also be used to mitigate or undermine 
existing conflict within a firm’s stakeholder network. 
Firms seeking to strategically manage their nonmarket environments through 
strategically forming ties with stakeholders face a dilemma. On the one hand, these firms 
should seek to secure advantageous network positions that provide them with valuable 
resources to manage relations with existing stakeholders and strategically form ties with 
potential external stakeholders. On the other hand, these firms should avoid perturbing 
existing relationships in a manner that exposes them to pre-existing conflict or fosters 
conflict through asymmetry in relationships. Below I outline a stakeholder influence 
strategy that highlights both the positional benefits of information and reputation and the 
costs of exposure to pre-existing conflict and the fostering of conflict through asymmetric 
relations. I then discuss the implications and contributions of this theory and conclude. 
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A NETWORK-BASED STAKEHOLDER INFLUENCE STRATEGY 
Positional Benefits: Securing Information and Enhancing Reputation 
I draw upon two widely known network metaphors: Networks as Pipes and 
Networks as Prisms (Podolny, 2001) in the development of my theoretical arguments on 
the benefits of network position. Using the metaphor of ‘networks as pipes,’ I explore 
how the structural characteristics of the firm's existing stakeholder network may afford it 
information to strategically form cooperative ties with potential stakeholders. Using the 
metaphor of ‘networks as prisms,’ I explore how the characteristics of the stakeholders 
within the firm's ego network are perceived by potential stakeholders within the broader 
external stakeholder network, and how this perception may result in the formation of new 
cooperative or conflictual ties between the firm and these potential stakeholders.  
Networks as Pipes 
Strategically forming cooperative ties and minimizing or undermining conflict 
with stakeholders is contingent on an accurate and comprehensive understanding of  
stakeholders, specifically their identity, preferences, values, beliefs, and expectations 
(Bernays, 1947). Armed with this information, the firm can meet the expectations, 
espouse the values, address the needs and navigate the concerns of stakeholders within its 
network, and also prioritize outreach efforts to potential stakeholders within the broader 
environment. Through the formation of (cooperative) ties with stakeholders, the firm may 
also diffuse information about itself throughout its existing network, and because the 
firm’s stakeholders are connected to other stakeholders with whom the firm is not 
directly tied, the firm may also diffuse information about itself throughout the broader 
external stakeholder network in order to dispel untrue and unfounded rumors, meet 
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expectations, acknowledge biases, and address specific issues of concern to stakeholders. 
Both incoming and outgoing information should be timely and relevant.  
Network ties are pipes which channel the flow of information and other resources 
(Gulati, 1999; Podolny, 2001), and specific network positions afford different 
“information benefits” akin to the benefits of social capital (Gulati, 1999; Putnam, 1993). 
Certain network positions are associated with greater information volume (a function of 
the quantity of information through the number of partners and  ties to these partners), 
information diversity (a function of the range of information from diverse sources), and 
information richness (a function of information quality based on prior experience and 
trust which affords fine-grained nuanced information) (Koka & Prescott, 2002). The 
quest to achieve a favorable network position among stakeholders however, changes the 
firm’s ego network (i.e., the structure of both cooperative and conflictual existing 
relations with those stakeholders already directly connected to the firm) in a manner that 
may introduce important costs, including the destabilization of the firm’s existing 
stakeholder network by creating competition and conflict among the firm’s existing 
stakeholders.  
Information volume. By increasing the number of stakeholders to whom it is 
connected and the number of ties to these stakeholders the firm can increase the flow or 
volume of information that it can access or distribute (Koka et al., 2002). Holding 
constant the number of ties, some network positions enable more efficient access or 
diffusion of information (Freeman, 1979). An actor with high centrality is a focal point 
within communication networks, is considered to be “in the thick of things” by other 
actors in the network and by themselves, and is strategically positioned for active 
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participation in the communication of information (Freeman, 1979: 219). The most 
central actor in communication networks is also the most powerful (Mizruchi & Potts, 
1998). Because the high visibility of central actors enables them to signal their ability to 
access resources from the network, they are desired targets for alliances (Gulati, 1999). 
The central position of an actor also affords it more ties according to preferential-
attachment theory where actors with a greater number of ties have an “accumulative 
advantage” (Barabasi & Albert, 1999) and therefore, as the number of ties increases, the 
probability of tie formation also increases (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996).  
Further, within network-building central actors are more likely to form ties with 
other central actors (Gulati et al., 1999). Structural positions that afford voluminous 
information also afford access to redundant information which can enhance reliability 
that can be critical in periods of uncertainty or crisis. Reliable and accurate information 
on the interrelationships among stakeholders is crucial to engendering cooperative 
stakeholder relations (Balkundi et al., 2006; Bernays, 1947; Krackhardt, 1990). An 
example of a central organization within a network of other stakeholders which has many 
ties and connections to many stakeholders is often the government. A firm seeking to 
gain a central position must also have a broad network of ties to many stakeholders from 
whom it can obtain information.  
P1a:  Firms in network positions conveying voluminous information increase 
cooperation with existing stakeholders in those firms’ stakeholder 
networks. 
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P1b:  Firms in network positions conveying voluminous information increase tie 
formation with potential new stakeholders from the broader external 
stakeholder network. 
Figure 1.1 depicts an organization in a network position conveying voluminous 
information. 
Information diversity. By increasing the range of ties across qualitatively different 
stakeholders the firm can  increase the diversity of information that it can access and 
diffuse (Koka et al., 2002). Diverse information is also “commensurate with a richer set 
of opportunities” (McEvily et al., 1999:1138). Stakeholders in any political environment 
vary across a broad range of parameters including their prioritization of issues (Polsby, 
1959; Wolfinger, 1960), the cognitive schema that creates a sense of identity (Rowley et 
al., 2003), and the basis (i.e., informal vs. formal) and magnitude of power. These 
differences may be driven by variation in ethnicity, demographics, religion, ideology, 
education and myriad other factors. Due to this variation, stakeholders may have 
difficulty interacting with each other, possibly due to age-old conflicts, resulting in 
information or relational gaps within the network. Filling the resulting gaps in network 
structure (i.e., structural holes) can provide the firm with unique and valuable 
combinations of information (Burt, 1992). These gains may be particularly large when a 
tie is made to previously unconnected stakeholders (Burt, 1992) including building a 
network of ties to stakeholders of diverse demographic and social characteristics, 
stakeholders who are not directly connected to the firm (i.e., isolated stakeholders) and 
stakeholders who are in highly peripheral network positions (Hart & Sharma, 2004). Ties 
with different types of stakeholders who themselves disagree is critical to the firm’s 
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ability to relate to, and manage its relations with, these stakeholders by affording the firm 
access to their different points of view. Also, powerful coalitions are more effective when 
they comprise diverse stakeholder types (c.f. Henisz, Dorobantu, & Gray, 2008; Moran, 
1973). Ties to diverse stakeholders may enable the firm to mitigate the impacts of 
adverse coalitions by providing the firm with early warning signs and a better 
understanding of the stakeholders comprising the coalition. Similarly, should the firm 
need to form its own supportive coalition of stakeholders (for example, to help lobby 
government or to build social support for its operations), ties to diverse stakeholders are 
critical.  
P2a:  Firms in network positions conveying diverse information increase 
cooperation with existing stakeholders in those firms’ stakeholder 
networks. 
P2b:  Firms in network positions conveying diverse information increase tie 
formation with potential new stakeholders from the broader external 
stakeholder network. 
Figure 1.2 depicts an organization in a network position conveying diverse information. 
Information richness. By increasing the depth or quality of a given relationship 
the firm can increase the richness of the information that it can access or distribute (Koka 
et al., 2002). As the information the firm seeks or wishes to distribute “is imbued with 
value, context and meaning,” it requires information exchange processes that are fine-
grained and facilitate joint problem-solving (Koka et al., 2002; Uzzi, 1996, 1997). Firms 
need to be able to understand nuances (such as expectations, beliefs, norms, values) in 
each unique context. Such information exchange is contingent upon strong relationships 
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repeatedly activated over long periods of time within which counterparties may develop 
trust (Uzzi, 1997) and social capital, defined by Putnam (1993:35) as “features of social 
organizations, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate action and cooperation 
for mutual benefit.” Within such relationships, firms and stakeholders develop better 
understandings of each other. Prior research has emphasized how such embeddedness 
facilitates the dissemination of shared norms (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and greater 
coordination and information exchange (Oliver, 1991) which increases cooperation 
(Coleman, 1988; Rowley, 1997). Embeddedness also increases with the formation of 
transitive relations, which affords the firm access to trusted partners of stakeholders, such 
as through referrals or private introductions (Gulati, 1995a, b; Hallen, 2008). For 
example, a focal firm with rich network ties to specific members of a community is more 
likely to gain the trust of the whole community and gain information on what the 
community in general expects from the firm. For firms seeking to influence stakeholders, 
establishing an intimate understanding and relationship with these stakeholders to the 
point of recognizing and acknowledging “names and faces” (McVea et al., 2005) is 
critical. 
P3a:  Firms in network positions conveying rich information increase 
cooperation with existing stakeholders in those firms’ stakeholder 
networks. 
P3b:  Firms in network positions conveying rich information increase tie 
formation with potential new stakeholders from the broader external 
stakeholder network. 
Figure 1.3 depicts an organization in a network position conveying rich information. 
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Networks as Prisms 
As perceptions influence action, strategies that impact stakeholders’ perceptions 
of the focal firm can impact the subsequent level of stakeholder conflict and cooperation 
(Kilduff & Krackhardt, 1994: 87). The strength of this relationship is greater in the 
presence of greater altercentric uncertainty (Podolny, 2001) in which the stakeholders 
lack other bases to form judgments about the focal firm. In addition to the use of symbols 
and rhetoric (Elsbach, 1994; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992), scholars of impression 
management advocate that firms seeking to enhance their reputation strategically 
demonstrate their connections with individuals and organizations widely considered 
positively or favorably, a strategy that enables the firm to “bask in the reflected glory” of 
these favorably perceived individuals and organizations (Cialdini, 1989; Cialdini & 
Richardson, 1980; Wann, Hamlet, Wilson, & Hodges, 1995). The concept of 
“homophily” that assumes  “similar” actors associate with and cooperate with each other 
(Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954; cf. McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001) leads external 
stakeholders who observe an unknown actor’s associations with a known actor to 
cognitively ascribe the observable or acknowledged traits of the known actor to the 
unknown actor (Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999: 317). Critical to this process is the 
expectation that the unknown actor will, as a result of this similarity, behave like the 
known actor, and as a result, external stakeholders will develop relations with the 
unknown actor that would parallel their relations with the known actor.  
Studies within the entrepreneurship literature highlight the importance of the 
network structure of an organization’s or individual’s connections to how other members 
of the network perceive the focal organization’s legitimacy (Baum & Oliver 1992). In his 
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work on structural embeddedness of firms in the New York garment industry, Uzzi 
(1997:48) found that a third party actor, the go-between, “transfers the expectations and 
opportunities of an existing embedded social structure to a newly formed one, furnishing 
a basis for trust and subsequent commitments to be offered and discharged.” In their 
study of young biotech companies, Stuart, Hoang & Hybels (1999) find that firms 
‘endorsed’ by prominent venture capital firms performed better than firms without ties to 
prominent firms. And, in his study of venture capitalist markets, Podonly (2001) finds 
that having associations with high quality actors signals high quality to potential 
exchange partners.  
I explore three characteristics of the stakeholders with whom the firm connects 
that may impact the perceptions of other stakeholders and, as a result, that firm’s 
subsequent ability to engender cooperative relations and form ties with these 
stakeholders: (1) stakeholder status—i.e., how “important” the stakeholder is relative to 
other stakeholders, (2) stakeholder centrality—i.e., the degree to which the stakeholder is 
directly connected to many other stakeholders within the stakeholder network, and (3) the 
stakeholder’s degree of cooperation—i.e., how cooperative the stakeholder is in their 
relations with other stakeholders. Arguably, many different stakeholder characteristics 
are perceived favorably by stakeholders in the broader environment. However, my choice 
of these three variables—stakeholder status, centrality and cooperation—is driven by 
how observable these characteristics may be from public discourse such as the media and 
through discussions with local actors.  
Stakeholder’s status. The status of the stakeholder with whom a firm connects is 
an indication of that stakeholder’s importance within the network of other stakeholders. 
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Status is a form of social stratification, i.e., a function of the collective statuses of the 
actors to whom an focal actor is connected (Bonacich, 1987). Put simply, actors 
connected to high status others are themselves considered to be high status. Status is a 
principal determinant of influence (Goffman, 1967; Ridgeway, 2006: 301; Ridgeway & 
Walker, 1995; Weber, 1968), deference (Turk & Lefcowitz, 1962), as well as a reflection 
of competence (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999; Thye, 2000). Status also affords ex 
ante exchange benefits (Thye, Willer, & Markovsky, 2006). Thye et al. (2006: 1472) find 
that “high status actors are more competent and influential in establishing the initial 
conditions for exchange,” i.e., high status actors obtain more favorable ex ante conditions 
for exchange as people are more willing to compromise when bargaining with actors they 
perceive to be of higher status. Additionally, in repeated transactions, high status 
individuals benefit more than low status individuals (Thye et al., 2006). Therefore, 
associating with high status stakeholders may afford the firm the ascribed benefits of 
influence, deference, competence and favorable ex ante conditions for subsequent firm-
stakeholder negotiations. For example, by forming connections with multilateral 
organizations that are perceived to be of high status, such as the United Nations and 
World Bank, the firm itself is perceived to be of high status and therefore “good” by 
external stakeholders such as local governments, communities and NGOs. The high 
status of such multilateral stakeholders connects them to other stakeholders who are also 
considered to be of high status. 
P4a:  Firms with ties to high status stakeholders increase cooperation with 
existing stakeholders. 
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P4b:  Firms with ties to high status stakeholders increase tie formation with 
potential new stakeholders from the broader external stakeholder network. 
Stakeholder’s centrality. An actor with high centrality—i.e., the extent to which a 
given individual is connected to others in a network (Sparrowe, Liden, Wayne, & 
Kraimer, 2001:316)—is a focal point within communication networks, is considered to 
be “in the thick of things” by other actors in the network, and is strategically positioned 
for active participation in the communication of information (Freeman, 1979: 219). The 
most central actor in a communication network is also the most powerful (Mizruchi et al., 
1998). Because the high visibility of central actors enables them to signal their ability to 
access resources from the network, they are therefore desired targets for alliances (Gulati, 
1999). Additionally, according to preferential-attachment theory (Barabasi et al., 1999), 
actors with a greater number of ties have an “accumulative advantage” where, as the 
number of ties increases, the probability of tie formation also increases (Powell et al., 
1996). Conversely, peripheral actors face a liability of unconnectedness (Powell et al., 
1996). Within network-building, central actors are more likely to form ties with other 
central actors (Gulati et al., 1999). Therefore by associating with stakeholders of high 
centrality, a firm is afforded greater visibility and thus increased opportunities to 
engender cooperative relations and form new ties with stakeholders.  
P5a:  Firms with ties to central stakeholders increase cooperation with existing 
stakeholders. 
P5b:  Firms with ties to central stakeholders increase tie formation with 
potential new stakeholders from the broader external stakeholder network. 
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Stakeholder cooperation. Cooperation is an important factor of network 
outcomes. Early work exploring cooperative or friendship relations among actors 
explored network outcomes based on friendship dynamics among actors (Heider, 1944; 
Newcomb, 1981) specifically, how friendship evolved in triples of  actors. More recent 
work studying cooperation within networks of actors has explored friendship relations 
among adolescent and school-children, specifically how friendship influences the 
behavior of actors in networks (Mercken, Snijders, Steglich, Vartiainen, & de Vries, 
2009; Snijders et al., 2003). The degree of cooperation between the stakeholder with 
whom the firm connects and other stakeholders in the network is an indication of that 
stakeholder’s “cooperativeness” and thus that stakeholder’s ability to establish 
cooperative ties. Stakeholders with cooperative relations have a greater potential to 
induce and extend cooperative ties (i.e., cooperative individuals generally beget more 
cooperative ties). Alternatively, stakeholders with low degrees of cooperation (i.e., those 
who engender conflictual relations) will have difficulty forming cooperative ties with 
other stakeholders (i.e., uncooperative individuals generate few cooperative ties). These 
stakeholders are also more likely to induce conflictual ties from, and extend conflictual 
ties to, other stakeholders. Therefore, by associating with cooperative stakeholders the 
firm is also expected to be cooperative, and therefore has an increased likelihood of 
engendering cooperative relations with stakeholders.  
P6a:  Firms with ties to highly cooperative stakeholders increase cooperation 
with existing stakeholders. 
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P6b:  Firms with ties to highly cooperative stakeholders increase tie formation 
with potential new stakeholders from the broader external stakeholder 
network. 
Who the firm is connected to will impact how third party actors view the firm, but 
in addition, how these third parties view the nature of the relationship between the firm 
and its existing stakeholders (i.e., those connected to the firm) is also an important 
determinant of whether and how these third parties choose to connect to the firm. Also, 
how the firm behaves towards the stakeholders with whom it is connected determines the 
continued nature of those relations. I explore how the tenor of the firm’s relations with 
existing stakeholders impacts the firm’s relations with both existing and potential new 
stakeholders from the external stakeholder network. 
 Tenor of relations.  How the firm interacts with its existing stakeholders alters 
how it is broadly perceived by other stakeholders in the environment, and how 
stakeholders connected to the firm will behave towards the firm. “Corporations ARE 
what they DO” (Post et al., 2002b:8, capitalization in original) as the actions of the firm 
are considered visible demonstrations of the firm’s policies, practices, values, ethics, and 
commitment to stakeholders. Scholarship on citizen participation, political participation, 
collective action, and stakeholder networks, support the insight that the content of the 
firm’s engagement with stakeholders is a key determinant of its ability to engender 
cooperative stakeholder relations. These literatures suggest that when the tenor of the 
relations with stakeholders builds trust and forges a common identity between the firm 
and stakeholders and empowers stakeholders, cooperation is enhanced. 
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 The citizen participation literature advocates that effective citizen participation is 
contingent on two-way information flows or “exchange of information/dialogue” (Rowe 
& Frewer, 2005:254) that builds trust between actors (Glass, 1979; Rowe & Frewer, 
2005). Critical to effective citizen participation is also the “redistribution of power” 
where stakeholders are “deliberately included” in decisionmaking (Arnstein, 1969:216). 
True citizen participation affords citizens a “voice” in, and the power to implement 
(Arnstein, 1969) planning and decisionmaking with the goal of improving these plans, 
decisions, and the services delivered (Benz, 1975; Rossi, 1969). Participation results in 
better (policy and project) outcomes (Munro-Clark, 1992; Steelman & Asher, 1997) and 
improved relations and rapport between actors (Buchy & Race, 2001).  
 The literature on political participation suggests similar insights. Through 
effective political participation citizens feel that the political system (or the political 
leadership) is “responsive” to attempted influence (Craig, 1979; Ginsberg, 1982). This 
feeling of “being heard” and “being able to effect change” creates feelings of trust 
(Balch, 1974) and legitimizes governments (or political authorities) in the eyes of the 
individual, subsequently resulting in “acquiescence” of the populace to the political 
system (Ginsberg, 1982; Olsen, 1982) and general political support for the regime 
(Iyengar, 1980). Scholarship on identity and collective action among groups argues that a 
shared identity impacts cooperation and participation (Simon, 2004). “Respectful 
treatment (i.e. a fair, trustworthy and dignified treatment)” of others is an important 
antecedent factor of cooperation. The concept of “convening stakeholder networks” 
(Svendsen & Laberge, 2005) within the stakeholder engagement literature suggests that 
by encouraging broad and inclusive participation and relationship-building in their 
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dealings with stakeholders, firms develop the benefits of social capital, a concept widely 
associated with trust (Putnam, 1993).  
P7a:  Firms that structure their stakeholder relations to provide greater 
effective voice to stakeholders will increase cooperation with existing 
stakeholders. 
P7b:  Firms that structure their stakeholder relations to provide greater 
effective voice to stakeholders will increase tie formation with potential 
new stakeholders from the broader external stakeholder network. 
Positional Costs: Exposure to Conflict and Fostering of Conflict via 
Asymmetric Relations 
 While certain network positions may allow a firm to access or distribute 
voluminous, rich and diverse information or to favorably influence how stakeholders 
perceive them and thereby increase cooperation with stakeholders, strategies to pursue 
these positions can also impose costs which undermine cooperation with stakeholders and 
may even foster or enhance conflict. Specifically, the same network positions associated 
with these resource benefits may also expose the firm to pre-existing conflict among the 
stakeholders with whom the firm is now tied, and into which the firm may become 
entangled. Further, any asymmetry in the structure of the firm’s relationships with these 
tied stakeholders could trigger resentment and/or competition among them which fosters 
novel conflict. In the next section, I outline the stakeholder-level and firm-stakeholder 
relationship-level determinants of these costs. 
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Networks as Structures 
A competing metaphor to the network as a system of interconnected pipes or 
prisms is that of “networks as structures that influence [, shape and constrain] the 
behavior of network members, and, through them, produce consequential network 
effects” (Kahler, 2009:5). An important structural concept of networks is the “triad,” i.e., 
the introduction of the third actor, due to the significant intrinsic differences between 
dyadic and triadic relations (Simmel, 1950). In one of the earliest explications of the 
unique factors that distinguish between dyads and triads Simmel (1950: 145) states, “the 
dyad represents both the first social synthesis and unification, and the first separation and 
antithesis. The appearance of the third party indicates transition, conciliation, and 
abandonment of absolute contrast.” A key insight of the triad is that actors are 
interrelated and their actions constrain each other. Summing their understanding of 
Simmel’s (1950) argument on triads, Krackhardt and Handcock (2007: 17) state,  
the foregoing line of Simmelian reasoning suggests that knowing the 
specific content, nature and strength of a relationship between pairs of 
people is insufficient to understand the dynamics that might emerge in a 
social system. Even at the dyadic level, it is critical to know whether any 
particular dyad is embedded in a group. 
 
Two important concepts of network theory on triads is that: (1) specific triadic 
configurations are more “stable” or enduring over time (Cartwright et al., 1956; Heider, 
1944; Stokman & Doreian, 1997), and (2) network-based power is a function of a 
“structural position in a field of connections to other agents as well as actor capabilities 
or attributes” (Kahler, 2009:4). The literature on stakeholder networks similarly argues 
that power and resulting influence within stakeholder networks are network-wide 
phenomena contingent on the collective interactions and dependencies of all the actors 
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within the network (Balkundi et al., 2006; Salancik, 1986). An understanding of the 
interrelationships among stakeholders, specifically the “influence networks” or 
“established patterns that characterize who defers to whom on critical issues” 
(Krackhardt & Hanson, 1993; Watkins, 2001:118) is fundamental to improving relations 
with specific groups of stakeholders.  
 Transitive Relations. Transitivity, a “central proposition in structural sociometry” 
(Davis, Holland, & Leinhardt, 1971), posits that the friend of my friend will be my friend 
(Rapoport, 1963: 541). Consider a triplet of actors, p, o and x, with signed directed 
cooperative relations such as liking, agreement, acceptance, or conflictual relations such 
as disliking, disagreement, rejection. “Interpersonal choices tend to be transitive if p 
chooses o [cooperative relations] and o chooses x [cooperative relations], then p is likely 
to choose x [cooperative relations]” (Davis et al., 1971: 309) (Cartwright et al., 1956; 
Davis, 1963; Heider, 1958; Hummon & Doreian, 2003). Figure 1.4 describes the 
transitive mechanism. 
In the context of the firm’s strategy to secure a preferential position in the 
stakeholder network that conveys useful information and signals strong reputation, the 
firm must consider the consequences of forming potentially unstable triads in which the 
new ties that they form expose them to pre-existing conflict. By contrast, they may seek 
to take advantage of pre-transitive ties in which an indirect connection between the two 
stakeholders would be expected and stable. Forming new ties has consequences for the 
relational dynamics among the firm’s tied stakeholders which may reverberate into their 
relations with the firm.  
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P8:  Cooperative [conflictual] ties by the firm to stakeholders whose pre-
existing relationships are cooperative [conflictual] are less expensive to 
form and maintain due to their inherent stability. 
 Influence Relations. Emerson’s (1962) theory of power posits that because of the 
power I have over my friend, my enemy is their enemy and my friend is their friend. The 
classical concept of power defined by Dahl (1957: 202-3) is that “A has power over В to 
the extent that he can get В to do something that В would not otherwise do.” Power is not 
an attribute of the actor, but is rather “a property of the social relation” (Emerson, 1962: 
32). Because interpersonal or social relations are primarily built upon mutual 
dependence, the intent and ability of an actor to influence another actor is contingent 
upon the ability of one actor, A, to control something of value to the second actor, B. That 
is, “power resides implicitly in the other’s dependency” (Emerson, 1962: 32, italics in 
original). Figure 1.5 describes the influence mechanism. 
 In their study of representative roles and relations, Turk and Lefcowitz (1962) 
explore the hierarchy of esteem and deference among individuals, and posit that under 
conditions of “legitimated equality” (that is, representatives holding legitimate and equal 
status and power) the relationship between representatives from different groups is 
characterized by “mutual deference and mutual indulgence” (Turk and Lefcowitz, 
1962:339). They further state that “such a relationship is not only symbolic of working 
harmony but fosters an image of joint importance and worth of the intergroup pair” (Turk 
and Lefcowitz, 1962:339). Alternatively, under conditions of legitimated inequality (i.e., 
one representative is of a higher status or importance than the other), the relationship 
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between representatives is characterized by “indulgence-deference” (Turk and Lefcowitz, 
1962:339). 
P9:  Cooperative [conflictual] ties by the firm to stakeholders whose pre-
existing relationships are conflictual [cooperative] are more likely to 
transform into conflict [cooperation] in a manner that conforms with the 
more powerful stakeholder in the triad. 
 Fairness and Symmetry in Relations. In empirical work on competitive behavior, 
Garcia, Tor, & Gonzalez (2006) find that highly ranked individuals engage in greater 
competitive behavior than intermediate individuals, but more importantly, that there is a 
general tendency for “competition among commensurate rivals on a relevant dimension 
to intensify in the proximity of a meaningful standard” (Garcia, Tor & Gonzalez, 2006: 
970). Individuals across a wide array of contexts engage in competitive behavior to 
protect their ‘superiority’ and reduce discrepancies (Festinger, 1954). I expect this same 
dynamic to occur within triads where the relationships are characterized by varying 
intensity or depth of participation. 
P10:  Triads in which relationships are symmetrical in the intensity of their 
interaction or in the depth of their participation are less expensive to form 
and maintain due to their inherent stability. 
 A similar dynamic can be triggered by differences in the characteristics of the 
firm and the stakeholder with whom it is tied. There is an inherent ‘cost’ to a high status 
or central actor by associating with the firm. In his study of investment bank syndicates, 
Podolny (1994) finds associations of high status firms with low status firms result in the 
loss of status, and that status constrains firms to associate with firms of similar status 
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(i.e., low status firms associate other firms of similarly low status, and high status firms 
associate with other firms of similarly high status). Associating with the firm may cause 
the high status stakeholder to lose its high status, thus generating resentment. 
Stakeholders may employ measures to distance themselves from the firm thereby 
potentially increasing conflict with the firm. 
P11:  Triads in which stakeholders are symmetrical in their status, centrality or 
degree of cooperation are less expensive to form and maintain due to their 
inherent stability. 
 Insular Networks. While social capital is largely thought to be positive, negative 
consequences are also prevalent (Putnam, 1993; Olson, 1982; Adler & Kwon, 2002). 
Portes (1998:15, Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; Portes & Landolt, 1996) identifies these 
negative consequences of social capital as (1) “exclusion of outsiders” (Waldinger, 
1995); (2) “excessive claims on group members” (Geetz, 1963); (3) “restrictions on 
individual freedoms” by societal demands for conformity (Boissevain, 1974; Rumbaut, 
1977); and (4) “downward leveling norms” (Bourgois, 1991; Stepick, 1992; Suarez-
Orozco, 1987). These constraints impede the development of new ties to outsiders and 
may lock the firm into a set of pre-existing relationships which, while advantageous in 
certain respects, are costly in others. 
P12:  Joining triads in which relationships are symmetrical in the intensity of 
their interaction or the depth of their participation increases the cost of 
forming subsequent relationships to stakeholders not closely connected to 
the triad. 
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Relative power. An important factor of triads of actors is that the 
interdependencies among them are exacerbated by relative power differentials. According 
to Simmelian theory, the third actor in a triad can take the position of the tertius 
gaudens—“the third who enjoys” (Simmel, 1950:154). The tertius acts as the partial 
partisan who seeks his own gain by taking advantage of the conflict of two others and 
can, by supporting or granting favor to one of the two parties, change the power and 
influence dynamic between them. An important insight on the role of the tertius is that 
the power of the tertius who seeks to influence the relationship between the actors in the 
dyad is “determined exclusively by the strength which each [of the two parties in the 
dyad] has relative to the other” (Simmel, 1950:157). Thus the difference in relative power 
of the two parties in the dyad is fundamental to determining how the third can benefit. 
Therefore the significance of the third who takes the position of the tertius is contingent 
on the power structure of the actors in the initial dyad.  
For the firm seeking to form a tie with a particular actor within the environment, it 
is important to understand how the power structure of the dyad (i.e., the power structures 
between the firm’s targeted stakeholder and the other stakeholders with whom that 
stakeholder is connected) impacts that firm’s ability to form cooperative or conflictual 
ties with this new actor. For two stakeholders in conflict, the firm’s ability to mitigate 
conflict between them may be contingent on the relative power difference between these 
two feuding stakeholders and critically, whether the firm has enough relative power to 
help a significantly weaker actor overcome the resistance of a relatively much stronger 
actor, or whether the firm has enough power to support a slightly stronger actor subdue a 
slightly weaker actor.  
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P13:  Joining triads in which relative power relationships are symmetrical 
(asymmetrical) in their relative power increases (decreases) the cost of 
forming subsequent relationships to stakeholders not closely connected to 
the triad. 
DISCUSSION 
Applying concepts and tools of network theory and insights from the 
entrepreneurship, social psychology, and civic or political participation literatures, I 
develop thirteen propositions to guide strategic tie formation within a stakeholder 
network. Such strategies are of particular importance for firms in politically or socially 
salient foreign environments. Scholars of international business, CSR and stakeholder 
management have all highlighted the importance of improving relations with stakeholders 
through bargaining, philanthropy and engagement; however, these strategies have, as of 
yet, provided limited guidance on the questions of with whom a firm should connect, 
how, and when. I apply the metaphors of ‘networks as pipes’, ‘networks as prisms’ and 
‘networks as structures’ to inform such a strategy calling attention to the positional 
benefits of information and reputation as well as the positional costs of exposure to pre-
existing conflict and the fostering of conflict due to asymmetry in the structure of 
relationships. Further theoretical and empirical work is necessary to augment and test 
these arguments.  
One important area for development is the inherent tradeoffs across some of the 
first-order relationships identified here. What is the manageable range of voluminous, 
diverse and rich information, as well as the manageable range of status, centrality and 
cooperation? For example, although forming ties with a wide range of stakeholders to 
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obtain diverse information is important to the firm’s ability to understand and influence 
stakeholders, this diversity may itself breed competition and conflict as more diverse 
stakeholders are more likely to be in pre-existing conflict or to exhibit asymmetries in 
relationships or underlying characteristics that lead to competition and conflict. A 
possible means to resolve this tension may be in the firm establishing a ‘manageable 
range’ of diversity among stakeholders which might give the firm a more limited view of 
the network of stakeholders, but which gives the firm a broader understanding of the 
environment at a manageable cost. Similarly, although forming ties to a high status 
stakeholder increases the status of the firm, the cost of forming this tie (i.e., assuming a 
position of deference and possibly loss of autonomy) may outweigh the benefits. Because 
status is a form of power, the best strategy for the firm is not to aim to form ties with the 
highest status stakeholder, but rather, to aim to form ties with stakeholders whose level of 
status the firm can ‘manage’ whose level of status is at par with, or slightly above that of 
the firm, thus reducing the asymmetric power between the firm and that stakeholder.  
Another set of tradeoffs or potential complementarities lie across the metaphors of 
pipes and prisms. Networks are pipes of information that help the firm strategically form 
ties with high quality stakeholders. Ties with these high quality stakeholders, as viewed 
by third party actors, will increase the formation of ties with other stakeholders and will 
increase cooperation with these new stakeholders. Thus networks as pipes and networks 
as prisms can be complementary and mutually reinforcing. Further work should explore 
under what conditions the firm should focus on building networks that afford it 
voluminous, diverse and rich information, and under what conditions the firm should 
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focus on forming strategic ties with high quality actors to positively influence its 
reputation with other stakeholders.  
In the theoretical analysis presented here, I have emphasized the dependent 
variables of firm-stakeholder cooperation and when ties will be formed but future work 
could expand the scope of inquiry to examine more traditional network constructs 
including status. Another related approach would be to consider measures of financial or 
operational performance as the dependent variable and consider whether the strategies 
outlined here can be shown to increase financial value or reduce delays and disruptions to 
operations. 
Another area for further development is the environmental contingencies 
including the context-specific question of the ‘acceptable’ degree of conflict and 
cooperation between firms and stakeholders. Maintaining cooperative relations is costly 
and therefore an understanding of how much cooperation is ‘enough’ is important. 
Conflictual relations are also costly, but conflict can also have positive externalities (e.g., 
conflict is an inherent part of negotiations) and therefore it is important to understand 
when, and how much is conflict is manageable for firms in politically risky 
environments. Country-level variation in formal and informal political institutions as well 
as cultural norms could play a large role in these tradeoffs. The prior actions of 
stakeholders towards the firm and other firms could also play a role. Strategies for a firm 
moving into a heavily conflictual or even crisis environment may differ substantively 
from one who is seeking to build up its political and social capital in the absence of such 
pre-existing conflict. 
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The theory presented here emphasizes the impact of network position and firm- 
and stakeholder-level characteristics on the subsequent evolution of firm-stakeholder 
conflict and cooperation. Feedbacks leading from the latter to the former also merit 
exploration. More cooperative relationships or more stable triads could, for example, lead 
to a network structure that is more effective at conveying information. Positive feedbacks 
could enhance the efficacy of certain strategies outlined here through a multiplier effect 
whereas negative feedbacks, beyond those outlined with respect to pre-existing conflict 
and relational asymmetry, could undermine strategy implementation. 
The relations between firms and stakeholders, and even between stakeholders 
themselves, vary on multiple dimensions and are not limited to merely conflict and 
cooperation but also include acquiescence, deference, etc. Future work building upon the 
concepts in this model should explore additional dimensions, particularly in terms of how 
the firm manages different types of relations with different actors at different times.  
Further, the formation and dissolution of ties with stakeholders is an important factor of 
firm strategy with many parallels to the quest for greater cooperation but, potentially, 
important differences as well. 
Given the complex theoretical and empirical relationships already uncovered and 
their interdependence, formalization of the underlying behavioral model of conflict and 
cooperation could be useful. Current work on endogenous network dynamics allows for a 
relatively limited scope of agency by actors in the network (Brandes, Lerner, & Snijders, 
2009; Snijders, 2001; Snijders, 2006; Snijders, Steglich, & Schweinberger, 2007). 
Expanding that scope to include strategic tie formation with the aim of altering collective 
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decisionmaking through coalition politics would be an exciting development that could 
link agent-based models in political economy and social networks. 
 A growing body of relational data linking political, social and economic 
stakeholders through economic, social, political and event-based data allows for the 
development of stakeholder network datasets to test the framework that I have outlined. 
Many large multinational corporations either develop themselves, or work with 
stakeholder consultancies to develop, stakeholder influence maps which contain 
information on stakeholder power, relations and polarity necessary to construct such a 
model. Other strategies would rely on secondary data such as the coding of relations 
across individuals and organizations using linkages between their websites, linkages 
found in event data in the formal media (King & Lowe, 2003a) or even blogs and other 
internet-based sources of information. One could supplement this analysis of unstructured 
text with financial or other transactional data as well as communication and other logs of 
activity. A growing body of research develops and analyzes sociometric data from 
sources other than surveys and tombstones. The potential for further expansion of this 
work to transform our understanding of strategies by firms to win the hearts and minds of 
external stakeholders is dramatic.  
A network-based stakeholder influence strategy begins with the assumption that a 
firm’s ability to create value is contingent upon the cooperation of external stakeholders. 
It models the dynamic interaction among the network that links these stakeholders and 
the focal firm providing guidance to that firm as to whom they should form connections 
with and how. That decision involves important first-order tradeoffs between the benefits 
and costs of a given position in the network which I describe here. Future work should 
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build upon this initial framework to incorporate additional contingencies and feedbacks, 
pursue more formal theoretical analysis of network dynamics and tradeoffs and subject 
the propositions to empirical testing. Such efforts would contribute strategic insight to the 
literatures of international business, corporate social responsibility and stakeholder 
theories as well as other empirical domains for network theorists. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Networks of Influence: Pipes and Prisms of Political 
Influence  
Strategic management scholars have long sought to understand how firms 
navigate environments characterized by uncertainty. In seminal work using a network 
lens, Podolny (2001) outlines two types of market uncertainty: egocentric uncertainty, 
where the focal actor is uncertain about the characteristics, qualities, and products of its 
potential exchange partners, i.e., the alters, within the marketplace; and altercentric 
uncertainty, where the potential exchange partners in the marketplace are uncertain about 
the characteristics, qualities, and products of the focal actor. He further argues and 
empirically finds that distinct network positions and characteristics mitigate egocentric 
and altercentric uncertainty, respectively (Podolny, 2001). Egocentric uncertainty of the 
focal actor is mitigated by that focal actor possessing a network rich in structural holes, 
i.e., it is the sole connection between two otherwise disconnected actors (Burt, 1992).  
The focal actor, by virtue of its rich network of structural holes, gains unique information 
that enables it to manage its egocentric uncertainty. Altercentric uncertainty on the other 
hand, is mitigated by high status. Producers or partners in the market rely upon the status 
metric to distinguish one actor from many similar others.   
I explore how firms overcome egocentric and altercentric uncertainty when 
diversifying into new geographical markets that span national boundaries. In the 
international context, the ability to operate profitability and thus survive is contingent 
upon the firm eliciting cooperation and minimizing conflict with ‘alters’ or external 
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stakeholders (i.e., those political social and economic actors who have a stake in the 
firm's operations) (Donaldson et al., 1995; Henisz, Dorobantu, & Nartey, 2011; Post et 
al., 2002b). The distinctions between egocentric and altercentric uncertainty may provide 
key insights to understand how firms can more effectively manage their stakeholder 
relationships in uncertain nonmarket environments (Baron, 1995). While greater relative 
amounts of egocentric uncertainty or altercentric uncertainty can characterize particular 
markets (Podolny, 2001), I explore nonmarket environments characterized by both 
egocentric and altercentric uncertainty. That is, environments where the investing firm is 
uncertain about the characteristics of its external stakeholders and these stakeholders 
themselves also face uncertainty about the characteristics and quality of the investing 
firm. High degrees of egocentric and altercentric uncertainty may occur in the 
international context when a foreign firm seeks to enter a new market or nonmarket 
environment. However this scenario may arise also for firms seeking to change 
perspectives stakeholders have developed about them based on the characteristics of 
these firms. For example, foreign firms face liabilities due to their foreignness (Hymer, 
1960/1976) and firms in specific industries, particularly the extractive industries, face 
liabilities due to their association with an industry which has a long history of adverse 
relations with stakeholders.  
I use tools and concepts from network theory to build upon the insights of 
Podolny (2001) and compare the efficacy of the ex ante strategies that firms can use to 
manage both egocentric and altercentric uncertainty. I hypothesize that through strategic 
network positioning that affords it information, the firm can manage its egocentric 
uncertainty; and, by managing how it is perceived through its associations, the firm can 
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also manage stakeholders’ altercentric uncertainty. Of course, the management of both 
types of uncertainty is not without cost. Therefore an important question to understand is 
which type of uncertainty should be the primary focus given limited resources.  
My analysis contributes to our understanding of the strategic relationship between 
firms and their external stakeholders within politically uncertain contexts. In contrast to 
the present focus on how the firm’s strategic positioning within networks impacts 
relevant outcomes to the firm, I explore how the network positions and characteristics of 
the firm as well as the network positions and characteristics of its external stakeholders 
directly impact relational dynamics between the firm and these stakeholders. I 
specifically focus on the evolution of conflict and cooperation between stakeholders with 
whom the focal firm has existing ties, as well as the propensity of that firm to form new 
stakeholder ties. Because network creation is not without cost, I also seek to understand 
which set of network characteristics provide the greatest returns to the firm in-terms of 
generating external stakeholder cooperation, mitigating stakeholder conflict, and forming 
new ties in politically uncertain environments.  
I explore these questions in the context of entrepreneurial firms in the global gold 
mining industry, an industry widely associated with conflictual events between firms and 
their external stakeholders. While much of this conflict is based on the historical 
perceptions of rapacious and destructive mining practices by mining companies that have 
led to an entrenched distrust of newly entering unknown mining companies by their 
external stakeholders, even those firms who seek to engage these stakeholders so as to 
avoid conflict and enhance cooperation face the problems of not knowing which 
stakeholders to seek out in order to best achieve this goal (i.e., firm egocentric 
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uncertainty). Conversely, stakeholders face the problem of not knowing with which 
mining companies they can genuinely cooperate to achieve shared goals as opposed to 
which companies are engaging in greenwash
3
 or otherwise seeking to manipulate their 
environment (i.e., stakeholder altercentric uncertainty) in order to maximize their short-
term profit without regard to the long-term implications of their actions. The global 
mining industry faces tough profit margins (Azapagic, 2004). With high capital costs, 
substantial costs of environmental protection, and considerable operational and business 
costs such as taxes and employee benefits, any additional costs significantly impact 
revenues. An important source of additional costs arises from the adverse activities of 
stakeholders and community activists (Gifford & Kestler, 2008; Humphreys, 2000). The, 
often substantial, costs of activism not only include direct operational disruptions and 
litigation but also include indirect costs. For example, wary of losses to their investments, 
investors who perceive high adverse community activism targeting a mining firm may 
reduce or discontinue financing (Humphreys, 2001). Relatedly, credit raters may also 
downgrade a firm’s rating in the presence of activism. Thus for firms in the global mining 
industry, the management of egocentric uncertainty by securing information benefits 
through its strategic position within the network, and the management of altercentric 
uncertainty by securing reputational benefits, is particularly important. 
My empirical analysis uses a novel dataset of over 51,754 stakeholder events 
among 4,623 external stakeholders of the population of 19 mining firms with three or 
fewer mines in emerging markets primarily involved in the extraction of gold that are 
                                                          
3
 The term “greenwashing,” coined by environmentalist Jay Westerveld in 1986, is defined as 
“disinformation disseminated by an organization so as to present an environmentally responsible public 
image” by the Oxford Dictionary. 
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listed on the Toronto Stock Exchanges (a total of 26 gold mines in 20 economies). Each 
stakeholder event is a media-reported incident in which a person or organization acts or 
speaks in a manner that conveys cooperation or conflict with another person or 
organization. This novel dataset is constructed from the hand-coding of 22,229 news 
articles gathered from FACTIVA. The media-reported stakeholder events are scaled 
using an adapted conflict-cooperation scale widely used in the literature on international 
conflict (Goldstein, 1992; McClelland, 1971) and range from highly conflictual to highly 
cooperative relations across 20 categories. My novel dataset of relations between 
stakeholders and firms, and among stakeholders themselves, is sensitive to the direction 
(i.e., who does what to whom), the polarity (i.e., whether cooperative or conflictual) and 
the strength (i.e., degree of cooperation or conflict) of the relation. I use this novel dataset 
to plot existing network relationships for each mine across time. Using network tools and 
concepts, I explore how the structural positions of a focal firm afford it information to 
mitigate egocentric uncertainty, while the characteristics of the stakeholders with whom 
the focal firm is connected and the nature of these ties afford the focal firm reputation 
benefits to mitigate altercentric uncertainty. 
I find that firms can mitigate their own egocentric uncertainty through increasing 
their access to information by bridging structural holes in stakeholder networks and 
forming ties to actors at both the core and periphery of the stakeholder network. I also 
find that firms can mitigate stakeholder altercentric uncertainty through forming ties with 
stakeholders who are high in status and highly cooperative with other stakeholders and by 
engaging in joint activities with these actors. Both of these tie formation strategies 
independently increase cooperation and decrease conflict with existing stakeholders and 
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increase the formation of new ties with new stakeholders. Interestingly, when I include 
measures to mitigate both firm egocentric uncertainty and stakeholder altercentric 
uncertainty in a single empirical specification, only the latter are statistically significant 
determinants of the evolution of conflict and cooperation within existing ties and the 
probability of forming a new tie. Thus, in contrast to present practice and scholarship 
which focus on the firm’s ability to manage its own egocentric uncertainty through 
strategic network positions that bridge structural holes and connect to stakeholders at 
both the core and periphery of the network, my findings suggest that the key determinant 
of an increase in cooperation and tie formation within the stakeholder network is the focal 
firm's ability to mitigate altercentric uncertainty by forming ties with high status, 
cooperative stakeholders and engaging in joint participatory activities with these actors. 
THEORY 
In Podonly’s (2001) seminal article developing the metaphors of networks as 
pipes and prisms, he posits a relationship between the network structure of firms and the 
type of uncertainty that dominates the market, i.e., whether altercentric or egocentric. The 
argument he puts forward is that firms whose networks are rich in structural holes should 
sort themselves into markets characterized by high egocentric uncertainty as their 
network position affords them the critical information they need to overcome uncertainty 
about these markets. Conversely, firms or actors who enjoy high status should sort 
themselves into markets that have high altercentric uncertainty as their network position 
signals high quality and thus mitigates the altercentric uncertainty of other actors in that 
market or market segment. Thus, an important argument in this work is that when firms 
understand and leverage the relative strengths of their network positions (i.e., the ability 
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to bridge structural holes or signal high status), these firms can better choose the 
environment in which they are more likely to succeed by overcoming the disadvantages 
of egocentric uncertainty or altercentric uncertainty. Holding the environment constant 
and allowing the investing firm agency over their network position generates the strategic 
prediction that firms facing an environment high in egocentric uncertainty should seek to 
bridge existing structural holes, whereas a firm facing an environment high in altercentric 
uncertainty should seek to enhance its status. 
I expand upon this premise and apply it to the case of firms diversifying into a 
new geographic market spanning a national boundary (i.e., a foreign market). This 
context is characterized by both egocentric uncertainty (i.e., the firm does not possess 
critical information on external stakeholders or alters in the network) (Podolny, 1994, 
2001) and altercentric uncertainty (i.e., external stakeholders or alters in the network are 
uncertain about the quality of the focal firm) (Podolny, 1994, 2001). For example, foreign 
firms have traditionally sought politically expedient relations with government actors as a 
means to mitigate egocentric uncertainty and secure political advantages. More recently, 
politically savvy firms have sought to mitigate altercentric uncertainty by holding town 
hall meetings to disseminate information about their operations and intentions to 
stakeholders. I explore network positioning strategies firms can employ to mitigate both 
egocentric and altercentric uncertainty within the nonmarket environment.  
Overcoming firm egocentric uncertainty 
Podolny (2001) argues that the key to overcoming egocentric uncertainty is 
through ego’s access to information. Network ties are pipes which channel the flow of 
information and other resources (Gulati, 1999) among actors in the network. Importantly, 
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the flow of information through these network ties includes information about the actors 
who themselves comprise the network. I explore two aspects of a firm’s network position 
that are known to influence access to information: the extent to which the firm bridges 
structural holes and the breadth of that firm’s connections to actors across the core and 
periphery of the network.   
Structural Holes. Conceiving of the network as a set of pipes through which 
information flows, certain structural positions afford the firm access to relatively more 
valuable or scarce information that is not accessible via the pipes that connect to other 
positions. Podolny (2001) argues that a key means to overcome egocentric uncertainty is 
to secure such positions that bridge structural holes in the network (Burt, 1992).  
Structural holes are defined as the network positions that bridge non-redundant actors 
within the network which enable occupiers of these network gaps to gain brokerage 
advantages of information and control (Burt, 1992). Occupying networks rich in 
structural holes has performance impacts on innovation (Ahuja, 2000a; Hargadon & 
Sutton, 1997), early promotion (Burt, 1992) and career mobility (Podolny & Baron, 
1997).  
Speaking to the relationship between uncertainty and structural holes Podolny 
(2005:231) writes: 
Though Burt does not use the concept of egocentric uncertainty in 
discussing the information benefits of structural holes, it seems clear that 
this conception of uncertainty is strongly aligned to his understanding of 
information benefits. The structural holes in a focal actor’s network are 
not a basis for others to make inferences about the actor; rather they 
determine the extent to which the focal actor overcomes uncertainty about 
how to best act to realize his or her interest. 
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A network rich in structural holes affords the focal firm the necessary information to 
overcome egocentric uncertainty from the environment. By forming exclusive ties to 
disconnected others within the wider network, firms who occupy structural holes or 
network positions of brokerage obtain unique information on the stakeholders themselves 
which the firm can use to discern quality or different types of characteristics or infer 
relations among stakeholders and thus obtain guidance on which stakeholders to 
strategically form what type of ties with. Because the key structural benefit of structural 
holes is brokerage opportunities and access to diverse information, this strategy is most 
efficient in heterogeneous environments as structural holes provide little performance 
benefit in redundant or closed networks in which actors have ties to each other and 
homogeneity is high (Burt, 2001).  
H1a.  Firms whose network positions bridge a greater number of structural 
holes will experience increased cooperation and decreased conflict with 
existing stakeholders. 
H1b.  Firms whose network positions bridge a greater number of structural 
holes will be more likely to form a new tie with an external stakeholder. 
Firm Range (Core-Periphery). Another strategy to overcome egocentric 
uncertainty in a foreign environment is to form ties with a diverse set of external 
stakeholders which collectively possess the information needed by the investing firm. 
Therefore the range of the firm’s network is contingent upon ties to qualitatively different 
partners (Koka et al., 2002) at different parts of the network. Improving stakeholder 
relations is stymied by the complexity and diversity of stakeholders in the network in 
terms of types, issues (Polsby, 1959; Wolfinger, 1960), identities (Rowley et al., 2003), 
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power (informal vs. formal), ethnicity, beliefs, religion, political affiliations, education, 
and myriad other factors. Further, different stakeholders have different abilities to impact 
the firm (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Mitchell et al., 1997). Because various stakeholder 
groups may not interact with each other, the firm’s strategic network-building efforts 
should ensure ties to different stakeholders to maximize relevant and diverse information.  
Networks are structural depictions of relations among stakeholders and therefore 
different types of stakeholders, who may not interact with each other, will plausibly 
occupy different parts of the network. One dimension of stakeholder diversity is the 
extent to which these stakeholders span the core of the stakeholder network as well as its 
periphery. The information benefits of having ties to stakeholders at the core and at the 
periphery are different. Stakeholders positioned at the core of the network are expected to 
hold important but redundant (widely known) information, whereas stakeholders 
positioned at the periphery of the network are often the sources of radical or new 
information (Hart et al., 2004). For better performance, ties ranging across both the core 
and periphery are important. In their study of core-periphery dynamics in the Hollywood 
motion picture industry, Cattani and Ferriani (2008) found that individuals with ties to 
others at the core and periphery of the network achieved greater creative results.  
Important insights on core-periphery issues that may impact firm relations with 
stakeholders can be gained from the geography and economic development literature 
where the concept of core-periphery speaks to inequality in economic development due to 
specific spatial localities being favored with development whereas other localities are 
neglected. Often the distinction is between the “dominating core and dominated 
periphery” (Friedmann, 1966, 1972) where core areas of economic development are the 
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source of political and social power and technological advancement and innovation. The 
stakeholders at the core areas of economic development are very different from 
stakeholders occupying peripheral areas of economic development (Ilbery, 1984) as 
depicted in the business concept of the bottom of the pyramid (Prahalad, 2004) and the 
associated strategies to reach actors in these peripheral areas of the country and 
associated stakeholder networks (London & Hart, 2004; Schwartz & Carroll, 2003). The 
impact of the core-periphery distinction is particularly important for mining and 
extractive firms who often have to bridge associations between actors in the economic 
core, such as the government, and disadvantaged actors in the economic periphery where 
their mining operations are often located (Jackson, Emerson, & Welsch, 1980; Mountjoy, 
1984).  
For a firm facing egocentric uncertainty, access to stakeholders at the core and 
periphery of the network and the information these different types of stakeholders hold is 
important to fostering cooperation, mitigating conflict and forming new ties.  
H2a.  Firms with greater diversity in ties spanning external stakeholders at both 
the core and periphery of the network will experience increased 
cooperation and decreased conflict with existing external stakeholders. 
H2b.  Firms with greater diversity in ties spanning external stakeholders at both 
the core and periphery of the network will be more likely to form a new tie 
with an external stakeholder. 
Overcoming stakeholder altercentric uncertainty 
Podolny (2001) argues that a focal actor can overcome altercentric uncertainty by 
exhibiting high quality. Thus an investing firm seeking to overcome its stakeholders’ 
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altercentric uncertainty should similarly seek to exhibit high quality within that 
environment. The key dilemma for the firm here is that even if it does consider itself to 
be of high quality (for example, it may be a market leader within its industry), the 
stakeholders within the host country environment may not know or understand this 
foreign measure of high quality or may not perceive this measure of high quality to be 
favorable. For example, an entrepreneurial mining firm with an executive team that has 
had past success in difficult foreign markets may be considered to be of high quality by 
investors and peers in the mining industry of their home country, but may not be afforded 
similar high status and could even be perceived negatively (and thus of relatively low 
quality) by external stakeholders within the new environment who would prefer a local 
management team even if that team is relatively inexperienced internationally. Because 
high quality is a relatively subjective metric, it is important for the firm to identify 
measures of quality that are important to the stakeholders within that particular 
environment and to find a means to associate itself with stakeholders who exemplify 
these subjective measures of high quality. The strategy to demonstrate quality through 
symbolism and rhetoric (Elsbach, 1994; Elsbach et al., 1992) as well as through strategic 
associations (Kim, 2009; Kim & Laumann, 2003) is well documented within the 
reputation literature as well as in practice by firms who seek to change how they are 
perceived by stakeholders, often after a negative event, by associating with other 
stakeholders who are widely favored. An anecdote demonstrating the performance 
benefits of strategic association is given by Cialdini (1989): 
At the height of his wealth and success, the financier Baron de Rothschild 
was petitioned for a loan by an acquaintance. Reputedly, the great man 
replied, “I won't give you a loan myself; but I will walk arm-in-arm with 
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you across the floor of the Stock Exchange, and you soon shall have 
willing lenders to spare” (Cialdini, 1989:45 in Kilduff & Krackhardt, 
1994:87). 
  
Pursuing Podolny’s (2001) metaphor of networks as prisms through which third- 
party actors ascribe some quality to the firm by virtue of its associations, the firm can 
reduce the altercentric uncertainty of stakeholders within the broader environment ex ante 
by strategically managing its associations (i.e., those actors with whom it is associated or 
connected). By associating with stakeholders who are themselves considered to be of 
high quality, the firm is itself associated with, or ascribed, high quality thus mitigating 
altercentric uncertainty. I explore three characteristics of the stakeholders connected to 
the firm that exhibit high quality: (1) the stakeholder’s status relative to other actors in 
the environment, (2) the stakeholder's degree of cooperation with other stakeholders in 
the environment, and (3) the joint actions of firms with stakeholders that together 
influence how external stakeholders in the environment perceive the quality of the 
investing firm. 
Stakeholder’s own status. The status of an external stakeholder with whom the 
firm connects is an indication of that stakeholder’s quality. By being associated with a 
stakeholder of high status the firm can itself enjoy a similarly privileged perception. 
Status is a principal determinant of influence (Goffman, 1967; Ridgeway, 2006: 301; 
Ridgeway et al., 1995; Weber, 1968), deference (Turk et al., 1962) and is a reflection of 
competence (Fiske et al., 1999; Thye, 2000). In the network literature, status can be 
objectively determined. Status is considered a function of the statuses of those to whom 
an actor is connected (Bonacich, 1987), i.e., actors connected to high status others are 
themselves considered to be high status. Status is also reinforcing as the high status of 
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actors subsequently leads to more connections with other actors of high status. In network 
building and evolution, status increases tie formation (Hallen, 2008; Podolny, 2001) and 
facilitates the formation of bridging ties and “pendant ties” to network isolates 
(Amburgey, Al-Laham, Tzabbar, & Aharonson, 2008). Further, in exchange events, 
status affords ex ante exchange benefits and greater benefit in repeated transactions (Thye 
et al., 2006). Therefore, associating with high status stakeholders may afford the firm the 
ascribed benefits of influence, deference, perceived competence, and favorable ex ante 
conditions for subsequent firm-stakeholder negotiations, and may also set the tone for 
long-term cooperative events and the formation of ties with new stakeholders. 
H3a.  Firms with more ties to higher status stakeholders will experience 
increased cooperation and decreased conflict with existing external 
stakeholders.  
H3b.  Firms with more ties to higher status stakeholders will be more likely to 
form a new tie with an external stakeholder. 
Stakeholder’s own degree of cooperation. An uncertain environment is often 
characterized by mistrust and conflict. In such an environment, the ability to elicit 
cooperation and reduce potential conflict with other alters (stakeholders) can be a key 
driver of performance. Thus, ties to stakeholders who are themselves cooperative with 
their peers is an important measure of quality that can be ascribed to the foreign firm 
through its associations and observed by peer stakeholders. The cooperation construct has 
been explored within the literature on networks particularly with regard to friendship 
dynamics and behavioral outcomes of friendship (Heider, 1944; Newcomb, 1981; 
Snijders et al., 2003). The degree of cooperation between an external stakeholder with 
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whom the firm forms a tie and its peers is an indication of that stakeholder’s ability to 
foster cooperation or to cooperate and to avoid or mitigate conflict. Forming ties to more 
cooperative stakeholders will enhance the investing firm’s likelihood of inducing and 
extending its own cooperation with these peer stakeholders. Alternatively, forming ties to 
external stakeholders engaged in more conflict will enhance the risk of inducing and 
extending its own conflict with these peer stakeholders.  
H4a.  Firms with more ties to more cooperative stakeholders will experience 
increased cooperation and decreased conflict with existing external 
stakeholders. 
H4b.  Firms with more ties to more cooperative stakeholders will be more likely 
to form a new tie with an external stakeholder. 
 Joint Activity. The actions of the firm are considered visible demonstrations of the 
firm’s policies, practices, values, ethics, and commitment to stakeholders and therefore 
the firm’s actions within the network alters how it is broadly perceived. Scholars of 
corporate social responsibility, stakeholder engagement and business ethics have argued 
that specific characteristics of a firm's interactions with its stakeholders will alter the 
perception of the investing firm by the stakeholders with whom it is tied as well as by 
peer stakeholders with whom it does not yet possess a tie (Post et al., 2002b; Zandvliet, 
2004). An important insight from the literature on community development and 
participatory models of political governance to the behavior of firms with stakeholders is 
a hierarchy of interactions ranging from one-way communication to joint and 
reciprocated activity (Arnstein, 1969; Choguill, 1996). I also argue that relationships 
based on joint participatory activities with stakeholders will signal high quality to third 
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party actors (as well as demonstrate values and commitment to existing stakeholders) and 
improve stakeholder network dynamics. 
Understanding the importance of their actions to their subsequent ability to 
engender political support, firms often seek to positively influence stakeholders by 
engaging in actions that result in observable and objective outcomes, particularly 
infrastructure development and philanthropy. An important insight from the development 
literature is that the often generous philanthropic efforts and impressive infrastructure 
development projects fail to (consistently) gain and or sustain stakeholder support as 
these initiatives are often identified and implemented solely by the firm without prior 
consultation or ongoing engagement with stakeholders. The lack of consultation and 
effective engagement heightens the sense of mistrust and suspicion from stakeholders 
thus increasing the risk of adverse action against the firm by stakeholders.  
 Scholarship on citizen and political participation suggest relations are improved 
through participatory engagement (Buchy et al., 2001) that builds trust between actors, 
engenders feelings of  empowerment (Arnstein, 1969) or of “being heard” (Craig, 1979; 
Ginsberg, 1982), and builds a shared or common identity (thus overcoming the “us” 
verses “them” mentality). By encouraging broad and inclusive participation and 
relationship-building in their dealings with stakeholders, foreign firms can develop the 
benefits of social capital, a concept widely associated with trust (Putnam, 1993).  
H5a.  Firms with more ties to stakeholders with which they engage in reciprocal 
joint actions will experience increased cooperation and decreased conflict 
with existing external stakeholders.  
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H5b.  Firms with more ties to stakeholders with which they engage in reciprocal 
joint actions will be more likely to form a new tie with an external 
stakeholder. 
Podolny (2001) highlighted that in environments characterized by high firm 
egocentric uncertainty, a firm should focus on information gathering and management 
whereas in environments characterized by high altercentric uncertainty, a firm should 
focus on managing how it is perceived by alters. I empirically explore the question of 
which of these strategies is most important for firms entering into and operating in 
nonmarket environments characterized by both high egocentric and altercentric 
uncertainty. 
DATA AND METHODS 
Sample, Data Construction, and Unit of Analysis 
I explore how firms mitigate both their own egocentric uncertainty and 
stakeholder altercentric uncertainty in the context of entrepreneurial firms in the global 
gold mining industry. I define a stakeholder “event” as any media-reported instance in 
which an actor or organization acts or expresses sentiment towards another actor or 
organization that connotes cooperation or conflict. I draw upon extensive research in 
international relations examining the escalation of inter-state conflict and cooperation to 
identify relevant verbs and verb phrases and code them on a scale of conflict and 
cooperation. 
Mining is widely considered one of the most socially irresponsible and 
environmentally rapacious industries. Due to this perception, mining firms often face 
significant conflict with a diverse set of relatively powerful external stakeholders 
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including, NGOs, governments, multilateral agencies, legal practitioners, 
environmentalists, development specialists and members of the community in which the 
mine is situated. Further, the high price of gold increases tensions among firms, 
governments and communities over who can and should legitimately extract and 
appropriate the large economic rents. In fact, my prior research demonstrates that 
variation in the degree of cooperation with external stakeholders explains twice as much 
variance in market capitalization for these companies as does variation in the net present 
value of the gold reserves these firms ostensibly control (Henisz et al., 2011). Given the 
importance of stakeholder conflict and cooperation to firm performance, this context is 
well-suited to my analysis of strategies to enhance cooperation and reduce conflict. 
My sample is the population of firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchanges 
(TSX) who own and operate up to three mines primarily containing gold in emerging 
markets. The sample includes 19 firms who operate 26 mines in 20 countries. Of all 
publicly-traded mining firms, 58%
4
 are listed on the TSX providing some assurance that I 
have a representative sample of global entrepreneurial mining firms investing outside of 
their home country. The restriction on the numbers of mines owned and operated made 
the task of coding the full population of stakeholder events tractable as compared to a 
potential expansion of my sample to include a greater number of mid-cap and major 
mining companies. 
I gather longitudinal panel data on the population of dyadic events reported in the 
media between firms operating the mines and media-relevant stakeholders (i.e., I rely 
                                                          
4
 TSX Mining Sector Sheet (as of October 12, 2011) 
http://www.tmx.com/en/listings/sector_profiles/mining-pdac.html 
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upon the media to define the set of actors and organizations that have a political, social or 
economic stake in the mine) as well as the events between stakeholders themselves. For 
each mine, I create a corpus of news articles by extracting those articles that reference 
both the firm and the mine from the full set of media documents in the comprehensive 
FACTIVA
5
 database. No temporal restrictions are employed and thus each corpus of 
articles contains all stakeholder events documented in FACTIVA from entry to exit for 
each mine of each firm in my sample thereby enabling longitudinal study of the firm’s 
events with stakeholders in each host country environment. For each mine’s corpus of 
articles, every sentence of every article is read and all stakeholder events are hand-coded 
according to a detailed coding protocol adapted from coding protocols widely employed 
in international conflict studies (Bond, Bond, Oh, Jenkins, & Taylor, 2003; King & 
Lowe, 2003b) (see Appendix 2.1).  
Events in my database vary by their degree of cooperation or conflict. I 
distinguish between the initiator of the event and the target of the event by coding which 
source actor did what to or expressed what sentiment towards which target actor. For 
example, consider a sentence from a fictional New York Times article dated February 13, 
2000 that states “Yesterday, Greenpeace accused Firm X of causing environmental 
damage,” the SOURCE actor is Greenpeace, the TARGET actor is Firm X, and the 
VERB or VERB PHRASE is accuse. To obtain a longitudinal view of events between 
firms and stakeholders and among stakeholders for each mine, I also code the reported 
date of each article and the date each stakeholder event occurred, e.g., in the NYT article 
                                                          
5
 FACTIVA comprises over 28,000 information sources from over 157 countries as well as almost 600 
continuously updated newswires of which 147 specifically cover the global “Metals and Mining” sector. 
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example given above the reported date is February 13, 2000 while the event date 
(reported as “yesterday”) is February 12, 2000. Appendix 2.2 provides more examples of 
the coding. 
My stakeholder events dataset is coded from 22,229 articles (i.e., an average of 
almost 1,000 articles per mine, ranging from roughly 300 to 2,700 articles per mine) 
which yields 51,754 stakeholder events linking 4,623 unique stakeholders. The number of 
stakeholder events per mine ranges from 97 to over 6,600; the number of stakeholders per 
mine ranges from 19 to just over 1,000;  the number of unique ties ranges from 20 to over 
800; and the number of years of the life of the mine range from 2 to 16 years. Based on 
these characteristics, this novel dataset of stakeholder events provides a comprehensive 
view of the dynamic events within firm-stakeholder networks and facilitates valid and 
objective quantitative analysis. Table 2.1 provides the summary statistics of the 
stakeholder dataset.    
 To empirically measure conflict and cooperation between firms and stakeholders 
and among stakeholders themselves, I code the verbs or verb phrases of each event using 
a conflict-cooperation scale—a modification of the Goldstein (1992) weighted events 
conflict-cooperation scale altered to apply to events between firms and stakeholders in 
the business context. The Goldstein conflict-cooperation scale is based upon 
McClelland’s (1971) World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS) which groups 
international relations events into 22 verb categories ranging from conflictual to 
cooperative using verbs such as “accuse,” “promise,” “threaten.” My modified conflict-
cooperation scale is a measure of the degree of cooperation or conflict between firms and 
stakeholders and among stakeholders and ranges from conflictual events of value 1, 
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denoting the launch of violent attacks with actual or potential serious deaths or injury, 
through highly cooperative events of value 20, denoting the provision of armed support 
or defense (see Appendix 2.3).  
 The modified conflict-cooperation scale is richly populated by a lexicon of over 
11,000 verbs and verb phrases. Each coded stakeholder event from the media is 
categorized along the modified conflict-cooperation scale (i.e., valued according to the 
degree of cooperation or conflict in the relation between the source and target actor) 
using a fuzzy matching technique which matches the verb or verb phrase used within the 
media-reported event to a verb or verb phrase within the lexicon of verbs and verb 
phrases. For ambiguous or politically-nuanced verbs or verb phrases, a synonym is used 
as defined by online dictionaries. For the fictional NYT article example given above, the 
verb “accuse” is roughly 8 on my conflict-cooperation scale. Events ranging across the 
scale are observed in my dataset of stakeholder relations, particularly for mines in former 
conflict zones (e.g., rebel attacks on UN peacekeepers and provision of Zimbabwean 
armed support to Congo, in the case of Banro Corporation’s Twangiza mine in the DRC). 
However, the majority of stakeholder events lie within the 3 (e.g., arrest, restrain, 
blockade) through 15 (e.g., rally in support, policy decision in support of the firm or a 
stakeholder) range. For empirical tractability this modified conflict-cooperation scale is 
later re-scaled to between -9 and +10, where neutral events are valued 0. 
Like similar relational scales applied in international relations and international 
conflict studies, my conflict-cooperation scale is continuous including both conflictual 
and cooperative events (i.e., cooperative events and conflictual events are dependent). In 
my analysis however, following seminal work on multiplex ties (c.f., Farace, Monge, & 
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Russell, 1977; Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998), I disaggregate the conflictual and 
cooperative components of the scale to explore instances when cooperative and 
conflictual relations are jointly occurring, similar to the Positive Affect Negative Affect 
Scale (PANAS)
 6
 widely applied in the literature on organizational behavior which 
considers positive affect and negative affect as independent constructs.  
Using this coding scheme and matching process, I create a longitudinal database 
of daily, directed source-verb-target events between firms and stakeholders and among 
stakeholders themselves. Using the source-verb-target events, dynamic depictions of the 
stakeholder network reflecting the level of connectedness and the degree of cooperation 
or conflict can be constructed for each mine. Specifically, I am able to capture who is 
connected to whom by stakeholder events, where each event falls on the scale of conflict 
and cooperation and, as a result, the average conflict and cooperation for each dyad in the 
network over a given length of time. The dynamic depiction of each stakeholder network 
is reflected by snapshots of the events on an annual basis over the life of the mine. 
Appendix 2.4 is a visual depiction of the events between the firm and stakeholders and 
events among stakeholders in the stakeholder network of Banro Resources Corporation’s 
Twangiza mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo for the year 2001. For each such 
snapshot, I use algorithms, as described in more detail below, to derive multiple network-
based metrics characterizing the structure of a stakeholder network at a moment in time. 
To my knowledge, with the exception of work done by Stark and Vedres (2006), few 
extant studies have constructed stakeholder networks of such depth in the emerging 
                                                          
6
 The PANAS scale is a “mood” scale, i.e. based on an individual’s “moods” and therefore cannot be 
applied in this study on dyadic relations. 
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market context, and no extant work of which I am aware applies content analysis of 
media articles to construct this network. 
The use of media articles referencing the firm and mine is important to defining 
the risk set of stakeholders—i.e., those stakeholders “at risk” of forming an event with 
the firm or with other stakeholders. Correct specification of the risk set is critical to 
addressing potential problems of unobserved heterogeneity (Gulati, 1999). Conceptually, 
all existing local stakeholders within the host country (as well as foreign stakeholders 
with established relations with a host country such as The United Nations, The World 
Bank and international non-governmental organizations) are “at risk” of forming ties with 
the firm and with each other. However, this conceptual set of stakeholders is too broad to 
be empirically tractable. Arguing that all “relevant” stakeholders have been identified in 
the media over the life of the mine, I limit my risk set to the actual set of stakeholders 
referenced in all the articles referencing the mine.  
The use of media articles also introduces several points of possible bias, however. 
An important limitation of note are the unobservable events created in informal networks 
and connections that happen behind closed doors which, because they are not reported in 
the media, cannot be taken into account in this dataset. Although these informal events 
are important to network dynamics (Balkundi et al., 2006) and thus to performance, 
because the informal events often lead to tangible outcomes (e.g., the formation of 
alliances or the awarding of grants and permits) which often are reported, I argue that the 
formal network as seen in the media proxy as the outcomes of the informal ties and 
connections.  
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My database of stakeholder events also cannot capture the inherent motivations of 
the actors. But because firms are unlikely to have first-hand knowledge of the 
motivations of stakeholders in practice, the absence of an understanding of the underlying 
motivations is inherent to any host country environment and is therefore an intrinsic 
unknown variable in any political influence strategy. In addition, as media reportage is 
limited by cultural and cognitive bias (Zelner, Henisz, & Holburn, 2009), broad 
generalization across different country environments is limited. However, because my 
TSX-derived sample includes gold mines in 20 countries, my findings may be more 
generalizable across different country contexts. Finally, whereas the use of articles 
written in the spoken language of each country and published by (often smaller) local 
newspapers may provide more accurate understandings of stakeholder events and also 
more detailed and nuanced stakeholder events, I am limited by language to the use of 
only English articles or articles translated into English before posting onto FACTIVA. 
Finally, given the magnitude of these mines relative to the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) of the countries and the high potential profits successful investors aspire to, I 
would argue that the combination of translated national, international and industry media 
provides sufficient coverage of stakeholder events to partially mitigate concerns about 
national media bias or censorship. 
Sociometric data 
The database of stakeholder events comprises the source actor, verb or verb 
phrase, and target actor for each media-reported event. I use this coded stakeholder 
events database to create sociometric data to construct my network-based measures. I 
create adjacency matrices representing firm-stakeholder and stakeholder-stakeholder 
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dyadic events (i.e., symmetric signed and directed data of who is connected to whom) for 
each rolling three-year period in which the mine is in operation. I use these n x n 
adjacency matrixes comprising nodes (stakeholders or the firm) X = {1,…,n} to draw 
network graphs (N,g) of firm-stakeholder and stakeholder-stakeholder events for each 
three-year rolling window. By convention, the diagonal elements in all my network 
matrices are 0 (Marsden, 2002).   
The adjacency matrix comprises directed and signed firm-stakeholder or 
stakeholder-stakeholder events, rij, gathered from the coded event data and scaled 
according to my conflict-cooperation scale. Events initiated by firm i to stakeholder j and 
events from j to i are differentiated, i.e., rij ≠ rji. Stakeholders or firms with no events 
between them are reflected as rij = 0 or rji = 0.  Because events are signed and directed 
actions or expressions of sentiment, to uphold the fidelity of the data, rji can be 0 while rij 
≠ 0, e.g., a stakeholder can initiate an adverse action against the firm, but the firm may 
not have prior events with that stakeholder and may not reciprocate the action or 
otherwise respond. My event data and resulting networks are sensitive therefore to the (1) 
direction, (2) polarity (sign), and (3) relative “strength” of the events between the firm 
and a stakeholder, or between two stakeholders.  
Dependent Variables 
I use two sets of dependent variables specifically examining (1) the degree of 
cooperation or conflict between the firm operating the mine and existing stakeholders, 
and (2) the number of ties formed with new stakeholders. The first dependent variable, 
the Degree of Conflict-Cooperation between the firm i and any stakeholder j in the 
stakeholder network is the simple mean of the conflict-cooperation scale for all the events 
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between the firm and that particular stakeholder within any given three-year rolling 
window. To add richness to the exploration of egocentric and altercentric uncertainty, I 
also separately analyze the Degree of Cooperation and the Degree of Conflict between 
firms and stakeholders. The second dependent variable is the Number of New Ties formed 
between the firm i and any given stakeholder j. The dependent variable Number of New 
Ties formed is simply a count of the number of direct ties between firm i and any new 
stakeholder j with whom the firm has its first ever reported event. I also separately 
examine the Number of New Positive (Cooperative) Ties and the Number of New 
Negative (Conflictual) Ties formed.  
Although the sociometric data comprises all events between all the actors within 
the host country environment during a specified three-year rolling window (i.e., also 
include stakeholder-stakeholder events), because I seek to examine the events between 
firms and their stakeholders my dependent variables are limited only to events between 
the focal firm and any stakeholder thus excluding events only between stakeholders. 
Independent Variables 
To examine the impact of the firm- and stakeholder-level variables on events 
between firms and stakeholders, I use (1) firm-based measures which mitigate firm 
egocentric uncertainty: access to structural holes and firm range across the core-periphery 
of the network; and (2) altercentric measures of the characteristics of the stakeholders 
with whom the firm is connected which mitigate altercentric uncertainty faced by other 
stakeholders: stakeholder status, cooperation and joint activity. I also include a set of 
controls for country, mine, network and time. 
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Firm egocentric uncertainty 
I use two measures of the firm’s strategic network position that afford it 
information to overcome its egocentric uncertainty: Structural Holes and Core-Periphery.  
Structural Holes. To measure how diverse the firm’s sources of information are, I 
use its access to structural holes (Burt, 1992) in the stakeholder network. Structural holes 
are defined as network positions that bridge non-redundant actors within the network 
thereby enabling actors occupying these network gaps to gain brokerage advantages via 
access to and control of diverse and possibly unique information (Burt, 1992). A position 
that links stakeholders who are themselves already connected will, by contrast, provide 
information more likely to be redundant (Burt, 1992). For the firm, connections with 
stakeholders who are themselves not connected may include ties to new stakeholders 
within the host country, politicians from different political parties that are not connected, 
and NGOs which are not connected. use the structural holes constraint measure which is 
a standard measure in network theory used to determine the firm’s lack of access to 
structural holes (i.e., the smaller the value, the greater the firm’s access to structural 
holes). I multiply the measure of structural holes by -1 to determine the impact of the 
firm’s access to structural holes and thus to diverse information. I use the formula below 
to compute this measure for each firm in each time period (Burt, 1992: 54). 
                        ∑      
 
   
                   
Where, 
    are direct ties between firm i and stakeholders j in the stakeholder network  
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       is the sum of the indirect ties from firm i to all stakeholders k via all 
intermediate stakeholders j. 
Core Periphery. Stakeholders differ in their location within the network. My Core 
Periphery measure, per convention, uses a block modeling approach to distinguish 
between stakeholders across different sections of the stakeholder network, specifically 
those stakeholders at the core of the network and those stakeholders at the periphery of 
the network. Primary or more well-known stakeholders are central to the network and are 
located at the core of the network while marginalized stakeholders are located at the 
periphery of the network (Hart et al., 2004). Due to the different locations of these 
stakeholders in the network, these stakeholders have different or more relevant 
information. Core stakeholders have redundant but important information and peripheral 
stakeholders have more radical or transformative information (Hart et al., 2004). For 
example, while ties to high-profile politicians and NGOs may provide the firm with 
information on the country’s mining and development policies, this information is 
relatively widely-known and is thus readily available from various sources. Direct ties to 
marginalized communities however, may provide the firm with more relevant location-
specific information, e.g., community expectations of the mine, specific development 
needs of the community, and relevant information on other communities surrounding the 
mine.  
To compute Core Periphery I first employ a simple block modeling core-
periphery algorithm provided in UCINET (Borgatti, 2002) which identifies core and 
peripheral stakeholders from their location in the network. I then create a ratio of the 
number of the firm’s stakeholders who are peripheral stakeholders to the number of 
 87 
 
stakeholders who are core stakeholders. However, because the core-to-periphery
7
 ratio of 
the stakeholder network itself may differ by country (i.e., in some countries the network 
core could be relatively small or large), I normalize the core-to-periphery ratio of the 
firm’s network of stakeholders by dividing by the core-to-periphery ratio of the larger 
stakeholder network. I include both incoming and outgoing ties in the analysis. Core 
Periphery values smaller than 1 reflect a higher focus of firm ties on core stakeholders, 
while values greater than 1 reflect a greater focus of firm ties on peripheral stakeholders. 
Core Periphery is computed as: 
             
   
∑               
∑          
 
∑                
∑          
 ⁄  
Where, 
                is the ratio of core stakeholders versus peripheral stakeholders 
who are connected with firm i at time t, normalized by dividing by the core-
periphery ratio of the stakeholder network itself 
    is a matrix of events     
           are firm i’s stakeholders who are core stakeholders j at time t 
                are firm i’s stakeholders who are peripheral stakeholders j at time t 
           are all stakeholders within the network matrix of events who are core 
stakeholders k at time t 
                are all stakeholders within the network matrix of events who are 
peripheral stakeholders k at time t. 
  
                                                          
7
 My Core-Periphery ratio is calculated Periphery/Core. 
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Stakeholder altercentric uncertainty 
I use three measures of the characteristics of stakeholder j who is directly 
connected to the firm which affords the firm high quality and thereby enables it to 
mitigate the altercentric uncertainty of other stakeholders: Stakeholder status, 
Stakeholder cooperation, and Joint activity.  
Stakeholder Status. Stakeholder status is a reflection of the importance of a 
specific stakeholder among other stakeholders in the network. Within a network, each 
stakeholder’s status is proxied by its eigenvector centrality (Bonacich, 1987) based on the 
premise that the status of a node in a network is a function of the statuses of the nodes 
with which it is directly tied. Thus the eigenvector centrality measure captures how 
important stakeholder j is within the political environment based upon the importance of 
the other stakeholders k who are connected to stakeholder j. The eigenvector centrality 
utilizes both direct and indirect ties to compute the position of a specific node in the 
network (Podolny, 1993). A well-connected (i.e., high status) stakeholder is one who is 
connected to other well-connected (i.e., high status) stakeholders, who are themselves 
well-connected (i.e., high status). Stakeholder status is computed:  
                         ∑   
 
   
Where, 
    is a matrix of events     (   can be both symmetric or asymmetric) 
(Bonacich, 1987) 
   is the eigenvector centrality of stakeholder j  
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  is a constant known as the eigenvalue, it is required to ensure equations have a 
nonzero solution. 
Stakeholder Cooperation. The degree of cooperation (or conflict) exhibited by a 
stakeholder j in its events with other stakeholders k is the simple mean degree of 
cooperation or conflict of all stakeholder j’s ties with all other stakeholders k in the 
network (i.e., excluding the stakeholder in the dyadic pair currently under analysis). The 
stakeholder’s degree of cooperation or conflict is determined from my conflict-
cooperation scale. Stakeholders with high degrees of cooperation are those whose 
interactions with other stakeholders are, on average, cooperative. Stakeholders with low 
degrees of cooperation (i.e., high degrees of conflict) are those whose interactions with 
other stakeholders are, on average, conflictual.  
                                  ∑         
 
   
                   
Where, 
     is the degree of cooperation or conflict in the event between stakeholder j and 
any other stakeholder k in the network at time t   
  is the number of stakeholders k in the stakeholder network. 
Joint Activity. To empirically analyze how firms act with stakeholders, i.e., 
measure the tenor of the events between the firms and stakeholders, I also code the 
engagement activities stated in the media.
8
 These engagement activities are coded along 
an engagement hierarchy. I developed this engagement hierarchy using insights gathered 
from in-depth interviews on stakeholder engagement with practitioners and specialists in 
                                                          
8
 The type of engagement is coded as part of the stakeholder events database. 
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the development community (i.e., NGOs, World Bank and other multilateral 
organizations, consultancies), academic scholars, as well as lessons from the literatures 
on corporate social responsibility, stakeholder engagement, and citizen participation. The 
engagement hierarchy progresses from superficial (i.e., communication, financial or 
transactional) engagement through engagement that requires firms to more deeply 
involve and collaborate with stakeholders. At one end of the continuum are 
announcements, meetings, data gathering, payment, activity, claims and requests. At the 
other end are monitoring and evaluation and the production of a good or service (e.g., 
executives from the mine and the community building a new community center together). 
In addition, within each category of engagement, I code whether the activity is unilateral 
(i.e., a firm makes an announcement), bilateral (i.e., a firm and government make a joint 
announcement), or multilateral (i.e., a firm, the United Nations, Government and local 
NGO meet to jointly discuss regional development). See Appendix 2.5 for the full coding 
scheme. 
Although the types of events are coded along this engagement hierarchy, the 
hierarchy is not numerically scaled. I therefore compute joint activity by identifying all 
joint actions between the focal firm and stakeholders within each three-year rolling 
window and create a measure of the proportion of joint activities between firms and 
stakeholders to all activities between firms and stakeholders. Joint activity is computed: 
                  
∑        
∑     
   
Where, 
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         is a count of the number of joint firm and stakeholder activities for firm i 
at time t 
      is the total number of activites between stakeholders and firm i at time t. 
Control variables 
I include variables controlling for country, firm, mine and network factors in the 
empirical analyses. At the country-level, I include a measure of “Voice” within the host 
country—essentially, a measure of the freedom of the media and freedom of speech 
within each country. I obtain this perception-based measure from the World Bank 
Institute’s World Governance Indicators (WGI)(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010). 
This measure is obtained from statistical compilation of surveys from a wide variety of 
civil society actors, including NGOs, think tanks, international organizations and industry 
experts, within different countries.  
At the level of the firm, I control for the firm's percentage ownership of the mine. 
This percentage is a measure of how much ownership the focal firm has at stake relative 
to other owners of the mine. As my sample is limited to small firms, many with only 1, 2 
or 3 mines, the loss of a mine has a significant adverse impact on the value of the firm. 
The percentage of ownership may also impact how the government will perceive the 
mine; for example joint ventures may decrease the level of government interference.  
At the mine level, I control for the development stage of the mine in terms of 
whether the mine is in exploration, feasibility, construction, production or the mining 
process has been suspended. Because exploration and feasibility are relatively early 
stages prior to the significant outlays of resources by firms to develop the mine, I code 
the binary Mine Status (Construction and Production) variable which is coded 1 if the 
 92 
 
mine is at the construction or production stage, and 0 otherwise. Also, because the 
suspension of a mine is a significant event with performance implications, and because 
the suspension of the mine can occur at any stage of the mine development and mining 
process, I code the Mine Status Suspension variable which is a binary variable coded 1 if 
the mine has been suspended within that year or not. 
I also control for the price of gold. This variable is particularly important as the 
price of gold has risen sharply over the past few years passing $500 per ounce for the first 
time in December 2005, $1,000 per ounce in March 2008, and toping $1,900 an ounce in 
August 2011. As gold is used as a hedge in times of financial crisis, the sharply rising 
price of gold heightens tensions over who has the right to appropriate this value and may 
thus significantly impact relations between firms and stakeholders. 
As a robustness measure, I also include a measure of the value of the mine
9
 in 
proportion to the host country gross domestic product. This measure is important as firms 
operating larger more valuable mines are more likely to face greater tensions and 
opposition from stakeholders. However, because the value of the mine can only be 
computed once the firm is listed on one of the Toronto Stock Exchanges, much of the 
media-reported stakeholder event precedes the periods in which the mine is valued. 
Therefore the periods in which the mine valuation occurs, for this study, present a biased 
sample of relations between firms and stakeholders. 
Due to the nature of the mining industry and the political salience of gold mining 
in particular, the global gold mining industry plausibly has networks of relations that are 
more diverse and more dense than networks of stakeholder relations for firms in other 
                                                          
9
 For the valuation model see Henisz, Dorobantu, Nartey, 2011 
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industries. I therefore control for the density of interactions in this industry by including a 
measure of the potential number of ties that could be formed by actors in the networks. I 
first compute the total possible number of directed ties that could be formed given the 
number of actors (both firms and stakeholders) in the network:  
                                 
Where, 
    is the number of actors in the network at time t. 
I then obtain a count of the ties not formed by subtracting a count of the existing directed 
tie relations in each network at time t from the total number of possible ties that could be 
formed at time t based on the number of actors in the network. Although my stakeholder 
dataset includes multiple ties to the same actor, for this computation, I do not count the 
number of directed ties between actors but rather, if 1 or more directed ties exist between 
two actors, i.e., an actor k with multiple ties to another actor j is counted only as 1 tie 
from k to j. If actor j reciprocates with one or more ties to actor k, that relation is also 
counted as 1 tie.   
I next create a proportion of these ties by dividing the number of ties not formed 
by the total number of possible ties.  
                
∑               
∑                   
   
Where, 
                 is the total number of possible new ties that can be formed  
among actors in a network g at time t 
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                    is the total number of directed ties that could exist in a 
network of actors g at time t. 
Importantly, I then lag this variable to obtain a measure of the potential ties in the 
previous time period. 
To control for the media-based data, I control for stakeholder events reported by 
major news outlets as this will have an impact on how widely the news is reported. The 
media source of the event (i.e., the name of the newspaper or media outlet) is coded in the 
stakeholder events database. I then use the media categories reported by FACTIVA to 
determine whether the reported media source is a major news outlet or not. For each 
network (i.e., mine-subperiod), I create a measure of the proportion of stakeholder events 
reported by major news outlets from the total number of reported stakeholder events. 
I also control for two additional cultural distance and media-related factors that 
may impact relations between firms and stakeholders. The first is a control for whether 
the country in which the mine is located speaks English as one of its official languages. 
This is important as media reports from English speaking countries may more fully 
reflect the relations between firms and stakeholders and therefore the media reports may 
be more accurate in their depictions of stakeholder relations. Further, a host country 
environment that officially governs in the English language may be an easier host country 
environment for Canadian mining executives to strategically relate with stakeholders. My 
measure of English Language is a binary variable coded 1 for English as the Official 
Language and 0 otherwise. I obtain this data from the CIA’s World Fact Book website.10 
The second distance-based control is the measure of the distance between Toronto, 
                                                          
10
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
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Canada where the firm is listed on the TSX and the capital city of that host country. I 
obtain the measures of distance from the Indo.com website.
11
 
 Finally, I also include indicator variables for year and mine. 
Models 
Degree of Conflict and Cooperation. As my event data is an unbalanced panel and 
my first dependent variable—Degree of Cooperation and Degree of Conflict—is a 
continuous scaled variable, I use a tobit model (xttobit) with fixed effects for mine and 
year. My panel variable is specified as the mine(firm)-stakeholder dyad within each mine. 
I fit the following model: 
                                  
                                                       
                                                    
                                    
Number of New Ties. My event data is an unbalanced panel and the dependent 
variables for all new ties formed between the firm and individual stakeholders are count 
variables. I use the ‘xtqmlp’ procedure written by Tim Simcoe12 which corrects the 
standard errors from a ﬁxed effects Poisson model for overdispersion (Rysman & 
Simcoe, 2008) addressing concerns on interpreting a conditional ﬁxed effects negative 
binomial model as a true ﬁxed effects estimator (Wooldridge 1999, Allison and 
Waterman 2002). The use of the of the traditional Poisson regression with year fixed 
                                                          
11
 http://www.indo.com/distance/index.html 
12
 This procedure is publicly available for download at http://scripts.mit.edu/~pazoulay/docs/xtqmlp.ado. 
The xtpoisson with fixed effects and robust standard errors is equivalent to the fixed-effects Poisson 
(Quasi-ML) regression (xtpqml stata module) with robust standard errors created by Tim Simcoe. 
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effects and robust standard errors clustered by each unique firm-stakeholder group is a 
similar and also appropriate empirical model to employ. I re-estimate the model shown 
above with the New Ties dependent variable.   
For both the main Degree of Conflict-Cooperation and New Ties Formed 
empirical specifications, I also run the disaggregated Degree of Cooperation, Degree of 
Conflict, New Positive Ties and New Negative Ties specifications. For all the full and 
disaggregated Degree of Conflict-Cooperation and New Ties Formed empirical 
specifications, I run three models: first, the model with only the two firm egocentric 
mitigating variables (structural holes and core-periphery); second, the model with only 
the three stakeholder altercentric mitigating variables (stakeholder status, stakeholder 
cooperation and joint activity); and third, the joint model with all the firm-level 
egocentric uncertainty variables and the stakeholder-level altercentric uncertainty 
variables. All models are run using Stata 11. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 present the descriptive statistics and correlations for the 
variables in the two sets of analyses. Table 2.4 presents the results for the analyses of the 
Degree of Conflict-Cooperation estimation model and Tables 2.5 and 2.6 present the 
results of the disaggregated Degree of Cooperation and Degree of Conflict models, 
respectively. Table 2.7 presents the results of the New Ties estimation models, and Tables 
2.8 and 2.9 present the results of the disaggregated New Positive Ties and New Negative 
Ties models, respectively. 
In the Degree of Conflict-Cooperation and the disaggregated Degree of 
Cooperation models, Models 1, 2 and 3 present the results of the base specifications, 
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Models 4, 5 and 6 present the results of the base specifications with mine and year fixed 
effects, Models 7, 8 and 9 include the major media outlets variable, Models 10, 11 and 12 
include the mine status variables, and Models 13, 14 and 15 present the base models all 
control and robustness variables: major media, mine status and mine and year fixed 
effects variables. I then present the models including the Mine Value variable. Models 
16, 17 and 18 present the results including the Mine Value (NPV) to the base model with 
mine and fixed effects, and Models 19, 20 and 21 present the results of full model, all the 
robustness variables and the Mine Value variable. Due to the nature of the mining 
industry in which firms often engage in exploration and feasibility studies prior to listing 
on the TSX, my dataset of media-reported events on firm-stakeholder relations precedes 
the valuations of the firms. Analyses of the data indicate a sample bias when only the 
observations using NPV are included in the model. Due to this bias, I discuss the results 
of the full model, including all other variables with the exception of the Mine Value (i.e., 
Models 13, 14 and 15). However, as the value of the mine is a variable of importance 
within the mining, I also present the models with the NPV. 
For each set of Degree of Conflict-Cooperation and Degree of Cooperation 
models, the first column presents the results of models including only the firm egocentric 
variables (Firm Structural Holes and Firm Range), the second column presents the results 
of models including only the stakeholder altercentric variables (Stakeholder Cooperation, 
Stakeholder Status and Joint Activity), and the third column presents the results of the 
joint models including both the firm egocentric and stakeholder altercentric variables. In 
the disaggregated Degree of Conflict models, I present only the full models (i.e., the 
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separate models of the stakeholder altercentric and firm egocentric variables are not 
included). 
Due to the robust nature of the results across the Degree of Conflict-Cooperation 
and Degree of Cooperation models, I discuss the results presented in Models 13, 14 and 
15—i.e., the base model, with mine and year fixed effects and all the robustness 
variables. For the Degree of Conflict models, the base model, with mine and year fixed 
effects and the robustness variables are presented in Model 5 which I discuss.  
I begin with a brief discussion of the impacts of the control and robustness 
variables on the aggregated Degree of Conflict-Cooperation between firms and 
stakeholders. The only variable that significantly impacts the aggregated degree of 
conflict-cooperation between firms and stakeholders is country Voice. The positive 
impact of voice implies that a country environment characterized by relatively high 
degrees of public discourse and freedom of speech has a significant and positive impact 
on the degree of conflict and cooperation between firms and stakeholders. In the 
disaggregated degree of cooperation model, Voice, the type of media, in addition to the 
status of the mines (construction and production and even the suspension stages) are all 
factors that significantly and positively impact the degree of cooperation between firms 
and stakeholders. The degree of conflict is significantly and negatively impacted by 
Voice.  
I next explore the impact of the variables that mitigate egocentric and altercentric 
uncertainty on the Degree of Conflict-Cooperation analyses. H1a is supported in the 
egocentric uncertainty model as access to Structural Holes significantly and positively 
impacts the degree of conflict and cooperation between the firm and its existing 
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stakeholders. This finding supports the empirical findings of Podolny (2001) that firms 
whose networks are rich in structural holes overcome egocentric uncertainty. By 
overcoming this egocentric uncertainty through their access to new information by 
bridging structural holes, these firms increase cooperation and decrease conflict with 
existing stakeholders. The economic significance of a one standard deviation increase in 
a firm’s access to structural holes is associated with a predicted change in its dyadic 
conflict-cooperation of 0.379 (i.e., a move from 10 to almost 10.4 on the 20-category 
conflict-cooperation scale) which is equivalent to 12% of one standard deviation of the 
dependent variable.  
H2a is also supported in the egocentric uncertainty model as access to 
stakeholders who span the CorePeriphery significantly impacts the degree of conflict and 
cooperation with existing stakeholders. Of interest however, is that the sign of the 
CorePeriphery variable is negative. The economic significance of a one standard 
deviation increase in the firm range in terms of access to actors in the core and periphery 
of the network is associated with a reduction in its dyadic conflict-cooperation of 0.158 
(i.e., a move from 10 to 9.842 on the 20-category conflict-cooperation scale) which is 
equivalent to 5% of one standard deviation of the dependent variable. This indicates that 
firms who have a greater degree of their ties to peripheral stakeholders decrease 
cooperation and increase conflict with their existing stakeholders, while ties with core 
stakeholders increases cooperation and decreases conflict between the firm and existing 
stakeholders. This finding implies that while radically new information, perhaps from a 
wide number of stakeholders, is significant, this radical information may be a source of 
tension and conflict as firms may find it difficult to manage stakeholders who have 
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disparate information. Therefore, it is important for firms to form ties to stakeholders 
who have access to new information, but these ties must be carefully and strategically 
managed by a greater number of ties to core stakeholders who are more central and have 
more ‘mainstream’ ideas and information than those stakeholders at the periphery of the 
network. 
Examining the stakeholder altercentric mitigating variables—Stakeholder 
Cooperation, Stakeholder Status and Joint Activity—on the Degree of Conflict-
Cooperation with existing stakeholders, I find empirical support for H3a (Stakeholder 
Cooperation) and H4a (Stakeholder Status), that both variables significantly and 
positively impact the degree of conflict and cooperation with existing stakeholders. I 
however do not find empirical support for H5a (Joint Activity). These findings suggest 
that the characteristics of the stakeholders to whom the firm is connected, specifically 
how cooperative these stakeholders are and the status of these stakeholders, as 
determined by their relations with other stakeholders, are important mitigating factors of 
the altercentric uncertainty stakeholders in the environment face about the firm. A one 
standard deviation increase in stakeholder status is associated with a predicted increase in 
dyadic conflict-cooperation of 0.253 which is equivalent to 8% of one standard deviation 
of the dependent variable. A one standard deviation increase in the degree of stakeholder 
cooperation is associated with an increase in the dyadic conflict-cooperation of 9.075 
which is equivalent to 287% of one standard deviation of the dependent variable (i.e., a 
significant move from 10 to 19 on the 20-category conflict-cooperation scale). 
To answer the question of the relative importance of these two sets of variables, I 
examine the results in the full model (Model 15 in Table 2.4). In this model, both firm 
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egocentric uncertainty mitigating variables, structural holes and core-periphery, lose 
their significance with the introduction of the stakeholder altercentric uncertainty 
mitigating variables: stakeholder status, stakeholder cooperation and joint activity. 
However, in the full model, the altercentric uncertainty mitigating variables stakeholder 
cooperation and stakeholder status remain statistically significant and positive. In the 
joint model, the economic significance of stakeholder status remains unchanged while the 
economic significance of stakeholder cooperation increases marginally. Therefore, in the 
face of both ego and altercentric uncertainty the greater return to the firm is to manage 
the altercentric uncertainty of stakeholders.  
The disaggregated models of Degree of Cooperation present a similar pattern of 
results to those of the full models of Degree of Conflict-Cooperation. The firm egocentric 
uncertainty mitigating variables, structural holes and core-periphery, are significant 
when only these variables are included in the model, supporting the hypotheses that firms 
whose networks are rich in structural holes increase cooperation with stakeholders, while 
firms with ties to core actors increase cooperation with stakeholders. In only the 
egocentric models, a one standard deviation increase in access to structural holes is 
associated with an increase in the predicted dyadic cooperation of 0.166 degrees of 
cooperation which is equivalent to 9.0% of one standard deviation of the dependent 
variable. A one standard deviation increase in spanning core-periphery is associated with 
an increase in the predicted dyadic cooperation of 0.09 which is equivalent to 4.9% of 
one standard deviation of the dependent variable.  
The stakeholder altercentric uncertainty mitigating variables, stakeholder status 
and stakeholder cooperation are also significant and positive in the models with only the 
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stakeholder-level variables, supporting the hypotheses that associating with high quality 
stakeholders in terms of their status and degree of cooperation mitigates stakeholder 
altercentric uncertainty and increases firm cooperation with stakeholders. In addition, the 
positive and significant impact of joint activities with stakeholders indicates that firms 
who engage in deeper engagement activities with stakeholders mitigate altercentric 
uncertainty and increase cooperation. A one standard deviation increase in stakeholder 
status is associated with a predicted increase in cooperation of 0.13 which is equivalent to 
an increase of 7.1% of one standard deviation of the dependent variable. A one standard 
deviation increase in stakeholder cooperation is associated with a predicted increase in 
cooperation of 2.695 which is equivalent to an increase of 146% of one standard 
deviation of the dependent variable. A one standard deviation increase in joint activity is 
associated with a predicted increase in dyadic cooperation of 0.14 which is equivalent to 
an increase of 7.8% of one standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
When all egocentric and altercentric variables are included in the full 
disaggregated cooperation model, both firm egocentric structural holes and core-
periphery variables lose their significance while all three stakeholder altercentric 
mitigating variables remain significant and positive. The economic significance of these 
variables on cooperation between firms and stakeholders remain high. A one standard 
deviation increase in stakeholder status is associated with a predicted increase in 
stakeholder cooperation of 0.13 which is equivalent to 7.4% of one standard deviation of 
the dependent variable. A one standard deviation increase in stakeholder cooperation is 
associated with a predicted increase in stakeholder cooperation of 2.695 which is 
equivalent to 146% of one standard deviation of the dependent variable. And, a one 
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standard deviation increase in joint activity is associated with a predicted increase in 
stakeholder cooperation of 0.15 which is equivalent to 8.3% of one standard deviation of 
the dependent variable. 
The disaggregated Degree of Conflict models present an interesting alternative 
scenario. In the full models including both egocentric and altercentric mitigating 
variables, conflict is statistically significantly impacted by having networks with a greater 
proportion of ties with core stakeholders, though these results have marginal economic 
significance. Conflict is also predicted to increase as the firm increases its cooperation 
with other stakeholders. A one standard deviation increase in conflict-cooperation with 
other stakeholders is associated with a predicted increase in stakeholder conflict of 1.5 
degrees which is equivalent to 88% of one standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
Conflict is, however, negatively associated with engagement in joint activity with a one 
standard deviation increase in this independent variable associated with a predicted 
decrease in conflict of 0.125 degrees which is equivalent to 12% of one standard 
deviation of the dependent variable.  
These findings have interesting implications for relations between firms and 
stakeholders. Insights from the aggregated degree of conflict-cooperation model allude to 
the question of which stakeholder attribute might be a more important indicator of high 
quality to stakeholders (at least in the global mining domain), i.e., the characteristics of 
the stakeholders versus the activities of the firm with and towards stakeholders. While 
‘how’ firms act with stakeholders is an important attribute of quality, these results 
suggest that the characteristics of the stakeholders associated with the firm is a relatively 
higher indicator of quality with greater economic impact on the degree of conflict and 
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cooperation between the firm and stakeholders. Importantly, the insights from the 
disaggregated Degree of Cooperation and Degree of Conflict models have implications 
for how firms should act when facing different types of stakeholders. For example, in 
environments where the firm has already garnered significant support, to increase that 
support the firm should focus on only the stakeholder altercentric strategies of forming 
ties to high status and highly cooperative stakeholders while also engaging in joint 
activities with these stakeholders. Conversely, in times of crisis when the firm is facing 
hostile stakeholder relations, the strategy to decrease conflict should be to engage in joint 
activities with peripheral stakeholders. 
I continue with a discussion of the results of the Ties Formed empirical models. 
Models 1, 2 and 3 present the results of the base model, Models 4, 5 and 6 present the 
results controlling for the type of media, Models 7, 8 and 9 present the results of models 
including both mine status variables, and Models 10, 11 and 12 present the base models 
with the media and mine status variables. The Mine Value variables are introduced into 
the base models in Models 13, 14 and 15 and into the full model in Models 16, 17 and 18. 
Again, due to the biases of the sample including the mine value, I discuss the full models 
presented in Models 10, 11 and 12 for the All New Ties, New Positive Ties and New 
Negative Ties models. As with the aggregated and disaggregated Degree of Conflict-
Cooperation models, for each set of results, I first present the separate results of the 
egocentric uncertainty (first column) and altercentric uncertainty models (second column) 
and then present the results for the joint egocentric and altercentric model (third column).  
Beginning with a brief discussion of the control variables in the aggregated and 
disaggregated New Ties models, I find country voice significantly and negatively impacts 
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tie formation (all new ties, positive new ties and negative new ties) when included in the 
firm egocentric model but has no impact when included in the stakeholder altercentric 
uncertainty model. In the joint egocentric and altercentric uncertainty model, country 
Voice significantly (weakly) and positively impacts the formation of positive ties, but has 
no impact on the formation of new ties generally, nor on the formation of negative ties. 
The previous structure of the network (i.e., in terms of the available possible ties that 
could be formed), and the price of gold significantly decrease the formation of all new 
ties, including both positive and negative ties in both the stakeholder altercentric 
uncertainty and the joint egocentric and altercentric models. In only the egocentric 
uncertainty models, previous network structure has a positive and significant impact on 
all tie formation, and the formation of positive new ties, but no impact on the formation 
of new negative ties. In the egocentric uncertainty models, the price of gold has no 
impact on tie formation (all, positive or negative ties). Whether the stakeholder events 
are, on average, reported by a major media outlet significantly (weakly) and positively 
impacts the general formation of new ties (only in the joint egocentric and altercentric 
uncertainty models), but has no significant impact on whether these new ties are positive 
or negative. The stage of development of the mine also significantly impacts the 
formation of ties. At the construction and production stages, the formation of all new ties 
and new positive ties significantly decreases. But at the construction and production 
stages there is no impact on the formation of new negative ties in the stakeholder 
altercentric and joint ego-altercentric models. Interestingly, at the construction and 
production stages, the formation of negative ties is significant and positive when only the 
egocentric model is considered. This positive result is lost (i.e., there is no significant 
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formation of negative ties) when the stakeholder altercentric variables are introduced. As 
expected, the suspension of a mine results in a significant decrease in the formation of 
new positive and new negative ties between firms and stakeholders in the egocentric, 
altercentric and joint models. However, in the stakeholder altercentric and joint models 
there is a significant but positive increase in the formation of all new ties (regardless of 
sign) at the mine suspension stage.     
Moving to the analysis of the impact of the altercentric and egocentric variables 
on the aggregate New Ties formed with new stakeholders, H1b is supported in the 
separate egocentric uncertainty model, i.e., the firm’s access to structural holes 
significantly impacts the formation of ties with new stakeholders. By having access to 
unconnected actors, the firm can significantly increase the formation of ties to 
stakeholders with whom it has never been previously connected. This may be because the 
stakeholders themselves may be bridging structural holes to other different types of 
stakeholders with whom the firm can form new ties. In fact, by forming ties to 
unconnected stakeholders, these stakeholders may ‘refer’ the firm to other stakeholders it 
can connect to. This finding supports extant theoretical and empirical research on the 
relationship between access to structural holes and the mitigation of egocentric 
uncertainty (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Podolny, 1993, 2005). By contrast, H2b is not 
supported as the firm's range of ties to peripheral or core stakeholders in the network has 
no impact on the formation of ties with new stakeholders in the separate egocentric 
uncertainty model. 
Examining the results of the stakeholder altercentric characteristics on the 
formation of New Ties, I find support for only H4b, that the degree of cooperation of the 
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stakeholders with whom the firm is connected significantly and positively increases the 
formation of new ties with other stakeholders. Neither H3b (associations with 
stakeholders of high status) nor H5 (joint activity with stakeholders) have a significant 
impact on the formation of new ties.  
Exploring the question of the relative importance of these two sets of egocentric 
and altercentric variables, I again find that access to structural holes loses its significance 
when included in the joint model with the stakeholder variables mitigating altercentric 
uncertainty. Although not significant in the models without the altercentric variables, in 
the joint model the core-periphery variable is significant and positive. In terms of 
economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in core-periphery is associated 
with a predicted change in the number of new ties of 0.9 ties which is equivalent to 16% 
of one standard deviation of the dependent variable. That is, firms whose networks 
include a greater proportion of ties with peripheral stakeholders significantly increase the 
formation of ties with new stakeholders. Forming ties to stakeholders with high 
cooperation remains significant and positive with a high economic significance. A one 
standard deviation increase in the conflict-cooperation with other stakeholders is 
associated with a predicted increase of 7.5 new ties which is equivalent to 131% of one 
standard deviation of the dependent variable. Therefore for firms seeking to increase tie 
formation with stakeholders, the strategy should focus on associating with stakeholders of 
high cooperation while targeting tie formation with peripheral actors. 
An examination of the results of the Positive New tie formation models shows a 
very similar pattern of results. When considering only the egocentric uncertainty 
mitigating variables, firms whose networks afford greater access to structural holes form 
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more positive ties. When considering only the stakeholder altercentric uncertainty 
variables, firms who associate with stakeholders of high degrees of cooperation form 
more positive new ties. In the joint egocentric and altercentric uncertainty models, while 
the structural holes variable loses its significance, the stakeholder conflict-cooperation 
variable remains significant, implying that forming ties with stakeholders who are highly 
cooperative significantly and positively increases the formation of positive ties. The 
economic significance of ties to highly cooperative stakeholders roughly doubles in 
magnitude. As with the formation of All New ties, the core-periphery variable is 
significant and positive in the joint model (although not significant in the model with 
only egocentric variables), implying that firms whose stakeholder networks span a 
broader network range form a significantly greater number of positive ties than those 
firms whose networks do not include peripheral actors. The economic significance of 
spanning the core and periphery also increased substantively, here by 63% (i.e., 2.6 new 
positive ties). An interesting difference from the joint All New ties model is the 
significant and positive relationship between associating with stakeholders of high status 
and the formation of positive new ties. A one standard deviation increase in stakeholder 
status is associated with a predicted increase of 5.6 positive new ties which is equivalent 
to 136% of one standard deviation of the dependent variable. Therefore, for firms seeking 
to form cooperative new ties with new stakeholders, a focus on forming strategic 
associations with stakeholders of high status and high cooperation as well as spanning a 
greater network range is important to strategic tie formation.  
In the Negative New ties formed models, firms whose networks are rich in 
structural holes and therefore are afforded access to novel information and opportunities 
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for brokerage significantly (weakly) increase the formation of negative new ties. Thus 
occupying structural holes presents a cost to the firm, however this cost is lost when 
jointly examining both sets of egocentric and altercentric mitigation variables. No 
altercentric uncertainty variables are significant in the models with only the stakeholder 
characteristics and joint activity variables and therefore strategic associations with 
stakeholders has no impact on the formation of new negative ties. However, when 
considering both the ego and altercentric models, firms who engage in joint activities 
with stakeholders significantly (weakly) and positively decrease the formation of new 
negative ties. Importantly, the economic significance of joint activities is substantial with 
a one standard deviation increase in joint activities between firms and stakeholders 
associated with a predicted decrease in negative ties of 2.8 which is equivalent to 99.9% 
of one standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
Insights from both types of models (degree of conflict-cooperation and formation 
of new ties) demonstrate interesting complementarities to the mitigation of both 
egocentric and altercentric uncertainty. In the egocentric uncertainty models, firms whose 
networks are rich in structural holes significantly and positively impact the degree of 
conflict-cooperation as well as the degree of cooperation and significantly and positively 
impact the formation of all types of new ties (including positive and negative ties). Firms 
whose networks are wide-ranging impact the aggregated and disaggregated degrees of 
conflict and cooperation, however, the impacts differ. To increase cooperation, a firm’s 
network should not be wide ranging but should focus on ties to core stakeholders; 
however, focusing on ties to core stakeholders significantly and positively increases the 
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degree of conflict with stakeholders. Within the egocentric models, forming networks 
with wide ranges has no impact on any form of tie formation. 
Although access to structural holes significantly increases the formation of all 
ties, positive ties and negative ties in the egocentric uncertainty models, in the presence 
of the altercentric variables, i.e., when considering both egocentric and altercentric 
uncertainty, access to structural holes has no impact on the formation of any ties. Those 
firms whose networks are wide-ranging and include actors from both the core and 
periphery of the broader stakeholder network significantly increase tie formation, 
particularly the formation of positive ties.  
Forming ties to stakeholders of high status significantly and positively impacts the 
degree of conflict-cooperation, specifically through increasing cooperation, but has no 
significant impact on conflict. In the models jointly explaining egocentric and altercentric 
uncertainty, forming ties to stakeholders of high status has a complementary impact on tie 
formation by significantly and positively increasing the formation of positive ties, but has 
no impact on the formation of negative ties. Thus for firms seeking to mitigate 
altercentric uncertainty, strategic associations with stakeholders who are considered high 
status are beneficial to both increasing cooperation and increasing the formation of 
positive new ties. 
Forming ties to stakeholders of high conflict-cooperation significantly and 
positively impacts the degree of conflict-cooperation, the degree of cooperation and the 
degree of conflict between firms and stakeholders in both the altercentric and joint 
egocentric-altercentric models. However, associating with stakeholders of high 
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cooperation significantly increases the formation of all new ties, and new positive ties, 
but has a negative, but not significant, impact on the formation of new conflictual ties.  
Engaging in joint activities has no impact on the degree of conflict and 
cooperation when considered together. However, when disaggregated, firms who engage 
in joint participatory activities with stakeholders significantly increase cooperation and 
significantly decrease conflict with stakeholders. Although engaging in joint activities 
with stakeholders has no impact on the general formation of new ties, or the formation of 
positive ties, firms who engage in joint activities with stakeholders significantly (but 
weakly) decrease the formation of negative ties.  
Perceiving the stakeholder network as both a set of pipes through which the firm 
can overcome egocentric uncertainty and a set of prisms which enables the stakeholders 
to overcome altercentric uncertainty is an important means for firms to understand how 
best to navigate the uncertainty in their environments. I explore how the strategic network 
positions of firms, specifically, their access to structural holes and the range of their 
networks, impact their degree of conflict and cooperation and tie formation with 
stakeholders. I also explore how the characteristics of the stakeholders with whom the 
firm is tied, and the nature of the firm’s relations with stakeholders, impact the degree of 
conflict and cooperation and tie formation between the firm and stakeholders. I also 
explore which strategy is more important given a firm’s limited resources. I find that 
while having a network rich in structural holes which ranges across stakeholders in the 
core and periphery of the network is important to the mitigation of egocentric uncertainty 
and the subsequent engendering of cooperation, mitigation of conflict and formation of 
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cooperative ties, rather, how the firm is perceived, based on its stakeholder associations 
and how the firm acts with these stakeholders, are more significantly important.  
Implications for Theory, Policy and Practice and Future Work 
The insights and findings of this work contribute to managerial practice as well as 
to the literatures on strategic management, international business and stakeholder 
engagement. I empirically evaluate the relative efficacy of foreign firms’ efforts to 
navigate foreign environments characterized by both egocentric and altercentric 
uncertainty through an emphasis on the position of the firm in the foreign stakeholder 
network (i.e., access to structural holes and ties to actors in the core vs. periphery of the 
network) which mitigates egocentric uncertainty as compared to an emphasis on the 
firm’s strategic associations with stakeholders and the characteristics of these 
stakeholders (i.e., status and cooperation) as well as the tenor of these relations (i.e., joint 
activity). My key findings augment the initial insights proposed by Podolny (2001) and 
empirically support his findings that egocentric uncertainty is mitigated by a network rich 
in structural holes and altercentric uncertainty is mitigated by demonstrating high status. I 
further find that in addition to having a network rich in structural holes, firms can also 
mitigate egocentric uncertainty by having ties to actors at different strategic parts of the 
network—the network core and the network periphery—with a greater focus on ties to 
core actors. I also find that the cooperation and joint activity with tied actors are also 
important factors through which alters perceive the quality of the investing firm. 
In present practice, many firms focus on reducing their egocentric uncertainty 
about a new market, often through strategic expeditious associations with politically-
connected stakeholders, without stopping to consider how their actions are influencing 
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the altercentric uncertainty of stakeholders in this new market. The perceptions of alters 
becomes paramount only after an adverse event or crisis that requires a rehabilitation of 
the investor’s reputation. My results should reinforce a growing trend in the literature to 
consider the worth of ex ante investments in political and social or reputational capital. 
By strategically managing how it is perceived by stakeholders, firms can increase their 
subsequent cooperation and decrease their subsequent conflict with existing stakeholders, 
and also increase the formation of ties with new stakeholders. 
In contrast to the strategic management literature’s focus on the purported 
performance benefits of network position, I draw attention to the intermediate construct 
of the conflict and cooperation exhibited by alters towards peers. While increasing 
cooperation and reducing such conflict is an implicit element of many studies of alliance, 
investor and other networks, the conflict and cooperation itself is unobserved. My 
analysis of the evolution of this conflict and cooperation revealed unexpected differences 
in the efficacy of different tie formation strategies which merit further analysis in more 
traditional network contexts. 
The international business literature has long been interested in political and 
social risk management emphasizing the importance of overcoming the liability of 
foreignness (Hymer, 1960)  and the obsolescing bargain (Vernon, 1971) as well as, more 
recently, more complex multi-stakeholder conflicts with NGOs and civil society actors 
(Henisz et al., 2005; Zelner et al., 2009). With relatively few exceptions (cf.Nebus et al., 
2009) however, this literature has not examined the underlying relationships between 
foreign investors and stakeholders and the determinants of their evolution across time. I 
believe the network methodology that I employ has wide applicability in international 
 114 
 
business particularly in the analysis of strategic interactions to win the hearts and minds 
of local stakeholders that are increasingly critical not only in the mining sector, oil, gas 
and other extractives but also in construction, infrastructure services, agriculture, 
pharmaceuticals, high-technology and numerous other politically or socially salient 
industries. 
My analysis also provides important insights for scholars of stakeholder 
management and engagement as well as corporate social responsibility (CSR). The 
failure of many firm CSR activities and strategies lies in the inability of these firms to 
move first from a charity or philanthropic basis to a strategic one and then from an 
instrumental cost or output-based stakeholder strategy (i.e., how many schools have been 
built?) to the deeper level of an engagement or outcome-based stakeholder strategy (i.e., 
how many students have graduated from this school and how important was that outcome 
to the local community?) My finding that the key to navigating an environment 
characterized by both egocentric and altercentric uncertainty is through managing how 
the stakeholders in the environment view the firm by strategically associating with 
stakeholders of high status and cooperation through joint and reciprocal activity, alludes 
to this issue of ‘going deeper’ with the firm’s engagement with stakeholders.  
These findings also raise important avenues of future research. First, although the 
stakeholder events data used for this study provides a rich empirical context in which to 
conduct this analysis, an important means to augment these findings is to explore the 
underlying mechanisms and motivations behind the firm’s actions through conducting 
comparative qualitative studies. Additionally, while present practice and the present focus 
of extant literature supports a largely reactionary approach to managing the political 
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environment, the insights from my findings suggest a proactive approach to the 
development of the firm’s network of stakeholders can have significant benefits to the 
firm. Thus an important avenue of future research is to consider the contrasting impacts 
of a proactive versus reactive approach by the firm. 
Lastly, while this work considers the impact and implications of the firm’s events 
with stakeholders upon the firm, an important avenue of research is to determine the 
impact and implications of these strategies on measures of firm-level financial and 
operational performance as well as on the stakeholders themselves. Although I limit the 
scope of this research to a strategic or instrumental approach to stakeholder 
engagement,
13
 an increase in cooperation with the firm implies a strategic benefit for both 
firms and stakeholders and future work should explore and measure the value created for 
both firms and stakeholders.  
  
                                                          
13
 Other scholars have also questioned whether stakeholder theory alone is useful to explicate the 
important but complex moral and normative issues of business ethics (Orts, E. & Strudler, A. 
2009. Putting a Stake in Stakeholder Theory. Journal of Business Ethics, 88: 605 – 615). 
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CHAPTER 3 
Networks of Influence: Homophily and Triadic Closure 
in Stakeholder Networks 
An organization’s ability to manage the sociopolitical environment is contingent 
on its strategic influence within the network of actors in which it is embedded, and on the 
endogenous or independent evolution of the structure of that network. Organizations seek 
to manage their sociopolitical environments by strategically forming ties to influence 
other political, social and economic organizations and actors
14
 (i.e., stakeholders) within 
their environments who together form a network. Strategic actions to form ties are critical 
to that firm’s ability to bargain, form coalitions and use influence tactics to obtain or 
control resources (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980:1) as well as that firm’s ability to change 
attitudes and opinions of stakeholders in support of that firm. An important factor of 
networks and their evolution however, is that the actors and organizations within them 
collectively interact and are interdependent (Balkundi et al., 2006; Salancik, 1986). The 
resulting network structures formed by these collective interactions and dependencies 
themselves “influence [, shape and constrain] the behavior of network members, and, 
through them, produce consequential network effects” (Kahler, 2009:5).  
Organizations seeking to strategically manage stakeholders in their environments 
therefore face an interesting dilemma. As they seek to strategically influence and shape 
their relations, interactions and interdependencies with other actors, these very actions to 
influence other actors through the formation of ties themselves induce evolutionary 
                                                          
14
 I use the term “actors” to refer generally to all possible entities and nodes within a sociopolitical network, 
including, firms, nongovernmental organizations, bilateral and multilateral entities, communities, and 
individuals. 
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network effects that result in specific network outcomes. Or, in sociological terms, as 
organizations seek to change the behavior of others in their network environment, their 
very actions change the structure of the environment itself (Weick, 1979). Therefore, an 
organization seeking to strategically influence other organizations within its environment 
must also understand what network characteristics endogenously create what specific 
network outcomes, especially as these network outcomes may be beneficial or 
detrimental to that firm. A firm that does not understand the relationships between 
specific network characteristics and the endogenous evolution of the structure of that 
network may find its strategic attempts to influence other actors thwarted or undone by 
unexpected changes in the structure of ties. Arguing for a systematic approach to 
identifying and managing network evolutionary processes, Dagnino et al (2008 : 69) 
write: 
To the extent that the processes underlying network emergence and 
evolution may be systematically influenced by the intentional actions 
taken by pivotal firms,…, it becomes of interest for firm executives to 
identify a limited number of variables which may be leveraged and 
managed in order to direct the evolution of the network they participate in 
towards a specific strategic aim and coherently with the requirements of 
the competitive domain in which they compete. 
 
I explore how homophily of the characteristics of the actors connected in a triad impact 
an important but underexplored network outcome—the closure of that triad. The 
performance benefits of triadic closure are well-documented in the literature and are 
founded upon the different concepts of Burt (1997a) and Coleman (1988) on social 
capital. According to Burt (1997a),  social capital comprises information and control 
benefits which can only be obtained when actors bridge non-redundant networks. 
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Coleman (1988) alternatively argues that social capital is a function of embeddedness or 
closure of the network. Embeddedness within the network affords both opportunities and 
constraints in tie formation (Kenis & Knoke, 2002). I do not explore the benefits or costs 
of triadic closure, but rather explore what factors of the network cause triadic closure. 
Specifically, I explore whether homophily or difference in the node-level (i.e., actor 
specific) or structural characteristics of actors in a triad impact the closure of that triad. 
 Figure 3.1 depicts open and closed triads. 
Whether, and how, a triad closes or remains open is important to firms seeking to 
manage their networks of stakeholders. Relationships among the actors in closed triads 
may be inherently more complex than those of open triads because of the greater degree 
of interdependency among the actors in closed triads. Influence and power relations 
among actors in open and closed triads may also differ where actors in open triads may 
be (knowingly or unknowingly) used against each other to the benefit of the third actor 
(Burt, 1992; Simmel, 1950). For example, in a triple of actors i, j, and k, actor i who has 
ties to both the other actors j and k in the triad, who are not themselves connected, is said 
to occupy a structural hole and can strategically benefit by leveraging information from 
one actor against the other (Burt, 1992). Because all actors in closed triads are 
interconnected, there are no leverage or information benefits. Influence and power 
relations and dynamics differ in open and closed triads also due to the possible formation 
of alliances among actors—whereas two actors in closed triads can form alliances against 
a common third threat (Simmel, 1950), actors in open triads cannot (unless, of course, the 
triad becomes closed). Lastly, actors in closed triads are subjected to the evolutionary 
mechanism of balance (Cartwright et al., 1956; Heider, 1958) and therefore the structure 
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of the relations may be more stable or unstable. Open triads are not subject to the 
evolutionary balancing mechanism but may be subject to the closely-related network 
evolutionary mechanism of transitivity, which is considered a precursor of some balanced 
structures (Davis, 1970; Doreian & Krackhardt, 2001; Holland & Leinhardt, 1972; 
Johnsen, 1986). 
 I use insights from Simmelian (Simmel, 1950) and Balance (Cartwright et al., 
1956; Heider, 1958) theories to explore the relationship between dyadic structure and 
triadic closure among networks of actors in the sociopolitical context. For each triple of 
actors forming an open triad, I explore how the homophily (or similarity) of the 
characteristics of the three actors comprising the triad impact the likelihood of that triad 
closing. I outline hypotheses of four types of structural homophily of the actors in the 
triad—access to resources, status, likeability and number of ties (centrality)—on the 
likelihood of the closure of that triad. I test these hypotheses in a novel database of the 
interactions among firms and political, social and economic actors in the global gold 
mining industry. Holding constant the quality of existing ties (i.e., strength and 
cooperation of the ties), symmetry of relations in the existing dyads, reciprocity of 
relations in the existing dyads, and the number of common others actors in existing dyads 
are connected to (i.e., for a triple of actors i, j, k, how many actors l, m,…z, actors ij or jk 
or ki are connected to), I find that a link that closes an open directed triad is more likely 
when the actors of the triad have different access to resources, and different status but that 
link is more likely when actors have similar numbers of ties to other actors. I also find 
that likeability among actors in the triad has no impact on the likelihood of closing that 
triad.  
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These findings suggest that for firms seeking to understand and manage their 
political environments, an understanding of how similar or dissimilar triples of actors are 
may provide insight into how relationships among actors may change. For firms 
establishing diverse networks of stakeholders, knowing which actors are more likely to 
form clusters (of triads) based on the similarity or dissimilarity of their access to 
resources, status, likeability and centrality may be critical to (1) predicting the formation 
of coalitions among actors, (2) determining whether to expend resources trying to form 
strategic ties with specific stakeholders or to allow network evolutionary processes to 
“help” in that tie formation, and (3) predicting how the formation of ties with specific 
other stakeholders can impact the structure of the existing ties in the firm’s stakeholder 
network and that firm’s ability to mitigate or leverage these impacts.  
 I contribute to the existing body of literature on homophily by exploring the 
impact of homophily of the structural characteristics among actors in a network on triadic 
closure. I hypothesize that although the principle of homophily would suggest that actors 
of similar characteristics are more likely to form a tie that closes an open directed triad, 
the nature of these characteristics in terms of their dyadic implications on dependence 
and zero-sum outcomes will determine whether the principle of homophily is supported 
or rejected. My finding that structural dissimilarity in terms of differential access to 
resources and differential status has a greater likelihood of closing directed triads is 
therefore an important complement to the existing body of work on the value of bridging 
structural holes. I use a theoretically well-documented but empirically underexplored 
approach to triadic closure using directed ties to structure the triads and thus contribute to 
the nascent body of empirical work on triadic structure. I also contribute to the nonmarket 
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and international business literatures, which have long explored interactions among firms 
and stakeholders in the sociopolitical context by identifying and empirically testing 
additional factors of strategic importance that firms can use to navigate their nonmarket 
environments. Also, I contribute to the network literature that has primarily used 
simulations to understand interactions among directed triads, by exploring how 
evolutionary network processes occur in the sociopolitical arena. Another important 
empirical contribution to the nonmarket, strategy and network literatures is the novel 
hand-coded dataset of stakeholder interactions in the global gold mining industry which I 
employ to explore the impact of homophily of the structural characteristics of actors in 
open triads on the likelihood of that triad closing.  
The remaining sections of the paper proceed as follows. I next outline the theory 
behind the strategic importance of the triad and the evolutionary mechanisms underlying 
change in triadic structures. I then outline my hypotheses on the relationships between 
four types of structural homophily among the actors forming an open directed triad—
specifically, access to resources, status, likeability and number of ties—and the likelihood 
of that triad closing. I then present my model, discuss the results and conclude with 
implications and future extensions of this work. 
THEORY 
Strategic influence in the dyad 
Organizations are “politically negotiated orders …perpetually bargaining, 
repeatedly forming and reforming coalitions and constantly availing themselves of 
influence tactics” often involving the “tactical use of power to retain or obtain control of 
real or symbolic resources” (Bacharach et al., 1980:1).  Power and influence between 
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actors has long been a focus of organizational scholarship (Blau, 1964; Cook & Emerson, 
1978; Dahl, 1957; Etzioni, 1961; French & Raven, 1959; Pfeffer, 1981; Weber, 1964). 
The classical concept of power defined by Dahl (1957: 202-3) is that “A has power over 
В to the extent that he can get В to do something that В would not otherwise do.” Within 
exchange relations, power is not an attribute of the actor, but rather “a property of the 
social relation” (Emerson, 1962: 32) and because social relations are primarily built upon 
mutual dependence, the intent and ability to influence an actor is contingent upon the 
ability of one actor, A to control something of value to a second actor, B. That is, “power 
resides implicitly in the other’s dependency” (Emerson, 1962: 32, italics in original). In 
this dyadic relational view of influence, the ability of an actor to influence another is 
contingent primarily on the characteristics of the target actor and the influencing actor. 
That is, the ability of an actor A to influence an actor B is contingent on the dependency 
relationship between them. Within networks of actors however, because actors are 
interconnected and interdependent, power and influence is dependent on the collective 
interactions and dependencies of all the actors within the network (Balkundi et al., 2006; 
Salancik, 1986), and not limited only to the interactions between actors in a dyad. 
Therefore, an explication of the relationships among actors at the level of the triad is 
necessary to understand how similarities and differences among actors impact the 
structure of the network in which their relations are embedded. 
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The Structure of the Triad and Balance and Transitive mechanisms 
Two primary literatures explore interactions among actors in triads: Simmelian 
theory (Simmel, 1950) and Balance theory (Cartwright et al., 1956; Heider, 1958). 
Simmelian theory explores how the introduction of the third actor changes relations and 
power between the actors of the initial dyad. Simmel argues that “the dyad represents 
both the first social synthesis and unification, and the first separation and antithesis” 
whereas, “the appearance of the third party indicates transition, conciliation, and 
abandonment of absolute contrast” (Simmel, 1950:145). The introduction of the third 
“emerges as a new relationship” characterized by the interactions between actors in the 
dyad and the interactions of each of these actors with the newly introduced third 
(Simmel, 1950:154). Consider an existing dyad of actors A and B. The introduction of 
actor C changes the influence dynamics between A and B because actor C’s relationship 
with A may impact A’s relationship with B.   
In Simmel’s discussion, the third actor interacting between two actors in a dyad 
can take primarily three positions or roles: the position of an impartial nonpartisan who 
(1) arbitrates or (2) mediates between the two actors in the dyad (for example mediators 
between labor and management), or the position of the (3) tertius gaudens—“the third 
who enjoys” (Simmel, 1950:154)—the partial partisan who seeks his own gain by taking 
advantage of the conflict of two others and can, by supporting or granting favor to one of 
the two parties, change the power and influence dynamic between them. Importantly, the 
power of the tertius who seeks to influence the relationship between the actors in the 
dyad is “determined exclusively by the strength which each [of the two parties in the 
dyad] has relative to the other” (Simmel, 1950:157). Specifically, the ability of an actor A 
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to influence actor B, is contingent on the relations between actor B and other actors, 
C…Z, with whom B is connected. This is because, actor A’s influence over actor B may 
be mitigated by B’s relationship with C. A classic example of these relationships is a host 
country government seeking to influence a foreign firm operating within its country. If 
that firm has (strong) ties with its home country, and the firm’s home country provides 
foreign aid to the host country government, the host country government’s ability to 
influence the firm, both positively or negatively, is contingent upon the firm’s 
relationship with its home country government (i.e., the willingness and ability of the 
home country government to act against the host country government in support of the 
firm by leveraging its power through tactics such as withholding aid support). 
Alternatively, a host country government may treat a foreign firm favorably because of 
its positive relationship with that firm’s home country government (e.g., the case of 
Chinese firms in African countries, and Russian firms in Venezuela). Early work 
exploring the insights and concept of Simmelian theory explored the formation of 
coalitions and the impact of the differences in power and other characteristics of the 
actors in the triad on the formation of coalitions (Caplow, 1956, 1959; Gamson, 1961). 
The insight here, is that the structural alignment of the triad is contingent on the degree of 
similarity or difference in the characteristics of the actors who form the triad. 
The second theory of triadic interaction, Balance theory (Cartwright et al., 1956; 
Heider, 1944; Heider, 1958) explores the relative stability or “balance” among actors 
already connected within a triad. In Heider’s (1946, 1958) discussion of cognitive and 
affective “balance,” social actors move towards balance in their relationships. A triad is 
balanced when all interactions between the three actors are positive or when two are 
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negative and one is positive, i.,e, (+,+,+), (+,-,-), (-,+,-), (-,-,+). Balanced triads are more 
“stable” or enduring over time (Cartwright et al., 1956; Doreian et al., 2001; Heider, 
1944; Heider, 1958; Hummon et al., 2003; Krackhardt et al., 2007; Shaffer, 1981; 
Stokman et al., 1997). A triad is imbalanced when all the interactions between the three 
actors are negative or when one is negative and two are positive, i.e., (-,-,-), (+,+,-),(-
,+,+), (+,-,+). Imbalance invokes a form of “tension” or strain which induces actors to 
change their social positions to reduce this imbalance, and thus imbalanced triads are 
inherently unstable. The balance process is not a single step, but rather a multi-step 
process (Doreian et al., 2001) and while not all structures become balanced, there is a 
move towards or against balance (Doreian et al., 2001). An important predictor of a 
balanced outcome is the presence of a positive relationship between the two initial actors 
in the dyad (Doreian et al., 2001) suggesting that the balancing mechanism is feasible 
only when the “primary tie” is positive. Figure 3.2 outlines the balancing mechanism.  
The balancing mechanism is contingent on the nature of the ties among all three 
actors in the triad. Newcomb (1978) argues that Heider’s initial discussion of balance of 
the triad implicitly assumes that the three ties within a triad have an equal weight upon 
balance, but in fact the three ties have different weights upon balance. That is, the 
structure of the triad is a function of the three different types of ties. In stochastic actor-
based dynamic network models, the nature of the ties between actors is a choice 
determined by the actor “sending” the tie, and is contingent on the attributes of the 
sending and target actors, the positions of actors in the network and actor perceptions 
about the network (Snijders, van de Bunt, & Steglich, 2010). That is, the nature of a tie is 
based on the characteristics of the actors. And therefore, the structure of a triad is 
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contingent upon the characteristics of the actors as these determine the nature of the ties 
formed. 
Limited but significant empirical work explores structural balance not as an 
outcome in and of itself, but rather as an underlying mechanism that shapes strategic 
outcomes among actors in a network. Exploring states of “equilibrium and 
disequilibrium” in the interactions among nation states, Harary (1961) finds that balanced 
configurations of nation states tend to maintain the status quo, and predicts that in 
imbalanced configurations the weakest bond will change sign to attain structural balance. 
Visser (1994) explores mechanisms of attaining cognitive balance in voting behavior and 
finds that persuasion and projection have a greater impact than policy voting. Burt’s 
(1997) study of entrepreneurs, distrust and third parties also finds a relationship between 
balance and trust: “the stronger the aggregate connection between the ego and alter 
through third parties, the more likely that ego and alter trust one another” (Burt, 
1997b:6). Kilduff and Krackhardt (1994) find support for the balancing mechanism: that 
an observer’s strain for cognitive balance in perceptions of friendship ties with prominent 
others boosts that actor’s reputation, but actually having a prominent friend has no impact 
on reputation. More recently, Nakamura, Tita and Krackhardt (2007) examine the balance 
of relationships among rival and ally networks of gangs in Los Angeles and find under 
conditions of imbalance irrational violence between gangs increases, whereas under 
conditions of balance gang violence is more rational and occurs only to obtain strategic 
advantages.  
While structural balance theory explores how endogenous changes occur in triads 
of actors based on their relations, a more strategic application is how actors “balance” 
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constraints they face due to power, inequality and dependence in their relations with 
others (Blau, 1964; Blau, 1977; Emerson, 1962). Important applications of balance theory 
and balancing mechanisms have been explored by scholars of alliances in the 
international relations and strategic management fields. International relations scholars 
have explored alliance formation or more broadly the phenomenon of “alignment”  
among nation states as a function of the inequalities of power and the relative strength of 
these nations (Snyder, 1991). The inequalities among actors can lead to alliances to either 
“balance (ally in opposition to the principal source of danger) or bandwagon (ally with 
the state that poses the major threat)” (Walt, 1985:4). Related work in the strategic 
management domain explores strategic alignment to mitigate constraint. In his theory on 
“two-step leverage” Gargiulo (1993) explores how actors seek to alleviate political 
constraints in the workplace by using cooptive strategies—i.e., forming strategic alliances 
with other actors who can mitigate the behavior of the actor who is the source of the 
constraint. In ongoing work, Gimeno & Jeong (2001) use structural balance theory to 
explain competitive and cooperative alliance behavior among firms in the airline 
industry.  
Transitivity, a mechanism closely related to structural balance, has long been 
explored as a component or mechanism of triadic closure within the network literature.  
Transitivity is a “central proposition in structural sociometry” (Davis et al., 1971) and is 
conceptually understood as: the friend of my friend will be my friend (Rapoport, 1963: 
541). For a triple of actors, p, o and x, with signed directed relations (e.g., cooperative 
relations such as liking, agreement, acceptance, or conflictual relations such as disliking, 
disagreement, rejection), “Interpersonal choices tend to be transitive if p chooses o 
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[cooperative relations] and o chooses x [cooperative relations], then p is likely to choose 
x [cooperative relations]” (Davis et al., 1971: 309).  Of the eight (8) possible 
configurations of relations among three actors identified in balance theory—i.e., (  
                                            —only the 
(      triplet is transitive, i.e., if p cooperates with o, and o cooperates with x, p will 
always cooperate with o (Davis & Leinhardt, 1972: 222). The       triplet is 
considered intransitive and all other triplets are vacuously intransitive (Holland & 
Leinhardt, 1970). The transitive mechanism is active only when all relations are 
cooperative (Davis et al., 1972: 222).   
Due to the directed nature of the transitive mechanism (i.e., ij, jk and ik), 
triads of actors can be distinguished by whether they are transitive (i.e., subject to the 
transitive mechanism) or cyclical (i.e., ij, jk, ki) and therefore not subject to the 
transitive mechanism (Figure 3.3 depicts transitive and cyclic triads).  
The Open Triad 
 Simmelian theory (Simmel, 1950) explores how the introduction of the third actor 
changes the dynamics between the two actors already connected in a dyad based on an 
implicit assumption that the third actor is known by, and directly connected to, both 
actors in the dyad, e.g., a mediator or arbiter negotiates between two actors who are 
connected, such as a mediator between two nations in conflict or an arbiter between 
management and labor unions. Balance theory (Cartwright et al., 1956; Heider, 1958) 
explores dynamics among the three actors in the triad once all ties among them have been 
formed and argues that the three actors must have balanced relationships for the triad to 
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be stable. Both Simmelian and Balance theories thus describe relations among “closed” 
triads when all actors are known to (i.e., tied to) each other. 
An intermediate triadic structure is one in which the third actor is introduced to 
only one of the two actors in the existing dyad, creating an open triad. An example of an 
open triad and the strategic problem of network closure within the sociopolitical sphere is 
a firm connected to two small nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), A and B, who are 
themselves not connected. Because of their small size, the firm may be able to “ignore” 
these two NGOs, however, if they should unite and effectively join forces against the 
firm, the firm may no longer be able to ignore them. If the probability of these two NGOs 
connecting is low, the firm can continue to ignore them. However, if the characteristics of 
the firm and each of the NGOs together induce an endogenous network evolutionary 
mechanism which causes these NGOs to connect (sooner rather than later), then the firm 
must strategically act to engender cooperation and support from A and/or B to mitigate 
the need for an alliance against it.  
Because the characteristics of all three actors (the firm, and NGOs A and B) 
collectively determine the structure of the triad, I explore how the homophily of the 
structural characteristics of all three actors impact the likelihood of a tie forming between 
NGOs A and B thus closing the firm, NGO A, and NGO B triad.   
Structural Homophily and Triadic Closure 
Within the literatures examining relations among triads of actors, of importance is 
the discussion on how inequalities or differences among actors results in cooptive 
balancing mechanisms and in specific balanced or imbalanced structures (Blau, 1964; 
Caplow, 1956, 1959; Emerson, 1962; Gargiulo, 1993). An important alternative relational 
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concept that also affects how actors in networks behave is homophily. Homophily, the 
principle that  actors with similar characteristics are more likely to associate with each 
other and cooperate with each other (Lazarsfeld et al., 1954; cf. McPherson et al., 2001) 
has long been associated with tie formation. Early work on social relations argued that 
the formation of ties between similar actors is a function of the similarity of these actors 
bringing about similar attitudes (Newcomb, 1978). Newcomb (1978) states: “the 
possession of similar characteristics predisposes individuals to be attracted to each other 
to the degree that those characteristics are both observable and valued by those who 
observe them—in short, insofar as they provide a basis for similarity of attitudes.” 
Homophily has been associated with diverse outcomes of strategic importance to 
cooperation and tie formation. Similar actors offer information relevant to each other 
(Festinger, 1954) and are more likely to cooperate and form stronger relationships 
(Buchan, Croson, & Dawes, 2002) while competition is greater among dissimilar actors 
(Nebus, 2006; Reagans, 2005). Ties between similar actors are more stable and last 
longer (Felmlee, Sprecher, & Bassin, 1990) and the cost of maintaining these ties 
between similar actors is plausibly lower than the cost of maintaining ties between 
dissimilar actors (Kossinets & Watts, 2009).  
I explore the impact of similiarity and differences among actors in a triad on the 
closure of that triad. While the mechanism of homophily argues consistent formation of 
ties between actors of similar characteristics, the balancing mechanisms created by 
inequality or differences argue the formation of ties between actors of dissimilar 
characteristics. Using insights from the literatures exploring the mechanisms of 
homophily and dependence, I explore the contingent factors of the actors in a triad that 
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would close or keep open the triad. I specifically explore how homophily or difference of 
four characteristics of actors in a directed triad—access to resources, status, likeability 
and ties to others—impacts the likelihood of a tie forming to close the triad. Access to 
resources and status are two concepts widely associated with dependence, that is, access 
to resources and status are possible only in the face of inequality and are therefore the 
outcomes of zero-sum games. Conversely, while likeability and popularity are two 
concepts widely associated with homophily and are possible without dependence, that is, 
likeability and popularity are not zero-sum outcomes. 
Zero-sum outcomes: Access to resources and Status 
Access to resources. Access to and control of resources is a form of power or 
influence which can be defined as the “inverse of dependence” (Brass, 1984). According 
to the dependency framework (Emerson, 1962; Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck, & 
Pennings, 1971; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977) power is obtained or created by an actor’s 
access to and control of resources. By providing access to people, information and other 
resources, an actor’s structural position within a network is an important source of power. 
Scholars have explored several “bases” of structural power—that is, the specific benefit 
structural positions afford actors who occupy those positions which “enables [these 
actors] to manipulate the behavior of others” (Bacharach et al., 1980:34). Bases of 
structural power include: control of coercive resources—those resources that can be used 
for sanction or punitive measures; control of remunerative resources—those resources 
that are used for reward; control of symbolic rewards—resources associated with 
normative and symbolic value (Bacharach et al., 1980; Etzioni, 1961). By providing 
unique information as well as the control of information (Pettigrew, 1973) structural 
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position also affords power. Those organizations that occupy structural holes, especially 
structural holes that span organizational and other boundaries, have access to and control 
of unique information (Burt, 1992) and have more power over organizations who do not 
occupy structural holes (Brass, 1984).   
Actors with greater access to resources maintain that power when associated with 
other actors who do not have the same access to resources. Further, because of the 
resource differential, those actors who have little access to resources actively seek out 
others with access to resources. Because the benefit of access to resources is a function of 
dependency,  
H1:  A link that closes a directed triad is more likely when actors in the triad 
have different access to resources. 
Status. Status is defined as “social esteem and respect that typically yields 
influence” (Ridgeway, 2006: 301) and can be understood as “an evaluative hierarchy 
between groups in society” (Ridgeway, 2006: 301; Weber, 1968) and as a “hierarchy of 
esteem and deference between individuals” (Goffman, 1967; Ridgeway, 2006: 301; 
Ridgeway et al., 1995). Status is also considered a function of the statuses of those to 
whom an actor is connected (Bonacich, 1987). In communication networks, status is 
reinforcing: higher status actors are connected to other actors of high status. However, in 
exchange networks, status is a result of dependence, that is, the status of the central actor 
is a function of the number of dependent ties (Cook et al., 1978)  The transfer of status 
across ties and the subsequent performance benefit is a hallmark of social network theory. 
Traditional performance benefits afforded to actors of high status include deference (Turk 
et al., 1962) and influence. A fundamental aspect of network evolution is that status 
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increases tie formation  (Hallen, 2008; Podolny, 2001). The performance benefit of high 
status is well documented. Burt (1987) in his study of the adoption of a new antibiotic by 
physicians finds that the diffusion of adoption is a function of prominence of the adopting 
physician with prominent physicians adopting the drug early. Status also affords 
exchange benefits (Thye et al., 2006). Melding the concepts of power from social 
characteristics theory and network exchange theory, Thye et al. (2006: 1472) find that 
“high status actors are more competent and influential in establishing the initial 
conditions for exchange.” That is, high status actors obtain more favorable ex ante 
conditions for exchange as people are more willing to compromise when bargaining with 
actors they perceive to be of higher status. Further, in repeated transactions, high status 
individuals benefit more than low status individuals (Thye et al., 2006). An actor of high 
status obtains the benefits of influence, deference, and favorable ex ante conditions for 
exchange. Because the benefits of high status are zero sum,  
H2:  A link that closes a directed triad is more likely when actors have different 
status. 
Non-zero sum outcomes: Likeability and Popularity 
Likeability.  Likeability is an outcome of affect—“the positive or negative 
evaluation of an object, idea, or mental image” (Lorenzoni, Leiserowitz, De Franca 
Doria, Poortinga, & Pidgeon, 2006: 265; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2005). Affect influences 
decision-making and the processing of information (Epstein, 1994), is closely associated 
with trust (Lewis & Weigert, 1984), and is perceived to be the underlying “motor” of 
behavior (Tomkins, 1962). Likeability is strongly predicted by political preference 
(Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982),  and directly impacts the willingness of actors 
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to create ties (Casciaro & Lobo, 2008). Likeability is also strongly associated with 
homophily in that similar actors associate and cooperate with each other (McPherson et 
al., 2001). Because likeability is not contingent on zero-sum dependence,  
H3:  A link that closes a directed triad is more likely when actors have similar 
likeability. 
Number of Ties (Popularity). Popularity or centrality within networks is a 
function of the number of ties that actor has to other actors within the network (Freeman, 
1979). An actor with high centrality is a focal point within communication networks and 
is strategically positioned for active participation in the communication of information 
(Freeman, 1979: 219). Central actors are also highly visible within the network, their 
central position signals their ability to access resources from the network and therefore 
they are desired targets for alliances (Gulati, 1999). Additionally, according to 
preferential-attachment theory (Barabasi et al., 1999) actors with a greater number of ties 
have an “accumulative advantage” where, as the number of ties increases, the probability 
of tie formation also increases (Powell et al., 1996). Because centrality is not a dependent 
zero sum game,  
H4:  A link that closes a directed triad is more likely when actors have similar 
number of ties. 
DATA AND METHODS 
Sample, Data Construction, and Unit of Analysis 
I test these hypotheses within the global gold mining industry on a unique 
longitudinal panel dataset of the stakeholder interactions of a population of 26 mines 
located in 20 largely emerging countries operated by 19 firms listed on the Toronto Stock 
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Exchanges (TSX). Due to the highly political nature of this industry, mining firms face 
significant adverse interventions orchestrated by a diverse set of relatively powerful and 
dedicated stakeholders including, NGOs, governments, multilateral agencies, legal 
practitioners, environmentalists, development specialists and members of the community 
in which the mine is situated, as well as actors located in different countries. The highly 
political nature of this industry is ideal to test the interactions among stakeholders at the 
triad-level as the higher numbers of stakeholders and the greater frequency of interactions 
creates a “denser” network with more open and closed triads than may occur among 
actors in a less politicized industry.  
The stakeholder interactions within this dataset comprise media-reported 
instances in which an actor acts or expresses sentiment towards another actor that 
connotes cooperation or conflict. I draw upon extensive research in international relations 
examining the escalation of interstate conflict and cooperation to identify relevant verbs 
and verb phrases and code them on a scale of conflict and cooperation to create the 
modified degree of conflict-cooperation scale relevant to actions and interactions among 
firms and stakeholders in the business context. This database is created through the hand-
coding of over 22,229 news articles (i.e., an average of almost 1,000 articles per mine, 
ranging from roughly 300 to 2,700 articles per mine) within the FACTIVA database 
referencing the mine name and the firm name. The news articles are coded according to a 
detailed coding protocol adapted from  international conflict studies (Bond et al., 2003; 
King et al., 2003b). My stakeholder events dataset comprises 51,754 stakeholder events 
linking 4,623 unique stakeholders. The number of stakeholder events per mine ranges 
from 97 to over 6,600; the number of stakeholders per mine ranges from 19 to just over 
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1,000;  the number of unique ties ranges from 20 to over 800; and the number of years of 
the life of the mine range from 2 to 16 years. Based on these characteristics, this novel 
dataset of stakeholder events provides a comprehensive view of the dynamic events 
within firm-stakeholder networks and facilitates valid and objective quantitative analysis. 
My event data is sensitive to the (1) direction, (2) polarity (sign), and (3) relative 
“strength” of the events among actors in the networks. Table 2.1 provides the summary 
statistics of the stakeholder dataset.    
My analysis is the triad level of the network, that is, for each set of three actors 
who are, or can be, connected. This level of analysis is more accurate and informative 
than the global network measures of balance and network closure as the global measures 
aggregate over the nature and differences of the ties precluding the ability to explore how 
these micro-level ties affect relations among actors (Kalish & Robins, 2006). I use the 
dataset of directed dyadic stakeholder relations to create a dataset of directed triadic 
stakeholder relations. My unit of analysis is the directed triad-mine; i.e., for each of the 
26 mines in the sample, every existing triple of actors is differentiated by the directed 
dyads within them and therefore, ij, jk, ki ≠ ij, jk, ki, i.e., the case of a triad 
where i chooses j, j chooses k, and k chooses i, is different from a triad where i chooses j, 
j chooses k, and i chooses k. Using directed ties to create the triads, I obtain eight 
possible configurations of triad. Within my stakeholder events dataset not all ties are 
reciprocated, i.e., ij, but there is no corresponding tie from j to i. Therefore, not all of 
the 8 possible directed triad configurations exist for each triple of actors. Figure 3.4 
presents the 8 possible directed triad configurations. 
From the dataset of stakeholder relations, for each 3-year rolling subperiod of 
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each mine, I first identify a list of all existing actors and cross-merge the initial set of 
existing dyads with the list of existing actors to obtain a set of 3 unique actors, i, j, and k 
(i.e., observations where an actor occurred twice in a triple, such as i, j, i, or i, j, j are 
excluded). Once all possible unique triples of actors are identified, I then determine 
whether each actor in the triple is in reality (i.e., according to the existing dyads recorded 
in the stakeholder dataset) connected to the two other actors in the triple to determine the 
set of existing triads. I identify three different triads based on the existing ties between 
actors: (1) existing closed triads, where all three actors are connected to each other, i.e., 
triads with three dyads, (2) existing open triads, where one of the actors in the triple is 
connected to both other actors who are themselves not connected, i.e., triads with two 
dyads, and (3) existing non-triads, where only two out of the three actors in the triple are 
connected by a single dyad, i.e., triads with only 1 dyad. Because my level of analysis is 
at the triad level (where 3 actors are completely or partially connected), I drop the non-
triads in which triples of actors have only 1 dyad between two actors.  
The stakeholder dataset of interactions between actors is a dataset of directed ties 
between actors and therefore the directed tie ij (where actor i acts or expresses some 
sentiment connoting conflict and cooperation towards actor j) may be very different from 
the directed tie ji (where actor j actors or expresses some sentiment connoting 
cooperation or conflict towards actor i).  Because interactions among actors shape 
network outcomes, and because interactions among actors are themselves shaped by actor 
attributes, I maintain the use of the directed data in the creation of the triads. Therefore, 
once the existing open and closed triads are identified, I follow the actor-based stochastic 
models within the literature (Snijders et al., 2010) et al, 2010) and those of scholars 
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studying structural balance (Cartwright et al., 1956) and next separate the triads based on 
their directed ties, thereby forming directed triads.  
The importance of directed ties in triads is well-documented within the network 
literature. Cartwright and Harary (1956), who generalized Heider’s theory of cognitive 
balance to a theory of social systems which can be used to explore balance (and relations 
among triads) in other contexts “such as communication networks, power systems, 
sociometric structures, systems of orientations, or perhaps neural networks,” argue that 
the “assumption of symmetry” in the theory of structural balance is limited (i.e., liking is 
not always reciprocated). They (re)-define balance in terms of “s-digraphs” (i.e., signed 
directed graphs) to include “in one conceptual scheme both symmetric and unsymmetric 
relationships.” They also state that in a triad, when po is positive and op is negative 
(or two actors have different signs) then the graph containing them is not balanced, 
implying that the relations among actors changes based on whether their ties are signed 
and reciprocated or not.  
Within graphs it is “extremely rare for the liking of i for j to have exactly the 
same value as the liking of j for i” (Davis, 1970:849). Therefore, an important concept 
within triadic structures is that the ties in directed graphs may be directed from the lesser-
liker to the greater-liker and thus have a “pecking structure” (Harary, Norman, & 
Cartwright, 1965) and can be considered to be hierarchical. Undirected triadic structures 
assume no hierarchy. Hierarchical graphs have different types of triads than graphs with 
no hierarchy. Therefore, different types of triads, based on their directed signs may be the 
result of different characteristics among the actors forming the triad. In addition, because 
the triadic evolutionary mechanisms of balance and transitivity are based on directed ties, 
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a more complete analysis of triadic structures includes the different types of triads 
identified through balance theory. Although I do not assume a pecking order or hierarchy 
from the directed ties in my stakeholder dataset (although a pecking order is possible 
because of the political nature of the industry), the fact that different triads may result 
from different actor characteristics and therefore may have important implications for 
firms seeking to understand and manage triadic configurations of actors in their networks, 
makes empirical analysis of directed triadic relations an important contribution to the 
literature. 
The literature on stochastic actor-based models also gives support for the use of 
directed ties. An assumption of stochastic actor-based models of dynamic networks 
(Snijders, 2006; Snijders et al., 2003; Snijders et al., 2010) is that  “actors control their 
outgoing ties” meaning that “changes in ties are made by the actors who send the tie, on 
the basis of their and others’ attributes, their position in the network and their perceptions 
about the rest of the network” (Snijders et al., 2010:46).   
While the importance of the use of directed ties in the literature has been widely 
stated, due to data limitations, few studies manage to employ directed ties. In his study of 
the relationship between homophily and transitivity among actors in personal networks,  
Louch (2000:47) uses symmetric relations but states “While a more complete analysis 
would deal with all triad types, data limitations resulting from the attempt to generalize 
transitivity to a wider variety of real-world situations necessitates starting with the 
symmetric case first.” 
Scholars have used various types of directed data within the literatures on social 
networks. Doreian and Mrvar (1996) in testing the “basic tenet of balance theory”—that 
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there is a “tendency towards balance with signed relations”—use signed directed graphs 
in their simulation. However, as they explore the tendency towards balance, they limit 
their sample to only the transitive triads excluding the cyclic triads (shown in Figure 3.3 
above). I similarly use signed directed triads but do not limit my triads to only the 
transitive triads but use all eight configurations of possible directed triads with both 
transitive and cyclic ordering.    
In their triad-level analysis examining the persistence of ties among actors in 
communities, Martin and Yeung (2006) use ties with both symmetric and asymmetric 
components, where each dyad has three possible structures: directed outgoing ij, 
directed incoming ij or reciprocal, ij. They also consider asymmetric relations as 
being hierarchical, i.e., if i chooses j, j chooses k, i chooses k because k is more attractive 
than i or j and everyone knows it” (Martin et al., 2006:359). 
Other structures of triads have been explored in the literature. Modeling social 
structure in small groups, Davis and Leinhardt (1972) focus on the types of pair relations 
among actors in their creation of triads. They assume three types of pair relations: (1) 
mutual positive, where i chooses j and j chooses i; (2) mutual non-positive, where i does 
not choose j and j does not choose i;  and, (3) asymmetric, where i chooses j but j does 
not choose i or the converse,  j chooses i but i does not choose j. They identify 13 
possible triads among groups of actors: 10 triads based on the three possible 
combinations of pair relations and three additional triad groups based on the possible 
“directions” for triads with two or more asymmetric relations.  
Exploring individual psychological differences on network structures, Kalish and 
Robins (2006), create a triad structure based on tie strength: S=strong ties (S), weak ties 
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(W), and no ties (N). They explore relations between an actor (ego) and two alters. While 
the relations between ego and the alters are limited to strong or weak ties, relations 
between the two alters can be strong, weak or no tie. Using this triad structure they 
identify nine different configurations of triads, three of which have three different types 
of structural holes: WNW, SNS, WNS. 
Scholarship on triad structure has therefore explored options for the creation of 
datasets of triads with the use of directed data with the most (detailed) configurations of 
possible triads as giving a more complete picture of interactions among triples of actors 
in networks. Therefore, I create a dataset of directed triads comprising up to 8 different 
configurations of triads. My longitudinal panel dataset of triads is unbalanced because not 
all triads are observed at every time period. To create a balanced panel to run my 
piecewise exponential hazard rate model, I interpolate by keeping the most recent value. 
For example, for a triad structure that occurs at subperiods 4, 5, 8, 9 and 12, I fill 
subperiods 6 and 7 with the values in subperiod 5, and fill the values of subperiods 10 
and 11 with the values of subperiod 9.   
The stakeholder dataset I use to create the triads is also sensitive to the strength of 
the ties between actors based on the degree of cooperation or conflict between them. The 
degree of conflict and cooperation ranges from -1 to +1 and the value 0 connotes a 
neutral tie. No tie is depicted as missing (i.e., “.”). Therefore, each of the three dyads 
within each triad is not only signed but is also weighted based on the average directed 
degree of conflict and cooperation. In this analysis however, I do not distinguish between 
cooperative and conflictual ties. Although the directed dataset is more complete and 
informative, work is underway to create a dataset with undirected triads which I will test 
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as a robustness check. Further, in their study of reciprocity in the global sphere using 
WEISS data, Rajmaira & Ward (1990) exclude neutral events between actors. In the 
creation of the triads, I do not distinguish ties based on cooperative, conflictual and 
neutral events that occur among actors. I do however, control for the sign (i.e., 
cooperation or conflict) and strength of these ties. 
Dependent Variables 
Closed Triad. My dependent variable is a binary variable exploring whether a 
triad of actors is closed (i.e., each actor is tied to the two other actors in the triad) or open 
(i.e., one of the actors in the triad is connected to both other actors who are not connected 
to each other). I code the closed triads as 1 and the open triads as 0. My final dataset 
comprises a total of 1,540,262 closed and open triad observations with 1,348,196 open 
triads (a frequency of 87.53%) and 192,066 closed triads (a frequency of 12.47%).  
My measure of closed triads corresponds with other similar measures of triadic 
closure in extant literature. Louch (2000) explores the relationship between homophily 
and transitivity in a respondent’s personal network. In this work, the triad comprises 
relations between a focal actor (the respondent) and two other actors (alters) identified by 
the focal actor as important in their network (i.e., someone with whom the respondent 
discusses important matters). The dependent variable in this paper is “transitivity,” which 
“is measured by whether or not each pair of alters has any tie” (Louch, 2000:53). While I 
explore all directed triads, Louch (2000) explores only symmetric strong ties which are 
strong predictors of transitivity. In their work on pretransitive triads, Doreian & 
Krackhardt (2001) explore triadic closure among actors in a simulation. For every trio of 
actors i, j and k, they explore whether the “pre-transitive” directed ties ij and jk 
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result in the formation of the tie between ik and whether the tie that is formed (that 
closes the triad) results in balanced or imbalanced triads. Using a unique dataset of emails 
among students and faculty at a US university, Kossinets and Watts (2009) model 
network evolution (the formation and dissolution of ties) and explore how homophily 
emerges overtime through individual decisions to form or dissolve ties. Their dependent 
variable, cyclic or triadic closure, is defined as “meeting a friend of a friend” (Kossinets 
et al., 2009:416) and is premised on transitivity—that, “if two individuals are connected 
to a mutual third party, they will tend to become connected themselves” (2009:417).  
Independent Variables 
Difference in Access to Resources. Access to unique information (Pettigrew, 
1973) and other resources is a source of power. To measure an actor’s ability to access 
and control unique resources I use a measure of that actor’s access to structural holes 
(Burt, 1992). Structural holes are defined as network positions that bridge non-redundant 
actors within the network thereby enabling actors occupying these network gaps to gain 
brokerage advantages via access to and control of diverse and possibly unique 
information (Burt, 1992). A position that links stakeholders who are themselves already 
connected will, by contrast, provide information more likely to be redundant (Burt, 1992) 
and therefore, information of little value. An organization connected to stakeholders who 
are themselves not connected may include ties to new stakeholders within the host 
country, politicians from different political parties that are not connected, and NGOs 
which are not connected. I proxy for access to unique information and therefore access to 
resources using the structural holes constraint which is a standard measure in network 
theory used to determine the firm’s lack of access to structural holes, (i.e., the smaller the 
 144 
 
value, the greater the firm’s access to structural holes). I multiply the measure of 
structural holes by -1 to determine the impact of the firm’s access to structural holes and 
thus to diverse information. I use the formula below to compute this measure for each 
firm in each time period (Burt, 1992: 54). 
                        ∑      
 
   
                   
Where, 
    are direct ties between actors i and j in the network  
       is the sum of the indirect ties from actor i to other actors k via all 
intermediate actors j 
To obtain the difference in access to resources for actors in each dyad of the triad, I 
simply compute the access to structural holes for each actor. Using the direction of the tie 
(from the source or initiating actor to the target actor), I subtract the value of the target 
actor’s access to resources from the value of the source actor’s access to resources to 
obtain the directed value of difference in access to resources for each pair of actors in the 
triad.  
Difference in Status. Access to high status others is a reflection of that actor’s 
status. I use the eigenvector centrality (Bonacich, 1987) as a measure of structural status 
for each actor in each of the three dyads of the triad. The eigenvector centrality measure 
is based on the premise that the status of a node in a network is a function of the statuses 
of the nodes with which it is directly tied. Thus the eigenvector centrality measure 
captures how important actor j is within the political environment based upon the 
importance of the other actors k who are connected to actor j. The eigenvector centrality 
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utilizes both direct and indirect ties to compute the position of a specific node in the 
network. A well-connected (i.e., high status) actor is one who is connected to other well-
connected (i.e., high status) actors, who are themselves well-connected (i.e., high status). 
High status affords the actor a form of power making those stakeholders of lower status 
dependent upon it. I compute actor status as:  
                   ∑   
 
   
Where, 
    is a matrix of events     (   can be both symmetric or asymmetric) 
(Bonacich, 1987) 
   is the eigenvector centrality of actor j  
  is a constant known as the eigenvalue, it is required to ensure equations have a 
nonzero solution. 
Recent work by Bonacich & Lloyd (2004) explores negative status relations in 
communication networks using the eigenvector. They put forward that: (1) a positive 
connection with a high status individual increases one’s status, (2) a positive connection 
to a disvalued individual decreases one’s status, (3) a negative relation to a high status 
individual decreases one’s status, and (4) a negative relation to a disvalued individual 
increases one’s status. I use both negative and positive ties to compute the status of the 
actor and therefore obtain a measure of status that also includes the impact of being 
negatively tied to actors in the environment.  
To obtain the difference in status between actors in each dyad in the triad, I 
compute the status values for both actors in each dyad. Using the direction of the tie 
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(from the source or initiating actor to the target actor), I then subtract the value of the 
target actor’s status from the value of the source actor’s status to obtain the directed value 
of difference in status for each pair of actors in the triad.  
Difference in Likeability. I use the degree of cooperation or conflict as a measure 
of that actor’s “likeability” among other actors in the network. The degree of cooperation 
(or conflict) exhibited by any actor j in its events with other actors k in the network is the 
simple mean degree of cooperation or conflict of all actor j’s ties with all other actors k in 
the network. The actor’s degree of cooperation or conflict is determined from the 
modified conflict-cooperation scale (for other applications of this scale see: Nartey, 
Henisz, Dorobantu, 2012; Henisz, Dorobantu, Nartey, 2012; Dorobantu, Henisz, Nartey, 
2012). Actors with high degrees of cooperation are those whose interactions with other 
actors are, on average, cooperative. Actors with low degrees of cooperation (i.e., high 
degrees of conflict) are those whose interactions with other actors are, on average, 
conflictual. Relations with the other actors in the triad are excluded from the computation 
of actor likeability. 
                    ∑         
 
   
                   
Where, 
     is the degree of cooperation or conflict in the event between actor j and any 
other actor k in the network at time t   
  is the number of actors k in the network. 
To compute the difference in likeability, I compute the likability for the actors in each of 
the three dyads in the triad. Using the direction of the tie (from the source or initiating 
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actor to the target actor), I subtract the value of the target actor’s likeability from the 
value of the source actor’s likeability to obtain the directed value of difference in 
likeability for each pair of actors in the triad.  
Difference in ties formed. My measure of ties formed is simply a count of the 
number of ties each actor in each dyad has with other actors in the network, i.e., the 
degree centrality (Freeman, 1979) of each actor in the dyad. Both incoming and outgoing 
ties are used in this computation. Actors who have large numbers of ties with others are 
more likely to form ties and therefore close the triad. Ties with the other actors in the 
triad are excluded from the computation of actor popularity. 
                  ∑    
 
   
 ∑    
 
   
 
Where, 
                  is the degree centrality of each actor j, who is directly 
connected to another actor k at time t  
     are outgoing ties from actor j to all other actors k in the network at time t  
     are incoming ties to actor j from all other actors k in the network at time t 
  is the number of actors k in the actor network. 
To compute the difference in number of ties for each actor in each of the three dyads in 
the triad, I use the direction of the tie (from the source or initiating actor to the target 
actor). I subtract the value of the target actor’s number of ties from the value of the 
source actor’s number of ties to obtain the directed value of difference in number of ties 
for each pair of actors in the triad.  
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Control variables 
Transitive Density. Transitivity is a structural mechanism within balance theory 
that predicts that if two actors have positive relations with a third, all three actors will 
always have positive cooperation relations with each other forming a closed and balanced 
triad (+,+,+).  For example, if an individual introduces her two “best friends” to each 
other, due to the transitive mechanism, these friends will also become “best friends.” I 
create a measure of Transitive Density by simply creating a density measure of the 
number of existing transitive triples within the network and dividing this number by the 
total number of possible transitive triples in the network. I use a lagged measure of 
transitive density, thus at time t1 I control for the transitive density of the previous period, 
time t0. 
Network size. Network size is an important variable impacting triadic closure as 
the size of the network can increase or reduce the time it takes to form ties (Louch, 2000; 
Martin et al., 2006). I control for the number of possible actors that are available to form 
triads by computing the size of the network. My network size variable is therefore simply 
a count of actors within the network at each subperiod. 
Tie Strength of Dyads. The strength of the tie between any two actors in a triad is 
an important indicator of the probability of triad closure (Louch, 2000). Freilich (1964) 
argues that the frequency of interaction among actors in a “natural triad” of two high 
status actors and one low status actor increases familiarity among these actors and may 
change the relationship among these actors. I control for the strength of each dyad in the 
triad by simply computing the number of ties between each of the actors in the triad. 
Therefore, Tie Strength of Dyad1 is the number of ties between actors i and j; Tie 
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Strength of Dyad2 is the number of ties between actors j and k; and, Tie Strength of 
Dyad3 is the number of ties between actors i and k. For the nonexisting tie between the 
two actors who are not connected in the open triad, the value of tie strength is 0.  
Difference in Sign. The Difference in sign is a binary variable coded 1 if the 
directed ties between actor i and j are opposite in sign, i.e., actor i cooperates with actor j, 
but actor j is in conflict with actor i. The variable is coded 0 if the ties between actor i and 
j are not different. I compute the difference in sign for each of the three dyads in the triad. 
These variables are named Difference in Sign Dyad1 (for actors i-j), Difference in Sign 
Dyad2 (for actors j-k), and Difference in Sign Dyad3 (for actors i-k). For the non-existing 
tie between the two actors who are not connected in the open triad, the value of 
difference in sign is 0.  
Reciprocity. Reciprocity is a binary variable coded 1 if reciprocal ties exist 
between actor i and j and 0 otherwise. I make no distinction between the type of 
reciprocation, that is, reciprocal ties of both opposite (+, -) and similar sign (+,+ or -,-) 
are all coded 1. Reciprocity is computed for each of the three dyads in the triad and are 
named Reciprocity of Dyad1 (reciprocity between actors i and j), Reciprocity of Dyad2 
(reciprocity between actors j and k), and Reciprocity of Dyad3 (reciprocity between 
actors i and k). Reciprocity increases contact among actors (Martin et al., 2006) and 
therefore is likely to positively impact the likelihood of triad closure. For the non-existing 
tie between the two actors who are not connected in the open triad, the value of 
reciprocity is 0.  
Common Others. An important indicator of whether a triad will close is the 
number of common others the actors in a triad are connected to. Unconnected actors 
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connected to greater numbers of third party others are more likely to meet and close the 
triad. Martin and Yeung (2006) in their study examining persistence of ties in 
communities of actors find “there seems to be a fundamental non-independence of ties: 
ties are more likely between people already implicitly connected via third parties who are 
in contact” (Martin et al., 2006:359). Kossinets and Watts (2009) examine the effect of 
similarity on new tie formation when individuals shared a mutual acquaintance and find 
that similarity impacts new tie formation even when these actors are introduced by a 
mutual acquaintance. Hu, Kaza and Chen (2009) examine facilitators of link formation in 
a network of felons and find that demographic homophily (age, race, gender) is not 
significant on link formation among felons in a narcotic network, but rather mutual 
acquaintance and shared vehicle association are facilitators of link formation. My 
measure of common others is simply a count of other actors that are connected to both 
actors in the dyad (i.e., a count of the number of other open triads in which both actors in 
the dyad are embedded). Common Others is computed for each of the three dyads in the 
triad and are named Common Others of Dyad1 (a count of the number of other open 
triads in which both actors i and j are embedded), Common Others of Dyad2 (a count of 
the number of other open triads in which both actors j and k are embedded), and 
Common Others of Dyad3 (a count of the number of other open triads in which both 
actors i and k are embedded). 
I include variables controlling for country, firm, mine and network factors in the 
empirical analyses. At the country-level, I include a measure of “Voice” within the host 
country—essentially, a measure of the freedom of the media and freedom of speech 
within each country. I obtain this perception-based measure from the World Bank 
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Institute’s World Governance Indicators (WGI)(Kaufmann et al., 2010). This measure is 
obtained from statistical compilation of surveys from a wide variety of civil society 
actors, including NGOs, think tanks, international organizations and industry experts, 
within different countries.  
At the level of the firm, I control for the firm's percentage ownership of the mine. 
This percentage is a measure of how much ownership the focal firm has at stake relative 
to other owners of the mine. As my sample is limited to small firms, many with only 1, 2 
or 3 mines, the loss of a mine has a significant adverse impact on the value of the firm. 
The percentage of ownership may also impact how the government will perceive the 
mine; for example joint ventures may decrease the level of government interference.  
At the mine level, I control for the development stage of the mine in terms of 
whether the mine is in exploration, feasibility, construction, production or the mining 
process has been suspended. Because exploration and feasibility are relatively early 
stages prior to the significant outlays of resources by firms to develop the mine, I code 
the binary Mine Status (Construction and Production) variable which is coded 1 if the 
mine is at the construction or production stage, and 0 otherwise. Also, because the 
suspension of a mine is a significant event with performance implications, and because 
the suspension of the mine can occur at any stage of the mine development and mining 
process, I code the Mine Status Suspension variable which is a binary variable coded 1 if 
the mine has been suspended within that year or not. 
I also control for the price of gold. This variable is particularly important as the 
price of gold has risen sharply over the past few years passing $500 per ounce for the first 
time in December 2005, $1,000 per ounce in March 2008, and toping $1,900 an ounce in 
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August 2011. As gold is used as a hedge in times of financial crisis, the sharply rising 
price of gold heightens tensions over who has the right to appropriate this value and may 
thus significantly impact relations between firms and stakeholders. 
As a robustness measure, I also include a measure of the value of the mine
15
 in 
proportion to the host country gross domestic product. This measure is important as firms 
operating larger more valuable mines are more likely to face greater tensions and 
opposition from stakeholders. However, because the value of the mine can only be 
computed once the firm is listed on one of the Toronto Stock Exchanges, much of the 
media-reported stakeholder event precedes the periods in which the mine is valued. 
Therefore, the periods in which the mine valuation occurs, for this study, present a biased 
sample of relations between firms and stakeholders. 
Due to the nature of the mining industry and the political salience of gold mining 
in particular, the global gold mining industry plausibly has networks of relations that are 
more diverse and more dense than networks of stakeholder relations for firms in other 
industries. I therefore control for the density of interactions in this industry by including a 
measure of the potential number of ties that could be formed by actors in the networks. I 
first compute the total possible number of directed ties that could be formed given the 
number of actors (both firms and stakeholders) in the network:  
                                 
Where, 
    is the number of actors in the network at time t 
                                                          
15
 For the valuation model see Henisz, Dorobantu, Nartey, 2011 
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I then obtain a count of the ties not formed by subtracting a count of the existing directed 
tie relations in each network at time t from the total number of possible ties that could be 
formed at time t based on the number of actors in the network. Although my stakeholder 
dataset includes multiple ties to the same actor, for this computation, I do not count the 
number of directed ties between actors but rather, if 1 or more directed tie exists between 
two actors, i.e., an actor k with multiple ties to another actor j is counted only as 1 tie 
from k to j. If actor j reciprocates with one or more ties to actor k, that relation is also 
counted as 1 tie.   
I next create a proportion of these ties, by dividing the number of ties not formed 
by the total number of possible ties.  
                
∑               
∑                   
   
Where, 
                 is the total number of possible new ties that can be formed  
among actors in a network g at time t 
                    is the total number of directed ties that could exist in a 
network of actors g at time t 
Importantly, I then lag this variable to obtain a measure of the potential ties in the 
previous time period. 
To control for the media-based data, I control for stakeholder events reported by 
major news outlets as this will have an impact on how widely the news is reported. The 
media source of the event (i.e., the name of the newspaper or media outlet) is coded in the 
stakeholder events database. I then use the media categories reported by FACTIVA to 
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determine whether the reported media source is a major news outlet or not. For each 
network (i.e., by subperiod), I create a measure of the proportion of stakeholder events 
reported by major news outlets from the total number of reported stakeholder events. 
I also control for two additional cultural distance and media-related factors that 
may impact relations between firms and stakeholders. The first is a control for whether 
the country in which the mine is located speaks English as one of its official languages. 
This is important as media reports from English speaking countries may more fully 
reflect the relations between firms and stakeholders and therefore the media reports may 
be more accurate in their depictions of stakeholder relations. Further, a host country 
environment that officially governs in the English language may be an easier host country 
environment for Canadian mining executives to strategically relate with stakeholders. My 
measure of English Language is a binary variable coded 1 for English as the Official 
Language and 0 otherwise. I obtain this data from the CIA’s World Fact Book website.16 
The second distance-based control is the measure of the distance between Toronto, 
Canada, where the firm is listed on the TSX, and the capital city of that host country. I 
obtain the measures of distance from the Indo.com website.
17
 
 Finally, I also include indicator variables to control for the various types of 
directed triads. 
Models 
Because I seek to explore the likelihood that a triad will be closed based on the 
characteristics of the three actors in the triad, I use a hazard rate model. I use a piecewise- 
                                                          
16
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
17
 http://www.indo.com/distance/index.html 
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exponential hazard rate model where the constant rate and any other variables of interest 
are allowed to vary within pre-defined time-segments (c.f. Blossfeld, Hans-Peter, & 
Rohwer, 1995).  This allows me to test whether certain variables become more or less 
important to closing the triad as the potential triad stays open longer. More importantly, 
the model also allows the impact of time (i.e., the age of the open triad, which in my 
sample is determined by subperiod) to be non-parametric as opposed to constant in the 
exponential model.  I use the model, 
                                         
where p denotes a time interval or piece that goes from  p-1 to  p 
I define my time intervals (time pieces) by subperiod and the variable whose effects may 
also vary between time pieces as each directed triad for each mine. I run the piecewise 
exponential models with 1, 3 and 5 subperiod-timepieces. All models are run with Stata 
11 using the ‘stpiece’ routine developed by Sorensen (1999). 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present the descriptive statistics and correlations for the 
variables in the analyses. Table 3.3 presents the full piecewise exponential hazard model 
where the constant and directed-triad-mine indicator variables are allowed to vary 
between single subperiod-timepieces, i.e., with every subperiod. Table 3.4 presents the 
same full model but the constant and directed-triad-mine indicator variables are allowed 
to vary between every 3 subperiod-timepieces, i.e., between every 3 subperiods. And 
Table 3.5 presents the same full model but the constant and directed-triad-mine indicator 
variables are allowed to vary between every 5 subperiod-timepieces, i.e., between every 5 
subperiods. Within each table, Model 1 presents the results of the main independent 
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variables (access to resources difference, status difference, likeability difference and 
popularity difference) in addition to the main control variables (network size, different 
signs in directed ties of dyad 1 and dyad 2, tie strengths for dyads 1 and 2, whether dyad 
1 and / or 2 contains reciprocal ties, degree of cooperation between actors in the dyads 1 
and 2, the number of common other actors for dyads 1, 2 and 3, the transitive density and 
the number of possible ties of the network in the previous time period, country voice, 
distance to Toronto, whether English is an official language in that country, the price of 
gold, ownership of the mine, and the status of the mine (construction and production, and 
whether the mine is suspended in that time period).  
Model 2 in each table adds the triad-type fixed effects to Model 1. Model 3 builds 
upon Model 2 and includes all interaction variables. These variables are: the interaction 
between likeability and voice, and interactions between the difference in sign, reciprocity, 
tie strength and degree of cooperation of dyads 1 and 2. Model 4 in each table includes 
the squared transformation variables: likeability and voice squared, and the possible ties 
in the previous network period squared. Finally, Model 5 includes the log of the ratio of 
the mine value (NPV) to GDP variable. 
Results across the three sets of time-varying models are generally robust once the 
triad fixed effects variables are included. Due to the bias in the sample containing the 
mine value variable (although the main effects are robust within that sample), I discuss 
the results presented in Table 3.3 (the piecewise exponential model that varies with each 
single time period), Model 4 (the full model excluding the mine value variable). 
I begin with a discussion of the control variables. Network size significantly but 
negatively impacts the likelihood of triadic closure. That is, the smaller the size of the 
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network the more likely that a link will be formed closing the directed triad. This 
outcome is expected as smaller networks have fewer options for tie formation than larger 
networks. I next examine the impact of the variables controlling for tie quality—
difference in sign, tie strength, reciprocity and cooperation—on the likelihood of a tie 
forming to close a directed triad. The difference in sign and degree of cooperation for 
both dyads 1 and 2 in the triad all negatively and significantly impact the likelihood of a 
tie forming to close the triad. This implies that dyads which have ties that are different in 
sign, and dyads that have ties of greater cooperation are less likely to form a tie to close 
the triad. On the other hand, dyads with reciprocal ties and those with greater frequency 
of interaction between the actors (i.e., greater tie strength) are more likely to form a tie to 
close the triad. The number of common others that the actors in each of the three dyads is 
tied to significantly and positively impacts the likelihood of a link forming that closes a 
directed triad. This finding strongly supports extant research that has also found a strong 
relationship between ties to mutual others and the likelihood of a tie forming that will 
close a triad closure (Gimeno et al., 2001; Kossinets et al., 2009; Louch, 2000; Martin et 
al., 2006).  
The transitive density of actors within the sociopolitical environment in the 
previous period positively and significantly impacts the likelihood that in the next 
subperiod a tie formed will close an open directed triad. This is an expected result as 
transitivity is an underlying mechanism of tie formation that closes cooperative triads 
(Doreian et al., 2001; Holland et al., 1970). The impact of the number of possible ties in 
the previous network period, while significant and positive in all previous models, loses 
its significance with the introduction of the squared transformation of this variable. 
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However, the squared transformation of the number of possible ties in the previous 
network period significantly and positively impacts the likelihood of a tie forming to 
close an open triad in the next time period. This implies a curvilinear relationship 
between the number of possible ties in the previous network and the formation of a tie to 
close a triad in the current time period. 
My measure of country voice, which is a measure of the degree of freedom of 
speech within the country in which the mine is located, also significantly and positively 
impacts the likelihood that a link will form closing a directed triad. This may be because 
countries in which political, social, and economic actors have freedom of speech are 
more likely to express sentiment and take actions in support of or against other actors in 
the sociopolitical environment thus increasing the frequency of tie formation and thus the 
likelihood that ties will form that will close open directed triads among these actors. 
Additionally, greater voice among actors may facilitate easy identification of other actors 
with whom an organization may want to strategically form a tie thus increasing the 
likelihood that a tie formed will close an existing open directed triad. 
The distance of the host country capital from Toronto, and whether English is an 
official language of that host country are country-level factors that both positively and 
significantly impact the likelihood of a tie forming to close the triad. The price of gold 
negatively and significantly impacts the likelihood of a tie forming to close the triad. The 
firm’s percentage of ownership of the mine positively and significantly impacts the 
likelihood that a tie will form to close the triad, and both the construction-production and 
suspended stages of mine development positively and significantly increase the 
likelihood that a tie will form to close the triad.  
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Moving onto the interaction variables, likeability of the actors in the dyads within 
the triad and the level of freedom of speech within a country environment together 
significantly and positively impact the closure of the triad which is an expected outcome 
as both likeability and voice individually significantly increase the likelihood of a tie 
forming to close the triad. However the negative and significant impact of the squared 
transformations of this interaction variable implies a curvilinear relationship. Exploring 
the joint impact of the nature of the two existing dyads in an open triad on the likelihood 
of a tie forming to close the triad, I find that the joint effect of the difference in sign in the 
first and second dyad, and the joint effect of the cooperation in the first and second dyads 
positively and significantly (weakly for cooperation) impact the likelihood of a tie 
forming to close the triad. The joint effect of reciprocity in both dyads, and the tie 
strength of both dyads significantly but negatively impact the likelihood of a tie forming 
to close the triad. 
While all control variables significantly impact the likelihood of a tie forming to 
close the triad, an interesting and important extension of this work is to explore the nature 
of the ties that close what types of triads. For example, while at both the construction-
production and suspension stages of the mine the likelihood of a tie forming to close the 
triad is significant and positive, more insight as to the nature of ties (particularly with 
regard to whether these ties are cooperative or conflictual) would increase our 
understanding on the contingent factors of triadic closure, i.e., what types of ties close 
what types of triads under what conditions. 
Continuing with a discussion of the independent variables of theoretical interest—
difference in access to resources, different status, different likeability and different 
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number of ties among actors in the directed triads. I find that a link that closes a directed 
triad is more likely to form when actors have different access to resources (support for 
H1) and different status (support for H2a) and similar number of ties (support for H4a). I 
find that likeability has no impact on the likelihood that a link that closes a directed triad 
will be formed (H3 is not supported). The economic significance of these variables is 
significant. An increase of 1 standard deviation in the difference in access to resources 
between the actors in a dyad (i.e., a change of 0.26%) will result in a 4.6% increase in the 
likelihood of a tie forming that closes a directed triad. An increase of 1 standard deviation 
in the difference in status between the actors in a dyad (i.e., a change of 0.14%) will 
result in a 4.5% increase in the likelihood of a tie forming that closes a directed triad. 
And, a decrease of 1 standard deviation in the difference in popularity or number of ties 
between the actors in a dyad (i.e., a change of 0.016%) will result in a 2.3% increase in 
the likelihood of a tie forming that closes a directed triad. 
The finding that a link that closes a directed triad is more likely when actors in a 
triad have different access to resources and different status is important to our 
understandings of the contingencies that support or prevent the homophily mechanism 
from driving structural outcomes. Actors with different access to resources gain the 
benefits of leverage and control (Burt, 1992) by forming ties to diverse actors with whom 
they have a dependent relationship. The power of the actor with greater access to 
resources lies in her control of these resources and the dependence of the other actor. The 
less-endowed actor, on the other hand, driven by their resource dependence, will seek to 
form ties with actors who have access to greater resources and may thus seek to curry 
favor of these more endowed actors. Although extant literature on homophily suggests 
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that actors of similar resources are likely to form ties, important insight is gained from 
exploring conditions under which actors with greater access to resources would choose to 
lose that resource dominant position by forming ties with other actors of similar 
resources, as well as the converse, when actors with greater access to resources choose to 
protect their dominant position by forming ties to other less-endowed actors. 
The finding that actors of high status are more likely to form a tie that closes a 
triad with other actors of different (low) status also augments our understanding of the 
contingent nature of tie formation. Status, as a function of hierarchy, is inherently based 
on differences. High status actors are more cognizant of their high status when in the 
presence of lower status actors due to the benefits of their high status, including 
deference (Turk et al., 1962), preferential exchange terms (Thye, 2000; Thye et al., 
2006), and preferential access to resources.  
An important insight from the extant status literature is the idea of a cost to high 
status actors who associate with lower status actors. In his study of investment bank 
syndicates, Podolny (1994) finds associations with low status firms results in the loss of 
status, and that status constrains firms to associate with firms of similar status (low status 
firms associate with low status others, and high status firms associate with high status 
others). Further work is required to determine when high status actors face a cost to 
associating with lower status actors, and when high status actors gain from associating 
with lower status actors, and importantly, what these costs are. For example, by 
associating with lower status actors, higher status actors face reputation costs (Podolny, 
1994). However, anecdotal evidence suggests that by associating with lower status actors, 
higher status actors may also enhance their reputation, i.e., philanthropy and donations to 
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the poor or ‘lower status’ actors in society affords the firm reputation benefits and 
possibly social capital.  
I find no support that likeability, whether different or similar between actors in a 
triad, has an impact on the likelihood that a link closes a directed triad. This finding is 
intuitively interesting as likeability is strongly associated with homophily in extant 
literature, i.e., similar actors associate and cooperate with each other (McPherson et al., 
2001), and therefore the expectation is that actors who are not only similar but have 
similar likeability are even more likely to associate and therefore the formation of a link 
that closes an open triad should be even more likely. A possible explanation for this result 
is that likeability differs by a wide range and the behavior of actors who have similarly 
high likeability may be very different from the behavior of actors who have similarly low 
likeability. Actors with low likeability may eschew each other (i.e., two unliked actors 
are less likely to associate and cooperate while two highly liked actors may associate and 
cooperate). Alternatively, similar actors with high likeability within the political sphere 
may perceive each other as competitors (i.e., these actors use their likeability 
instrumentally to obtain resources) and therefore do not associate or cooperate, whereas 
actors with similarly low likeability within the political arena may band together to form 
a coalition. Closer investigation of this result is required with a focus on categorizing the 
likeability of actors as similarly high, similarly low or different. 
Lastly, the finding that a link that closes a directed triad is more likely when 
actors in triads have similar number of ties to other actors (i.e., actors of similar 
popularity), is expected and supports the theoretical concepts and empirical findings of a 
large body of extant literature on the sociological importance of homophily. I argue that 
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because dependence is not inherent to likeability i.e., being likeable is not a zero-sum 
outcome and therefore there is no inherent ‘cost’ to associating with similar others, the 
mechanism of homophily is freely applied.  
Implications and extensions 
In this work, I explore how homophily of the structural characteristics among all 
three actors in an open directed triad impact the likelihood of a tie forming that will close 
that triad. My findings imply that an organization seeking to manage interactions with 
other actors in a sociopolitical network should be cognizant of the structural homophily 
of the actors to whom it is tied and their third party actors, who may or may not be tied to 
the firm, as these characteristics collectively shape their interactions. An important 
complement to this work is to explore how homophily of the structural characteristics of 
only the unconnected actors in the triad impact the likelihood that a tie will form between 
them thus closing the triad.  
While this and other studies (Kossinets et al., 2009; Louch, 2000) explore triadic 
closure as a dependent variable, more work needs to be done to understand what other 
factors impact triadic closure including other network characteristics of homophily such 
as structural equivalence (Fombrun, 1982) and role equivalence. Further, while I have 
explored how homophily among all stakeholders within a specific sociopolitical 
environment (the global gold mining industry) impact the likelihood of closure of triads 
among these actors, because different types of actors exist within different environments, 
an important extension is to test the relationship between homophily and triadic closure 
in different contexts. For example, how will the relationship between homophily and 
triadic closure change among a network of only economic actors (firms), or different 
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types of political and/or social actors (e.g. interactions among nation states), or the actors 
in an different industry context. Therefore, future research in this area could determine 
whether specific types of homophily are more important to closing ties among different 
types of actors and in different contexts.  
I explore whether the triad is closed or not, but an important extension of this 
work could explore not only whether the triad is closed but importantly how the triad is 
closed (i.e., is the newly closed triad balanced and therefore stable or imbalanced and 
therefore unstable).  Additionally, although my triad data is directed and signed, I only 
employ the direction of the ties in this work, controlling for the cooperation of the 
existing dyads. Including measures of whether the triads are cooperative or conflictual 
(i.e., a measure of balance based on the degree of cooperation or conflict of the triad) 
may change the relationship between homophily among the actors in an open triad and 
the likelihood that a tie will form closing the triad. Further, although social balance 
processes may be natural, they are not necessarily good (Antal, Krapivsky, & Redner, 
2006). Therefore an important extension of this work is to empirically determine under 
what conditions triadic closure is beneficial and disadvantageous within the sociopolitical 
arena. Triadic closure, as with all network mechanisms, is not without cost, therefore, an 
interesting extension may be to explore the type and range of costs of closing the triad for 
different types of homophily among actors in the triad.  
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Conclusion 
In this dissertation, I use the tools of network theory to specify strategic choice 
variables of stakeholder networks that foreign firms can alter to manage and thus improve 
the nature of their relations with individual stakeholders. This dissertation thus answers 
the call of Kobrin (1979: 77) for “better definitions of the [political risk] phenomena, a 
conceptual structure relating politics to the firm and a great deal of information about the 
impact of the political environment” to move the literature forward. Scholarship using 
network applications in the context of international business is limited despite the 
substantial advances in social network theory and analytical tools. Early work by Moran 
(1973) explored multinational firms’ strategic use of transnational network alliances to 
effectively mitigate political risk by creating a coalition of diverse external political, 
financial and economic stakeholders to influence the extent of adverse government 
interventions. Speaking to the impact of network research in political contexts, Knoke 
(1993: 23) asserts that “by combining reputational, positional and decision-making 
measures, researchers delineate the networks of communication ties and resource 
exchanges, which shape collective actions that attempt to influence the outcomes of 
political controversies.”  
Further, within the realms of political science and policymaking, network 
methods applied to research on political interactions has “refocused the substantive 
issues…, raised provocative theoretical questions, and addressed important empirical 
relationships” (Knoke, 1993: 24). Despite these gains however, there is room for further 
“creative theoretical and methodological efforts” (Knoke, 1993: 42).  Recent work by 
Kahler (2009) applies network theory to international politics through the primary views 
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of networks as both structures and collectives of strategic actors. Addressing the 
important contributions of network applications to international politics, Kahler (2009: 
32) states:  
Although network analysis will continue to justify itself through its ability to 
explain significant features of contemporary international politics, its theoretical 
contribution should not be overlooked. Networks offer a means to investigate the 
relations between agents and structure in an empirically convincing manner. 
Networks force attention to dimensions of power that conventional views of 
international politics neglect. Networked governance is an alternative to 
hierarchies and markets with its own roster of strengths and weaknesses. 
In this dissertation, I seek to jointly address the calls of Kobrin and Knoke by defining an 
integrated networks-as-structures and networks-as-actors approach similar to that of 
Kahler (2009), for multinational firms to strategically improve relations with 
stakeholders. In addition to applying concepts and tools from network theory, I apply 
insights from the entrepreneurship, social psychology, and civic or political participation 
literatures. Broadly, in this dissertation, I contribute to the political risk and international 
business literatures by applying network tools to analyze stakeholder influence strategies.  
The theories and preliminary findings of the network-based sociopolitical strategy 
I outline in this dissertation have significant implications for scholarship, practice and 
policy. Particularly important to this work is the understanding that the firm’s ability to 
improve relations through increasing cooperative relations and ties while reducing 
conflictual relations and ties may impact its ability to operate and, for small firms 
particularly, its ability to survive. First, the current connections of the firm to 
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stakeholders have ramifications for the evolution of the firm’s network over time. Extant 
literature has established that a firm’s connections to financial and economic actors 
influences the type and degree of political uncertainty and intervention it faces (Henisz, 
2000; Moran, 1973). My preliminary findings contribute to this area of research by 
establishing not only the importance of the firm’s connections with social actors to the 
mitigation of political uncertainty, but more importantly, that the characteristics of the 
social, political and economic actors to whom the firm is tied impacts its subsequent ties 
and relations with stakeholders in the broader network. Thus, firms can better navigate 
uncertain political environments by managing the strategic “choice” of who to connect 
with in the host country environment.  
While extant literature looks at the firm’s direct relations, I in addition explore 
how these direct relations are perceived by others and the implications for the firm’s 
subsequent relations with these actors. Traditional multinational firm practice in host 
countries highlights the formation of connections to “important” stakeholders. However, 
these findings suggest that connecting with “important” stakeholders affords both 
strategic benefits and liabilities. Further, these findings raise questions of “who” is an 
important stakeholder and what determines importance. While present practice largely 
considers outward signs of “importance,” these findings suggest the need for firms to 
seek relations to actors with “local legitimacy,” i.e., a high status actor may lack local 
legitimacy whereas a well-liked stakeholder may have local legitimacy.  
In this dissertation I explore the idea that firm relations with stakeholders are 
contingent upon the interdependencies and relationships among stakeholders themselves, 
a concept that has significant implications for firm nonmarket strategy. By understanding 
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“who defers to whom” (Watkins, 2001) the firm improves its ability to leverage relations 
among stakeholders and improves its chances of survival within the host country. While 
extant theoretical literature has sought to understand the importance of interrelationships 
and influence networks (Balkundi et al., 2006; Krackhardt et al., 1993; Salancik, 1986; 
Watkins, 2001), few empirical examples within the international business and nonmarket 
literatures explore the dynamics of firm and stakeholder relations. Extant studies rather 
focus predominantly on the firm’s dyadic relations with governments and financial and 
economic actors. This work highlights the implications of stakeholder interrelations and 
interdependencies on the firm’s relations with stakeholders. In addition, the findings of 
this research also contribute to the literature on stakeholder theory and management. 
Within this literature, the development and utility of a comprehensive stakeholder theory 
is stymied the question of how to identify key stakeholders (Donaldson et al., 1995; 
Greenwood, 2007; Mitchell et al., 1997). Presently, key stakeholders are subjectively 
determined by managers.   
The findings of my two empirical chapters are important for firms seeking to 
navigate hostile nonmarket environments. In chapter 2, the first empirical paper, I explore 
how firms seeking to enter new markets can mitigate both their egocentric uncertainty 
and the altercentric uncertainty the stakeholders in the environment face through strategic 
positions to obtain information and reputation benefits. Because tie formation is costly, I 
explore which type of strategy (and uncertainty) firms should expend their limited 
resources on. I find that although strategies to mitigate egocentric uncertainty through 
building networks rich in structural holes and networks which span the core and 
periphery of the stakeholder network are significant and important to engendering 
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cooperation, reducing conflict and forming ties with stakeholders, this the strategy to 
obtain information benefits loses its significance when compared with the strategy to 
obtain reputation benefits through mitigating stakeholder altercentric uncertainty.  
In chapter 3, the second empirical paper, I explore how homophily or dissimilarity 
in the structural characteristics of dyads of actors impacts the endogenous network 
process of a tie forming to close a triad. I explore homophily of four characteristics of the 
actors in the dyads that form a triad: access to resources, status, likeability and popularity. 
While the literature on homophily argues that stakeholders of similar characteristics will 
form ties, using insights from the literatures on dependence theory I argue that for the 
characteristics of stakeholders that are inherently based on dependence, rather greater 
dissimilarity will form the tie that will close the triad. I find support for this argument: 
specifically, actors with different access to resources and different status will positively 
impact the formation of a tie that will close the triad, while actors with similar ability to 
form ties will positively impact the formation of a tie that will close the triad. I find no 
impact of similar or dissimilar actors in terms of likeability on the likelihood of triad 
closure. 
The findings from this study suggest that for the firm, the key stakeholder may 
not be a question of only who the stakeholder is and how managers perceive the 
stakeholder, but also a question of the stakeholder’s position and influence within the 
broader host country network, how this stakeholder is perceived by others within the 
network, and importantly how homophily among actors in triads impacts the structure of 
the network and the relations among actors. Using network tools and concepts, I proffer 
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an objective alternative to the present subjective managerial salience approach to 
stakeholder identification.  
Of course these findings also raise further questions for firm strategy, avenues of 
research which form part of my broader research agenda. Firstly, although the 
stakeholder relations data used for this study provides a rich empirical context in which to 
conduct this analysis, an important means to augment these findings and to better explore 
the underlying mechanisms is to conduct comparative qualitative studies. Preparations for 
these qualitative analyses are underway.   
Second, while my findings have implications for firm performance by 
highlighting how firms can obtain reputation and information benefits through their 
strategic positioning in stakeholder networks, and outlining the possible costs of 
asymmetry in ties that could increase conflict with stakeholders; exploring how firms can 
mitigate both their own egocentric uncertainty through strategic network positions and 
stakeholder altercentric uncertainty through strategic associations with stakeholders; and 
finally, examine how firms can shape endogenous network outcomes by understanding 
how characteristics of actors in an open triad influence the formation of a tie that will 
close the triad, and important avenue of research is to determine the costs and impacts of 
these findings in terms of financial and operating performance outcomes. Work is 
ongoing in this area. 
Third, in contrast to present practice and the present focus of extant literature on a 
largely reactionary approach to managing the political environment, the insights from my 
findings suggest a strategic proactive approach to the development of the firm’s network 
of stakeholders can impact the degree of conflict and cooperation and strategic tie 
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formation between firms and stakeholders. Therefore, an important avenue of future 
research is to consider the contrasting impacts of a proactive versus reactive approach by 
the firm. That is, to explore the impact of adverse interventions by both governments and 
social actors on firms who have applied a proactive approach similar to the sociopolitical 
approach outlined in this research, compared with similar interventions on firms who 
have largely applied the reactionary traditional approach. 
Another important extension of this dissertation research is to explore the country 
contexts in which a sociopolitical nonmarket strategy would be applicable. Arguably, not 
all aspects of the network-based influence strategy I outline are applicable in all host 
country environments. Further research on which aspects of the network-based influence 
strategy are applicable in which country or environment context is important. Similarly, 
an important area of research is to understand which firms can, or are more likely to, 
engage in these practices. Conventional wisdom and insights from extant literature 
propose that large firms are most likely to be able to effectively navigate politically risky 
environments due to their size, political clout and slack resources. However, examples 
from my novel database suggest otherwise. For example, facing significant political 
uncertainty during the six year civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
large firms such as AngloGold abandoned their investments. In contrast, smaller firms 
such as Tenke Corporation perceived the political uncertainty as an opportunity to gain 
first-mover and long-term political advantages by strategically building political 
relationships with warring factions, and remained during the war. Even as the war drew 
to an end, large firms were reluctant to enter into the mineral-rich but politically risky 
DRC; as voiced by an American investment lawyer: “I don't believe that the largest 
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American companies are going to rush into the Congo, … I believe some of the smaller, 
enterprising companies in the U.S. and Canada will go in and wheel and deal. If that goes 
well, they'll bring in the larger companies.”18 An exciting avenue of research is to explore 
this phenomenon. 
Lastly, while this dissertation considers the impact and implications of the firm’s 
relations with stakeholders upon the firm, an important avenue of research is to determine 
the impact and implications of these strategies on stakeholders. Although I limit the scope 
of this research to a strategic or instrumental approach to stakeholder engagement,
19
 the 
findings of this research implies a strategic benefit for both firms and stakeholders 
through collaborative engagement. The joint production activities of firms and 
stakeholders can help stakeholders produce services and products that will meet the 
specific needs of their communities, act as a catalyst for local development, and may 
generate novel outcomes such as the fostering of community-led social entrepreneurship 
initiatives (Esman & Uphoff, 1984: 77). Further, communication and collaboration 
between firms and stakeholders, particularly when started early in the firm’s operations, 
may improve the firm’s ability to mitigate the inevitable environmental damage that is 
caused by the extraction process by using local knowledge of the environment gathered 
from the firm’s interactions with local stakeholders. The insights of this dissertation may 
also enable firms to practically and consistently engage in sustainable business practices 
centered on balancing the social, economic and environmental impacts of business 
                                                          
18
 Gerald Padmore, a lawyer with Cox, Buchanan, Padmore &Shakarchy, a Denver firm specializing in 
international resources investment, in Denver Post, May 1997. 
19
 Other scholars have also questioned whether stakeholder theory alone is useful to explicate the important 
but complex moral and normative issues of business ethics (Orts, E. & Strudler, A. 2009. Putting a Stake in 
Stakeholder Theory. Journal of Business Ethics, 88: 605 – 615). 
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(Elkington, 1998) and creating value—to society and themselves (Elkington & Hartigan, 
2008). These and other potential social impacts of a collaborative sociopolitical firm 
strategy are also important avenues for future research.  
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APPENDIX 
FIGURE 1.1: NETWORK POSITION CONVEYING VOLUMINOUS 
INFORMATION 
 
 
 
The SQUARE shaped node is the most central as it is connected to the most number of 
partners. The information gathered through forming ties with many others (i.e., a large 
ego network) provides the firm with information on how to manage its existing 
stakeholders and how to strategically target and form ties with external stakeholders. 
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FIGURE 1.2: NETWORK POSITION CONVEYING DIVERSE INFORMATION 
 
 
 
The SQUARE shaped node is connected to diverse stakeholders with different attributes 
(depicted by the shapes, sizes, and colors of nodes). By forming ties with stakeholders of 
different characteristics firms have access to unique information which they can use to 
manage existing stakeholders in their networks and strategically form ties with external 
stakeholders. 
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FIGURE 1.3: NETWORK POSITIONS CONVEYING RICH INFORMATION 
 
 
 
The SQUARE shaped note has many ties of different “richness” (richness is depicted by 
the strength or thickness of the tie). Using richer information, the firm can manage 
relations with existing stakeholders and strategically form ties with new stakeholders. 
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FIGURE 1.4: TRANSITIVE (FRIENDSHIP) MECHANISM 
 
  
+ (t) 
+ (t+1) + (t) 
 
 
Transitive (Friendship) Mechanism: Cooperative relations between firms and 
stakeholders are contingent on structural relations. Cooperative p→o and o→x 
relations at time t will create or improve relations between p→x at time t+1 
 
x 
o P 
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FIGURE 1.5: INFLUENCE MECHANISM 
 
 
 
 
  
 
p 
+ (t) 
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+ (t) + (t+1) 
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o 
- (t) 
- (t+1) 
 
 
Influence Mechanism: The more influential stakeholder will influence the weaker 
more deferent stakeholder to have similar cooperative or conflictual relations with 
the firm.  
(1a)  Assuming p has greater influence over o and cooperative relations with x at 
time t, p can positively influence o’s relations with x at time t+1.  
(1b) Assuming p has greater influence over o and conflictual relations with x at 
time t, p can negatively influence o’s relations with x at time t+1.  
Thus the influence mechanism can result in an increase in cooperation or conflict. 
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APPENDIX 2.1: CODING PROTOCOL FOR EVENT DATA 
 
I. COMPANYID. Unique firm identifier. 
II. COMPANYNAME. Enter the parent company name. This field can only contain one of 
the 38 publicly traded parent companies that make up our sample. 
III. MINE. Enter the mine name. This field can only contain one of the __ mines owned by 
one of the 38 publicly traded parent companies that make up our sample. 
IV. RDAY. Locate the day of the report in the byline or other header text.  
V. RMONTH. Locate the month of the report in the byline or other header text. 
VI. RYEAR. Locate the year of the report.  
VII. EDAY. Identify the day of the event using the byline or the other header text in 
conjunction with the context of the article (e.g., three years ago…) 
VIII. EMONTH. Identify the month of the event using the byline or the other header text in 
conjunction with the context of the article (e.g., three months ago…) 
IX. EYEAR. Identify the year of the event using the byline or the other header text in 
conjunction with the context of the article (e.g., three years ago…) 
X. NEWSSOURCETYPE. Note the type of news source. Common examples include print 
media, TV transcript, company press release, stakeholder press release, …  
XI. NEWSSOURCE NAME. Note the specific name of the news source (e.g., New York 
Times, Market Wire).  
XII. ONEWSSOURCETYPE. For rebroadcast or retransmitted reports, note the original type 
of news source. Common examples include print media, TV transcript, company press 
release, stakeholder press release, …  
XIII. ONEWSSOURCENAME. For rebroadcast or retransmitted reports, note the original 
name of the news source (e.g., New York Times, Market Wire, ...).  
XIV. SENTENCE. Provide the full text of the sentence that includes the event 
XV. INDIRECTREPORTERTITLE. In cases where the news source lists a third party 
individual as the source for the news, identify this entity. “Jim Jones, CEO of Greenpeace 
today announced that XYZ corporation spilled toxic materials into the river.” The 
INDIRECT REPORTERTITLE field should equal CEO. 
XVI. INDIRECTREPORTER. In cases where the news source lists a third party individual as 
the source for the news, identify this entity. For example, in the sentence “Jim Jones of 
Greenpeace today announced that XYZ corporation spilled toxic materials into the river.” 
The INDIRECT REPORTER field should equal Jim Jones. 
XVII. INDIRECTORGANIZATION. In cases where the news source lists a third party 
organization as the source for the news, identify this entity. For example, in the sentence 
“Jim Jones of Greenpeace today announced that XYZ corporation spilled toxic materials 
into the river.” The INDIRECT REPORTER field should equal Greenpeace. 
XVIII. VERB. Locate the event verb 
a. Identify all verbs within the sentence. 
b. Determine which verb appears in the main clause; this verb will convey the main 
event or activity of the sentence. Note that implied and/or secondary verbs may exist 
within a single sentence but should not be substituted for or combined with the main 
verb event coding.  
c. Record the literal value of the verb or verb phrase 
XIX. VERBINFINITIVE. Record the infinitive of the verb or verb phrase that conveys the 
main event or activity of the sentence. For example, in the case of “Goldfields 
Corporation is pleased to announce the release of the report”, the VERBINFINITIVE is 
“announce” as this action best conveys the main event or activity of the sentence. 
XX. SOURCEPHRASE. Locate the source (i.e., initiating) actor 
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a. Locate the subject of the main clause of the sentence to be coded. This is, almost 
always, the source (i.e., initiating) actor 
i. The source (i.e., initiating) actor is the “who” of the sentence; that is, the 
person, place or thing that takes the action within a sentence 
ii. The initiating actor in the main clause will, generally, appear at the beginning 
of the sentence. 
b. Record the entire noun phrase occurring in the subject position as the literal, “source 
value.” 
c. Note that passive voice sentences are constructed without source actors; therefore it 
is possible that no source exists in the report being coded. 
d. If a single sentence references two subjects, it should be entered into two rows. 
XXI. SOURCETYPE. Identify the type of the source if applicable. Examples include “report 
of”, “comment by”, “speech of”, “statement of” 
XXII. SOURCETITLE. Identify the title of the source if applicable. Examples include CEO, 
VP, or Senator. Provide literal text. May be blank. 
XXIII. SOURCEORG. Identify the organization of the source if applicable. Examples include 
XYZ Corporation, Romanian government or Greenpeace. Provide literal text. May be 
blank. 
XXIV. TARGETPHRASE. Locate the target (i.e., recipient) actor 
a. Locate the object of the main clause of the report to be coded. The object, if present, 
is the target (i.e., recipient) actor of the event. The target may be an indirect or direct 
object. It may be a person, place or thing. 
b. Record the entire noun phrase occurring in the direct of indirect object position as the 
literal, “target value.” 
c. Note that many sentences are constructed without targets; therefore, it is possible that 
no target exists in the sentence being coded. 
d. If a single sentence references two objects, it should be entered into two rows. 
XXV. TARGETTYPE. Identify the type of the target if applicable. Examples include “report 
of”, “comment by”, “speech of”, “statement of” 
XXVI. TARGETTITLE. Identify the title of the target if applicable. Examples include CEO, VP 
of Commercial Affairs, or Senator. Provide literal text. May be blank. 
XXVII. TARGETORG. Identify the organization of the target if applicable. Examples include 
XYZ Corporation, Romanian government or Greenpeace. Provide literal text. May be 
blank. 
XXVIII. ISSUE CONTEXT (Additional information regarding the context to which the 
event data pertains where helpful. Examples include environment, corruption, wages or 
property acquisition) 
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APPENDIX 2.2: EXAMPLES OF CODING 
 
Sentence Text 
Source (i.e., 
subject) 
Verb(s) 
Target(s) 
(i.e., 
object(s)) 
Conflict-
Cooperation 
Category 
Conflict-
Cooperation 
Scale 
ASG Chairman Stephen Everett also praised RAMSI 
and local police and thanked the Solomons 
government for its positive support 
ASG 
Chairman 
Stephen 
Everett 
Praise; 
Thank 
Local Police; 
Solomons 
Government 
[express 
support 
verbally] 
13 
On September 14
th
 2007, President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan ceremonially kicked off 
the process of extracting gold and copper ore at the 
Varvarinskoye deposit. He was quoted as saying that 
this mine is one of many enterprises in the region that 
will “build  up the power of Kazakhstan’s economy 
President 
Nazarbayev 
Ceremonially 
kicked off 
Varvarinskoye 
deposit 
[owned by 
European 
Minerals 
Corporation] 
[show support 
through 
action] 
14 
[George] Salamis [President of Rusoro, Russian firm] 
shied away from commenting directly on the 
importance of Rusoro's Russian component but 
instead said: "We wouldn't be anywhere in Venezuela 
if it weren't for the great connections we've built with 
the Venezuelan government at all levels. 
Salamis - 
President of 
Rusoro 
build 
connections 
Venezuelan 
government 
[build positive 
events with] 
13 
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APPENDIX 2.2: EXAMPLES OF CODING (cont’d) 
 
Sentence Text 
Source (i.e., 
subject) 
Verb(s) 
Target(s) 
(i.e., 
object(s)) 
Conflict-
Cooperation 
Category 
Conflict-
Cooperation 
Scale 
Kabila's government is fighting for its survival as 
rebels backed by neighboring Rwanda and Uganda 
have pushed their way westward toward the capital 
city of Kinshasa. Zimbabwe and Angola are 
supporting Kabila with arms and troops. 
Kabila’s 
government 
fight for 
survival 
rebels 
[opposed in 
active military 
conflict] 
1 
Kabila's government is fighting for its survival as 
rebels backed by neighboring Rwanda and Uganda 
have pushed their way westward toward the capital 
city of Kinshasa. Zimbabwe and Angola are 
supporting Kabila with arms and troops. 
Rwanda 
government;  
Uganda 
government 
Back Rebels 
[support in 
active military 
conflict] 
20 
Kabila's government is fighting for its survival as 
rebels backed by neighboring Rwanda and Uganda 
have pushed their way westward toward the capital 
city of Kinshasa. Zimbabwe and Angola are 
supporting Kabila with arms and troops.  
Zimbabwe 
government; 
Angola 
government 
Support with 
arms 
Kabila 
[support in 
active military 
conflict] 
20 
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TABLE 2.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF STAKHOLDER DATASET 
Company 
ID 
Firm Name Mine Name Country  
No. of  
Articles 
No. of 
Stakeholder 
Events 
No. of  
stakeholders 
No. of  
Unique 
Ties 
Min year 
Max 
year 
5111000 Luna Gold Corporation Aurizona/Piaba Brazil 569 197 19 13 2006 2008 
205 Nevsun Resources Ltd. Bisha Eritrea 1131 2387 177 94 2003 2008 
220 Olympus Pacific Minerals 
Inc. 
Bong Mieu Vietnam 476 111 74 46 1997 2008 
136 Gold Reserve Inc. Brisas Venezuela 1525 6650 457 205 1993 2008 
105 European Goldfields Ltd. Certej Romania 700 413 62 45 2000 2004 
89 Dundee Precious Metals Inc. Chelopech Bulgaria 936 3342 338 166 2003 2008 
9471000 Infinito Gold Ltd./Vannessa  Crucitas Costa Rica 480 616 90 47 2001 2008 
219 OceanaGold Corporation Didipio Philippines 534 1783 120 72 2006 2008 
190 Minefinders Corporation  Dolores Mexico 1125 164 61 48 1996 2008 
225 Orvana Minerals Corp. Don Marino Bolivia 1718 492 82 61 1994 2008 
223 Orezone Resources Inc. Essakane Burkina Faso 583 230 34 31 2004 2008 
35 Australian Solomons Gold 
Ltd 
Gold Ridge Solomon Islands 300 896 100 54 2004 2008 
89 Dundee Precious Metals Inc. Krumovgrad Bulgaria 587 2630 230 129 2003 2008 
9471000 Infinito Gold Ltd./Vannessa  Las Cristinas Venezuela 653 7620 756 285 1995 2005 
219 OceanaGold Corporation Macraeas New Zealand 554 97 46 36 2004 2008 
203 Mundoro Mining Inc. Maoling China 629 342 69 54 2004 2008 
105 European Goldfields Ltd. Olympias Greece 700 6633 232 123 2003 2008 
921000 AXMIN Inc. Passendro  Central African 
Republic 
400 277 20 13 2003 2008 
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TABLE 2.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF STAKHOLDER DATASET (cont’d) 
Company 
ID 
Firm Name Mine Name Country  
No. of  
Articles 
No. of 
Stakeholder 
Events 
No. of  
stakeholders 
No. of  
Unique 
Ties 
Min year 
Max 
year 
220 Olympus Pacific Minerals 
Inc. 
Phuoc Son Vietnam 763 132 48 33 1997 2008 
123 Gabriel Resources Ltd. Rosia Montana Romania 1593 4543 
  
1997 2010 
219 OceanaGold Corporation Reefton New Zealand 457 153 36 31 2004 2008 
105 European Goldfields Ltd. Skouries Greece 650 6394 178 102 2003 2008 
63 Centamin Egypt Ltd. Sukari Egypt 1400 508 25 20 1997 2008 
39 Banro Corporation Twangiza DR Congo 2744 4255 1007 435 1995 2008 
291000 Alhambra Resources Ltd. Uzboy Kazakhstan 499 362 51 29 2001 2008 
106 European Minerals 
Corporation 
Varvarinskoye Kazakhstan 523 527 57 40 1996 2008 
  Total   19 22229 51754 4369 2212     
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APPENDIX 2.3: DEGREE OF COOPERATION SCALE 
 
 Level of 
Conflict or 
Cooperation 
Category Details 
I Violent attack w/ actual or potential/intended deaths or serious injury 
II Threaten to violently attack w/ actual or potential/intended deaths or 
serious injury        
III Restrain, imprison, hold against will, blockade, arrest, expel, capture, 
sequester 
IV Financially undermine deploy financial resources against (including sale 
of financial position at or below market price)      
V Threaten to financially undermine threaten/offer financial resources 
against(including sale of financial position at or below market price)       
VI Oppose, veto, impose, force, break, halt, reject, flee, default on obligation, 
rally in opposition, overturn, lose, national political decision in opposition 
(e.g., Supreme Court, Parliament, President…)    
VII Investigate, demand, alert, restrict, repeal of administrative, local or 
regional supportive policy   
VIII Deny, complain, criticize, denounce, negative comment, reject, accuse    
IX Call for action, request assistance against, request information on  
X Neutral statement of fact 
XI Yield, comply, solicit, request assistance with, vote for, am encouraged 
by       
XII Mediate, agree, travel to meet, engage, offer, positive comment 
XIII Host, praise, empathize, apologize, forgive, assure, thanked    
XIV Agreement or receipt/provision of information 
XV Rally in support, ratify, win election, policy decision in support (e.g., 
Supreme Court, Parliament, President…)    
XVI Offer financial support/defense/protection (including acquisition of a 
financial stake at market price or above)        
XVII Provide financial support/defense/protection (including acquisition of a 
financial stake at market price or above)      
XVIII Relax/ease major financial or security penalty/sanction/constraint      
XIX Offer armed support/defense/protection  
XX Provide armed support/defense/protection       
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APPENDIX 2.4: STAKEHOLDER NETWORK FOR BANRO RESOURCE CORPORATION’S TWANGIZA MINE IN THE 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, 2001 
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APPENDIX 2.5: ENGAGEMENT CODING PROTOCOL  
 
a. Announcement 
i. Corporate 
ii. Stakeholder 
iii. Joint 
b. Meeting 
i. Company-Stakeholder 
ii. Stakeholder-Stakeholder 
iii. Company-Company 
c. Data Gathering 
i. Survey or poll 
ii. Database 
iii. Consultative Meeting 
d. Payment 
i. Cash 
ii. In kind donation 
e. Activity (i.e., an action or the cessation of an action) 
i. Company 
ii. Stakeholder 
iii. Company-Stakeholder 
iv. Stakeholder-Stakeholder 
v. Multi-stakeholder 
f. Claims and Requests 
i. Damages 
1. Monetary 
2. Physical 
ii. Violation 
1. Criminal 
2. Contractual 
3. Process 
4. Ethical 
iii. Exclusion 
iv. Denial 
v. Request 
1. Information 
2. Compensation 
3. Activity (i.e., to do something or stop doing something) 
g. Monitoring and Evaluation 
i. Company 
ii. Stakeholder 
iii. Company-Stakeholder 
iv. Stakeholder-Stakeholder 
v. Multi-stakeholder 
vi. National government 
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TABLE 2.2: VARIBLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
  
Number of 
observations 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Conflict-Cooperation 3683 
1.630 3.162 -9 10 
Cooperation 3048 
3.370 1.846 0 10 
Conflict 1649 
-2.746 1.792 -9 0 
All new ties 16535 
0.623 5.686 0 311 
New positive ties 16535 
0.474 4.138 0 133 
New negative ties 16535 
0.156 2.811 0 251 
Firm structural holes  19387 
0.927 0.120 0 1 
Firm periphery core  21987 
0.006 0.008 0 0.065 
Stakeholder status  7192 
0.024 0.052 0 0.75 
Stakeholder cooperation-
conflict  
7192 
0.104 0.333 -0.9 1 
Joint activity  21987 
0.533 0.342 0 1 
Ownership 21987 
93.875 10.816 40 100 
Voice 20281 
-0.347 1.014 -2.136 1.678 
English official language 21987 
0.074 0.262 0 1 
Gold price 21987 
0.433 0.175 0.273 0.973 
Possible ties 19874 
0.905 0.116 0 0.989 
Distance to Toronto 21987 
4727.386 1943.349 2024 8779 
Media major outlets 21987 
0.185 0.145 0 0.602 
Mine Status Construction 
& Production 
21987 
0.077 0.267 0 1 
Mine status (suspension) 21987 
0.027 0.163 0 1 
NVP / GDP (log) 6937 
0.241 0.032 0.100 0.292 
Year  21987 
2002.963 4.112 1993 2009 
Mine ID 21987 
14.407 7.325 1 25 
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TABLE 2.3: CORRELATIONS 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 
Conflict-
Cooperation 
1 
          
2 Cooperation 0.443 1 
         
3 Conflict 0.336 -0.260 1 
        
4 All new ties -0.059 -0.066 -0.055 1 
       
5 New positive ties -0.004 -0.074 -0.037 0.926 1 
      
6 New negative ties -0.116 -0.039 -0.049 0.836 0.569 1 
     
7 
Firm structural 
holes  
0.027 0.002 -0.040 0.065 0.068 0.042 1 
    
8 Firm periphery core  -0.017 -0.097 0.065 -0.036 -0.041 -0.022 0.040 1 
   
9 Stakeholder status  -0.041 -0.017 -0.128 -0.050 -0.040 -0.052 -0.103 -0.056 1 
  
10 
Stakeholder 
cooperation-
conflict  
0.560 0.128 0.303 -0.024 0.024 -0.080 0.008 -0.059 -0.066 1 
 
11 Joint activity  -0.068 0.090 -0.095 0.089 0.065 0.097 0.149 0.248 -0.036 -0.161 1 
12 Ownership -0.107 -0.038 -0.027 0.019 0.012 0.023 -0.159 0.351 -0.057 -0.197 0.209 
13 Voice 0.143 0.026 0.090 0.106 0.127 0.051 0.331 0.174 -0.226 0.216 0.003 
14 
English official 
language 
-0.091 0.179 -0.220 0.006 -0.037 0.065 0.098 -0.205 -0.107 -0.166 0.352 
15 Gold price -0.114 0.068 -0.185 -0.085 -0.092 -0.060 0.154 0.145 -0.105 -0.159 0.137 
16 Possible ties -0.024 -0.014 0.017 -0.188 -0.191 -0.145 0.019 0.145 -0.251 0.010 -0.201 
17 Distance to Toronto -0.066 0.110 -0.177 0.069 0.047 0.080 0.351 -0.161 -0.045 -0.111 0.543 
18 
Media major 
outlets 
-0.069 0.110 -0.071 -0.018 -0.037 0.016 -0.348 -0.122 -0.109 -0.109 0.258 
19 
Mine Status 
Construction & 
Production 
-0.181 -0.022 -0.129 0.013 -0.007 0.031 0.242 0.424 -0.020 -0.260 0.673 
20 
Mine status 
(suspension) 
-0.078 -0.060 0.033 -0.061 -0.058 -0.051 -0.030 -0.050 0.071 -0.088 -0.328 
21 NVP / GDP (log) -0.061 -0.020 0.000 -0.078 -0.079 -0.071 0.004 0.241 -0.270 -0.056 0.318 
22 Year  -0.139 0.044 -0.199 -0.120 -0.135 -0.079 0.201 0.019 -0.162 -0.145 0.124 
23 Mine ID -0.022 -0.007 -0.065 0.053 0.081 0.004 0.279 -0.277 -0.027 0.012 -0.139 
 
 
 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
12 Ownership 1 
          
13 Voice 0.141 1 
         
14 
English official 
language 
-0.075 -0.269 1 
        
15 Gold price 0.007 -0.051 0.321 1 
       
16 Possible ties 0.187 0.198 -0.021 0.216 1 
      
17 Distance to Toronto -0.290 -0.177 0.736 0.299 -0.167 1 
     
18 
Media major 
outlets 
-0.147 -0.322 0.274 0.100 0.168 0.424 1 
    
19 
Mine Status 
Construction & 
Production 
0.180 0.052 0.134 0.316 0.042 0.351 0.022 1 
   
20 
Mine status 
(suspension) 
-0.043 -0.197 -0.114 0.095 0.012 -0.289 -0.294 -0.194 1 
  
21 NVP / GDP (log) 0.413 0.131 0.049 0.272 0.647 -0.009 0.225 0.341 -0.097 1 
 
22 Year  -0.100 -0.056 0.401 0.816 0.382 0.387 0.155 0.310 0.124 0.457 1 
23 Mine ID 0.088 0.149 -0.122 0.153 0.068 0.120 0.012 -0.094 0.187 0.004 0.162 
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TABLE 2.4: DEGREE OF CONFLICT-COOPERATION 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Firm structural holes 
(H1) 
0.88* 
 
0.26 1.10** 
 
0.24 
(0.378) 
 
(0.270) (0.399) 
 
(0.294) 
Firm periphery core 
(H2) 
-7.72** 
 
0.86 -8.57** 
 
1.13 
(2.946) 
 
(2.080) (3.280) 
 
(2.430) 
Stakeholder status (H3)  
1.54** 1.47** 
 
1.63** 1.64** 
 
(0.525) (0.511) 
 
(0.539) (0.524) 
Stakeholder 
cooperation-conflict 
(H4) 
 
8.61*** 8.76*** 
 
8.51*** 8.66*** 
 
(0.126) (0.135) 
 
(0.130) (0.138) 
Joint activity (H5) 
 
0.02 0.09 
 
0.09 0.10 
  
(0.102) (0.101) 
 
(0.123) (0.123) 
Ownership -0.02+ 0.00 -0.00 5.65+ 3.29 3.37 
 
(0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (2.911) (2.224) (2.128) 
Voice 0.43*** 0.07 0.08 1.25*** 0.98*** 1.03*** 
 
(0.099) (0.049) (0.051) (0.357) (0.254) (0.259) 
English official 
language 
-0.40 0.08 0.05 
-
1,011.26+ -593.56 -609.33 
(0.359) (0.181) (0.182) (519.967) (397.307) (380.077) 
Gold price -0.22 -0.21+ -0.16 0.49 0.14 0.23 
 
(0.188) (0.116) (0.134) (0.365) (0.248) (0.268) 
Possible ties (T-1) -1.01** -0.22 -0.07 -0.85* -0.13 -0.10 
 
(0.388) (0.308) (0.301) (0.424) (0.337) (0.329) 
Distance to Toronto 0.00* -0.00 -0.00 0.24+ 0.14 0.14 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.123) (0.094) (0.090) 
Media major outlets 
      
       Mine Status 
Construction & 
Production 
      
      
Mine status 
(suspension)       
      
NPV / GDP (log)       
      Year  No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Mine ID No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.90** 0.37 0.41 
-
1,649.72+ -968.30 -994.22 
 
(1.122) (0.560) (0.635) (851.568) (650.664) (622.452) 
Observations 2,990 3,510 2,990 2,990 3,510 2,990 
Number of mine-
stakeholder groups 971 1,101 971 971 1,101 971 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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TABLE 2.4: DEGREE OF CONFLICT-COOPERATION (cont’d) 
  
Model 
7 
Model 
8 
Model 
9 
Model 
10 
Model 
11 
Model 
12 
Model 
13 
Model 
14 
Model 
15 
Firm 
structural 
holes (H1) 
1.03* 
 
0.23 1.05** 
 
0.19 0.98*  0.19 
(0.402) 
 
(0.297) (0.405) 
 
(0.298) (0.408)  (0.300) 
Firm 
periphery 
core (H2) 
-8.45* 
 
1.14 -8.96** 
 
0.76 -8.81**  0.77 
(3.279) 
 
(2.431) (3.340) 
 
(2.475) (3.340)  (2.476) 
Stakeholder 
status (H3)  
1.63** 1.63** 
 
1.62** 1.62**  1.61** 1.62** 
 
(0.540) (0.526) 
 
(0.539) (0.524)  (0.540) (0.526) 
Stakeholder 
cooperation-
conflict (H4) 
 
8.51*** 8.66*** 
 
8.51*** 8.66***  8.51*** 8.66*** 
 
(0.130) (0.138) 
 
(0.130) (0.138)  (0.130) (0.138) 
Joint activity 
(H5)  
0.09 0.10 
 
0.07 0.09  0.07 0.09 
 
(0.123) (0.123) 
 
(0.124) (0.124)  (0.124) (0.124) 
Ownership 
5.57+ 3.29 3.37 5.47+ 2.91 2.99 5.40+ 2.91 2.99 
(2.910) (2.225) (2.128) (2.959) (2.256) (2.160) (2.958) (2.256) (2.161) 
Voice 1.33*** 0.98*** 1.04*** 1.27*** 1.03*** 1.06*** 1.35*** 1.03*** 1.06*** 
 
(0.362) (0.256) (0.263) (0.360) (0.257) (0.262) (0.365) (0.259) (0.265) 
English 
official 
language 
-
997.24+ -593.25 -608.66 
-
979.17+ -527.01 -540.64 
-
966.82+ -526.90 -540.35 
(519.75
6) 
(397.35
7) 
(380.10
2) 
(528.50
0) 
(402.95
0) 
(385.90
1) 
(528.28
4) 
(403.01
2) 
(385.92
6) 
Gold price 0.53 0.14 0.23 0.54 0.21 0.29 0.58 0.21 0.29 
 
(0.366) (0.249) (0.269) (0.368) (0.251) (0.270) (0.369) (0.251) (0.271) 
Possible ties 
(T-1) 
-0.69 -0.13 -0.09 -0.85* -0.16 -0.11 -0.69 -0.16 -0.10 
(0.440) (0.349) (0.339) (0.424) (0.337) (0.328) (0.440) (0.349) (0.338) 
Distance to 
Toronto 
0.24+ 0.14 0.14 0.23+ 0.12 0.13 0.23+ 0.12 0.13 
(0.123) (0.094) (0.090) (0.125) (0.095) (0.091) (0.125) (0.095) (0.091) 
Media major 
outlets 
-0.51 -0.01 -0.03 
   
-0.50 -0.00 -0.02 
(0.361) (0.263) (0.265) 
   
(0.361) (0.263) (0.265) 
Mine Status 
Construction 
& Production 
   
0.08 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.08 
   
(0.107) (0.077) (0.078) (0.107) (0.077) (0.078) 
Mine status 
Suspension    
0.17 0.26 0.26 0.16 0.26 0.26 
   
(0.230) (0.172) (0.168) (0.230) (0.172) (0.168) 
NPV / GDP 
(log)       
   
      
   
Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mine ID Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1,626+ -967.78 -993.10 -1,597+ -859.00 -881.54 -1,576+ -858.82 -881.04 
 
(851.23) (650.75) (622.50) (865.51) (659.90) (631.9) (865.16) (659.99) (632.01) 
Observations 2,990 3,510 2,990 2,990 3,510 2,990 2,990 3,510 2,990 
Number of 
mine-
stakeholder 
groups 971 1,101 971 971 1,101 971 971 1,101 971 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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TABLE 2.4: DEGREE OF CONFLICT-COOPERATION (cont’d) 
  Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
Firm structural 
holes (H1) 
0.59 
 
0.11 0.72 
 
0.16 
(0.572) 
 
(0.507) (0.599) 
 
(0.522) 
Firm periphery 
core (H2) 
-1.15 
 
2.00 -1.69 
 
0.78 
(3.147) 
 
(2.624) (3.436) 
 
(2.886) 
Stakeholder 
status (H3)  
3.44** 2.60* 
 
3.60** 2.76* 
 
(1.256) (1.219) 
 
(1.256) (1.219) 
Stakeholder 
cooperation-
conflict (H4)  
8.09*** 8.31*** 
 
8.09*** 8.31*** 
 
(0.183) (0.198) 
 
(0.183) (0.198) 
Joint activity 
(H5)  
0.21 0.23 
 
0.21 0.23 
 
(0.197) (0.214) 
 
(0.216) (0.227) 
Ownership -0.60 -0.36 -0.32 -0.67 -0.41 -0.40 
 
(1.286) (1.142) (1.065) (1.293) (1.145) (1.068) 
Voice 0.94 0.55 0.68 0.92 0.56 0.76 
 
(0.796) (0.686) (0.666) (0.822) (0.688) (0.683) 
English official 
language 
-31.65 -18.54 -16.51 -34.98 -21.21 -20.38 
(65.152) (57.883) (53.933) (65.508) (57.993) (54.092) 
Gold price 0.29 0.17 0.18 0.17 -0.00 0.05 
 
(0.341) (0.276) (0.283) (0.352) (0.287) (0.291) 
Possible ties -1.29 3.12* 3.01* -1.89 2.63+ 2.48+ 
 
(1.616) (1.277) (1.391) (1.669) (1.434) (1.453) 
Distance to 
Toronto 
0.06 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.04 
(0.120) (0.106) (0.099) (0.121) (0.107) (0.100) 
Media major 
outlets    
0.12 -0.09 -0.45 
   
(1.004) (0.629) (0.846) 
Mine Status 
Construction & 
Production    
0.03 0.08 0.06 
   
(0.123) (0.101) (0.106) 
Mine status 
(suspension) 
   
-0.48+ -0.53* -0.55* 
    
(0.287) (0.251) (0.236) 
NPV / GDP 
(log) 
6.19* -2.81 -2.22 5.49+ -3.59 -3.66 
(3.018) (2.426) (2.496) (3.230) (2.464) (2.675) 
Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mine ID Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -285.61 -175.62 -157.28 -317.74 -201.76 -195.35 
 
(623.052) (553.424) (515.754) (626.552) (554.554) (517.370) 
Observations 1,637 1,941 1,637 1,637 1,941 1,637 
Number of 
mine-
stakeholder 
groups 705 819 705 705 819 705 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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TABLE 2.5: DEGREE OF COOPERATION 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Firm structural holes (H1) 0.82** 
 
0.52* 0.85** 
 
0.41 
 
(0.279) 
 
(0.252) (0.295) 
 
(0.269) 
Firm periphery core (H2) -4.74* 
 
1.28 -3.66 
 
3.95+ 
 
(2.341) 
 
(2.080) (2.562) 
 
(2.323) 
Stakeholder status (H3) 
 
1.30** 1.35** 
 
1.35** 1.36** 
  
(0.471) (0.462) 
 
-0.482 (0.476) 
Stakeholder cooperation-
conflict (H4) 
 
4.18*** 4.38*** 
 
4.25*** 4.43*** 
  
(0.150) (0.159) 
 
-0.151 (0.161) 
Joint activity (H5) 
 
0.30** 0.32*** 
 
0.27* 0.35** 
  
(0.096) (0.095) 
 
-0.108 (0.109) 
Ownership -0.00 -0.00 0.00 1.29 0.18 0.06 
 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (2.074) -1.914 (1.859) 
Voice 0.17* 0.09 0.03 0.77** 0.90*** 0.62** 
 
(0.074) (0.059) (0.060) (0.265) (0.235) (0.240) 
English official language 1.04*** 0.95*** 0.99*** -232.41 -37.27 -13.41 
 
(0.275) (0.224) (0.221) (370.454) (341.927) (331.976) 
Gold price -0.15 0.07 -0.11 0.10 0.17 -0.04 
 
(0.142) (0.112) (0.126) (0.274) (0.228) (0.245) 
Possible ties -1.12*** -0.16 -0.10 -0.88** -0.07 0.08 
 
(0.279) (0.275) (0.271) (0.311) (0.301) (0.298) 
Distance to Toronto -0.00* -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.05 0.01 0.00 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.088) (0.081) (0.079) 
Media major outlets 
      
       Mine Status Construction & 
Production 
      
       Mine status (suspension) 
      
       NPV / GDP (log) 
      
       Year  No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Mine ID No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 4.14*** 3.31*** 2.13** -375.62 -56.25 -18.80 
 
(0.853) (0.650) (0.711) (606.704) (559.964) (543.673) 
Observations 2,553 2,892 2,553 2,553 2,892 2,553 
Number of mine-
stakeholder groups 838 925 838 838 925 838 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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TABLE 2.5: DEGREE OF COOPERATION (cont’d) 
  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Model 
10 
Model 
11 
Model 
12 
Model 
13 
Model 
14 
Model 
15 
Firm 
structural 
holes (H1) 
0.88** 
 
0.49+ 0.65* 
 
0.23 0.68*  0.31 
(0.298) 
 
(0.273) (0.295) 
 
(0.269) (0.298)  (0.272) 
Firm 
periphery 
core (H2) 
-3.72 
 
3.80 -5.42* 
 
2.10 -5.52*  1.89 
(2.564) 
 
(2.323) (2.581) 
 
(2.346) (2.583)  (2.346) 
Stakeholder 
status (H3)  
1.41** 1.45** 
 
1.33** 1.33**  1.40** 1.44** 
 
(0.484) (0.479) 
 
(0.480) (0.471)  (0.481) (0.474) 
Stakeholder 
cooperation-
conflict (H4)  
4.26*** 4.44*** 
 
4.24*** 4.42***  4.25*** 4.43*** 
 
(0.151) (0.161) 
 
(0.151) (0.160)  (0.151) (0.160) 
Joint activity 
(H5)  
0.26* 0.35** 
 
0.20+ 0.28**  0.19+ 0.27* 
 
(0.108) (0.109) 
 
(0.108) (0.108)  (0.108) (0.108) 
Ownership 1.33 0.23 0.12 0.83 -0.29 -0.42 0.86 -0.24 -0.36 
 
(2.075) (1.914) (1.858) (2.083) (1.925) (1.866) (2.084) (1.924) (1.865) 
Voice 0.74** 0.86*** 0.54* 0.90*** 1.05*** 0.77** 0.86** 1.01*** 0.68** 
 
(0.269) (0.236) (0.243) (0.266) (0.236) (0.241) (0.269) (0.237) (0.244) 
English 
official 
language 
-238.19 -46.00 -23.76 -149.30 46.23 70.74 -155.22 36.83 60.80 
(370.54
1) 
(341.90
5) 
(331.91
7) 
(372.14
7) 
(343.80
9) 
(333.31
8) 
(372.18
1) 
(343.74
0) 
(333.16
5) 
Gold price 0.09 0.16 -0.07 0.31 0.33 0.17 0.30 0.32 0.14 
 
(0.274) (0.228) (0.246) (0.275) (0.229) (0.246) (0.275) (0.229) (0.246) 
Possible ties 
(T-1) 
-0.95** -0.17 -0.04 -0.87** -0.15 0.04 -0.95** -0.27 -0.11 
(0.322) (0.309) (0.305) (0.309) (0.299) (0.295) (0.319) (0.307) (0.302) 
Distance to 
Toronto 
0.06 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
(0.088) (0.081) (0.079) (0.088) (0.081) (0.079) (0.088) (0.081) (0.079) 
Media major 
outlets 
0.22 0.35 0.47+ 
   
0.28 0.40+ 0.53* 
(0.272) (0.240) (0.245) 
   
(0.270) (0.239) (0.243) 
Mine Status 
Construction 
& 
Production 
   
0.35*** 0.30*** 0.33*** 0.35*** 0.31*** 0.33*** 
   
(0.080) (0.071) (0.072) (0.080) (0.071) (0.072) 
Mine status 
(suspension)    
0.67*** 0.59*** 0.66*** 0.68*** 0.60*** 0.68*** 
   
(0.188) (0.172) (0.168) (0.188) (0.172) (0.168) 
NPV / GDP 
(log)       
   
      
   
Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mine ID Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -385.27 -70.75 -36.16 -238.70 81.34 119.95 -248.64 65.73 103.24 
 
(606.85
0) 
(559.93
0) 
(543.58
0) 
(609.45
7) 
(563.03
7) 
(545.85
5) 
(609.51
6) 
(562.92
7) 
(545.60
8) 
Observations 2,553 2,892 2,553 2,553 2,892 2,553 2,553 2,892 2,553 
Number of 
mine-
stakeholder 
groups 838 925 838 838 925 838 838 925 838 
Standard errors in parentheses;  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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TABLE 2.5: DEGREE OF COOPERATION (cont’d) 
 
  Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
Firm 
structural 
holes (H1) 
-0.22 
 
-0.11 0.06 
 
-0.09 
(0.449) 
 
(0.459) (0.470) 
 
(0.471) 
Firm 
periphery 
core (H2) 
-0.03 
 
3.32 -0.46 
 
1.90 
(2.691) 
 
(2.549) (2.938) 
 
(2.810) 
Stakeholder 
status (H3)  
3.05** 2.66* 
 
3.10** 2.67* 
 
(1.168) (1.147) 
 
(1.169) (1.147) 
Stakeholder 
cooperation-
conflict (H4)  
4.26*** 4.55*** 
 
4.28*** 4.55*** 
 
(0.215) (0.237) 
 
(0.215) (0.236) 
Joint activity 
(H5)  
0.38* 0.54** 
 
0.31 0.38+ 
 
(0.173) (0.195) 
 
(0.190) (0.207) 
Ownership 1.27 1.20 1.37 1.08 1.02 1.20 
 
(0.982) (0.954) (0.926) (0.988) (0.957) (0.931) 
Voice -0.06 0.03 -0.35 -0.39 0.12 -0.44 
 
(0.631) (0.599) (0.599) (0.656) (0.603) (0.620) 
English 
official 
language 
63.10 59.76 67.93 53.39 50.91 58.95 
(49.748) (48.339) (46.902) (50.044) (48.459) (47.140) 
Gold price -0.15 0.01 -0.21 -0.05 0.05 -0.08 
 
(0.276) (0.248) (0.260) (0.285) (0.257) (0.270) 
Possible ties 
-0.57 3.09** 3.93** -0.95 2.68* 3.46** 
(1.276) (1.149) (1.264) (1.311) (1.258) (1.315) 
Distance to 
Toronto 
-0.12 -0.11 -0.13 -0.10 -0.09 -0.11 
(0.092) (0.089) (0.086) (0.092) (0.089) (0.087) 
Media major 
outlets    
1.81* 0.14 1.14 
   
(0.827) (0.586) (0.796) 
Mine Status 
Construction 
& 
Production    
0.14 0.18* 0.17+ 
   
(0.102) (0.092) (0.099) 
Mine status 
(suspension)    
0.19 0.15 0.22 
   
(0.244) (0.237) (0.231) 
NPV / GDP 
(log) 
-0.27 -5.84** -5.03* 0.18 -6.39** -5.25* 
(2.471) (2.166) (2.337) (2.623) (2.194) (2.488) 
Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mine ID Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 618.57 579.16 660.45 526.18 492.54 573.52 
 
(475.751) (462.178) (448.519) (478.733) (463.409) (450.953) 
Observations 1,419 1,607 1,419 1,419 1,607 1,419 
Number of 
mine-
stakeholder 
groups 608 682 608 608 682 608 
Standard errors in parentheses;  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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 TABLE 2.6: DEGREE OF CONFLICT 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Firm structural 
holes (H1) -0.34 -0.20 -0.23 -0.18 -0.20 1.43* 0.53 
 
(0.399) (0.428) (0.434) (0.438) (0.443) (0.640) (0.718) 
Firm periphery 
core (H2) -1.16 -9.26** -9.21** -8.75* -8.69* -10.58*** -13.10*** 
 
(2.982) (3.533) (3.532) (3.598) (3.598) (3.126) (3.241) 
Stakeholder 
status (H3) 0.07 0.17 0.19 0.15 0.17 2.56+ 3.21* 
 
(0.754) (0.756) (0.757) (0.757) (0.758) (1.435) (1.463) 
Stakeholder 
cooperation-
conflict (H4) 2.64*** 2.65*** 2.65*** 2.68*** 2.67*** 1.38*** 1.32*** 
 
(0.258) (0.259) (0.259) (0.260) (0.260) (0.327) (0.323) 
Joint activity 
(H5) 
-0.41* -0.63** -0.61** -0.60* -0.58* 0.29 0.13 
(0.180) (0.232) (0.236) (0.236) (0.240) (0.307) (0.315) 
Ownership -0.01 6.45 6.38 5.38 5.30 -1.32 -1.15 
 
(0.011) (7.781) (8.043) (8.148) (8.394) (2.630) (2.654) 
Voice 0.20 1.01* 1.02** 0.96* 0.98* -3.45** -2.89* 
 
(0.122) (0.394) (0.395) (0.397) (0.398) (1.128) (1.136) 
English 
official 
language 
-0.74+ -1,209.70 -1,197.18 -1,018.21 -1,004.24 -64.36 -54.54 
(0.411) (973.596) (978.733) 
(1,003.02
2) 
(1,007.93
8) (133.346) (134.610) 
Gold price -0.20 0.33 0.36 0.37 0.40 1.18** 1.01* 
 
(0.212) (0.440) (0.445) (0.445) (0.449) (0.397) (0.437) 
Possible ties -0.34 -1.28+ -1.17 -1.19+ -1.08 3.75* 3.21 
 
(0.636) (0.714) (0.751) (0.719) (0.756) (1.890) (2.025) 
Distance to 
Toronto 
0.00 0.29 0.29 0.24 0.24 0.12 0.10 
(0.000) (0.220) (0.220) (0.226) (0.226) (0.245) (0.247) 
Media major 
outlets   
-0.20 
 
-0.19 
 
-2.07 
  
(0.435) 
 
(0.436) 
 
(1.303) 
Mine Status 
Construction 
& Production 
   
-0.03 -0.03 
 
0.34* 
   
(0.124) (0.125) 
 
(0.151) 
Mine status 
(suspension) 
   
0.16 0.15 
 
-0.14 
    
(0.207) (0.207) 
 
(0.236) 
NPV / GDP 
(log)      
0.84 -2.46 
     
(3.206) (3.499) 
Year  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mine ID No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
-0.01 -1,986.28 -1,965.77 -1,673.02 -1,650.14 -606.48 -517.50 
(1.379) 
(1,549.74
0) 
(1,552.77
5) 
(1,593.42
9) 
(1,596.37
3) 
(1,274.41
0) 
(1,286.57
5) 
Observations 1,238 1,238 1,238 1,238 1,238 633 633 
Number of 
mine-
stakeholder 
groups 400 400 400 400 400 274 274 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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TABLE 2.7: NEW TIE FORMATION—ALL TIES 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Firm structural holes (H1) 3.76** 
 
0.85 3.77** 
 
1.58 
 
(1.197) 
 
(1.830) (1.185) 
 
(1.632) 
Firm periphery core (H2) -8.11 
 
-0.88 -8.91 
 
-4.51 
 
(9.511) 
 
(10.507) (9.827) 
 
(10.427) 
Stakeholder status (H3) 
 
-1.29 8.12 
 
0.50 15.96 
  
(2.987) (12.916) 
 
(3.823) (16.861) 
Stakeholder cooperation-
conflict (H4) 
 
3.54** 3.99* 
 
3.58** 4.08** 
  
(1.342) (1.570) 
 
(1.337) (1.556) 
Joint activity (H5) 
 
-0.82 -0.85 
 
-1.20 -1.42 
  
(0.942) (1.050) 
 
(1.086) (1.211) 
Voice -2.46** 5.02 6.02 -2.52** 4.55 5.40 
 
(0.827) (3.756) (3.728) (0.877) (4.128) (4.122) 
Gold price 0.64 
-
11.38*** 
-
11.48*** 0.71 
-
10.99*** 
-
11.07*** 
 
(0.769) (1.176) (1.233) (0.788) (1.193) (1.138) 
Possible ties 2.79** 
-
62.81*** 
-
62.81*** 2.43* 
-
64.87*** 
-
66.17*** 
 
(0.899) (8.604) (8.959) (1.042) (8.358) (8.522) 
Media major outlets 
   
0.86 4.00+ 6.16* 
    
(1.001) (2.413) (2.851) 
Mine Status Construction & 
Production 
      
       Mine status (suspension) 
      
       NPV / GDP (log) 
      
       
       Observations 6,056 3,275 2,709 6,056 3,275 2,709 
Number of mine-stakeholder 
groups 912 922 786 912 922 786 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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TABLE 2.7: NEW TIE FORMATION—ALL TIES (cont’d) 
  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Model 
10 
Model 
11 
Model 
12 
Firm structural holes (H1) 3.49** 
 
2.94 3.46** 
 
2.86 
 
(1.159) 
 
(2.626) (1.139) 
 
(2.224) 
Firm periphery core (H2) -15.13 
 
24.78* -15.65 
 
19.49* 
 
(10.241) 
 
(10.735) (10.397) 
 
(9.795) 
Stakeholder status (H3) 
 
-1.30 8.62 
 
0.22 14.93 
  
(3.085) (13.473) 
 
(3.902) (16.196) 
Stakeholder cooperation-
conflict (H4) 
 
3.31** 3.78** 
 
3.37** 3.94** 
  
(1.284) (1.457) 
 
(1.265) (1.431) 
Joint activity (H5) 
 
-0.51 -0.15 
 
-0.84 -0.66 
  
(0.954) (1.026) 
 
(1.099) (1.194) 
Voice -2.36** 4.47 5.27 -2.41** 4.14 4.88 
 
(0.749) (3.827) (3.713) (0.783) (4.090) (4.014) 
Gold price 0.24 
-
10.79*** 
-
11.20*** 0.31 
-
10.51*** 
-
10.91*** 
 
(0.782) (1.131) (1.136) (0.790) (1.176) (1.105) 
Possible ties 2.69** 
-
60.18*** 
-
60.21*** 2.36* 
-
61.98*** 
-
62.88*** 
 
(0.892) (8.396) (8.586) (1.039) (8.216) (8.366) 
Media major outlets 
   
0.77 3.15 4.88+ 
    
(0.977) (2.387) (2.777) 
Mine Status Construction & 
Production 0.73+ -1.94*** -2.59*** 0.72+ -1.82*** -2.32*** 
 
(0.426) (0.426) (0.646) (0.420) (0.441) (0.613) 
Mine status (suspension) -3.88*** 
-
17.21*** 
-
15.82*** -3.89*** 
-
16.42*** 
-
16.61*** 
 
(0.790) (0.587) (0.594) (0.794) (0.596) (0.598) 
NPV / GDP (log) 
      
       
       Observations 6,056 3,275 2,709 6,056 3,275 2,709 
Number of mine-stakeholder 
groups 912 922 786 912 922 786 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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TABLE 2.7: NEW TIE FORMATION—ALL TIES (cont’d) 
  Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
Firm structural holes 
(H1) -0.35 
 
-1.69 -3.25 
 
-0.49 
 
(1.447) 
 
(2.012) (2.273) 
 
(2.043) 
Firm periphery core 
(H2) 8.00 
 
-48.34** 12.91 
 
-89.37*** 
 
(10.926) 
 
(15.209) (10.858) 
 
(25.552) 
Stakeholder status (H3) 
 
43.29* 34.26 
 
65.31+ 33.98* 
  
(21.439) (20.960) 
 
(35.056) (15.954) 
Stakeholder 
cooperation-conflict 
(H4) 
 
2.75 3.96* 
 
1.48 4.60* 
  
(1.917) (2.004) 
 
(2.207) (2.153) 
Joint activity (H5) 
 
4.87+ 5.34* 
 
4.52* 5.01* 
  
(2.595) (2.228) 
 
(2.251) (2.136) 
Voice -0.42 12.26+ 9.08 1.82 16.19+ -3.14 
 
(2.435) (6.537) (8.699) (2.443) (9.363) (10.293) 
Gold price -1.72 -9.85*** -9.13*** -2.18+ -10.10*** -7.86** 
 
(1.128) (1.732) (2.418) (1.211) (1.749) (2.652) 
Possible ties -2.11 -30.72* -16.72 5.02 -31.37** -14.24 
 
(4.033) (12.343) (13.479) (4.769) (11.174) (19.418) 
Media major outlets 
   
-6.86* -2.71 19.57** 
    
(2.840) (7.895) (6.959) 
Mine Status 
Construction & 
Production 
   
-0.19 -1.89 1.87* 
    
(0.413) (1.480) (0.776) 
Mine status (suspension) 
   
-2.17+ -16.45*** -16.97*** 
    
(1.126) (0.629) (1.135) 
NPV / GDP (log) 10.41 
-
154.47*** 
-
190.42*** 6.20 
-
138.42*** 
-
241.26*** 
 
(6.748) (22.344) (25.517) (6.711) (26.384) (43.355) 
       Observations 2,002 1,322 1,111 2,002 1,322 1,111 
Number of mine-
stakeholder groups 505 457 389 505 457 389 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 200 
 
TABLE 2.8: NEW TIE FORMATION—POSITIVE TIES 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Firm structural holes (H1) 3.81* 
 
0.93 3.78* 
 
1.87 
 
(1.587) 
 
(1.820) (1.589) 
 
(1.691) 
Firm periphery core (H2) -6.92 
 
5.90 -7.28 
 
1.50 
 
(8.627) 
 
(12.282) (8.695) 
 
(11.662) 
Stakeholder status (H3) 
 
1.73 21.72* 
 
3.88 29.62** 
  
(5.920) (10.057) 
 
(6.720) (11.279) 
Stakeholder cooperation-
conflict (H4) 
 
7.81*** 8.67*** 
 
7.61*** 8.17*** 
  
(1.630) (1.812) 
 
(1.561) (1.675) 
Joint activity (H5) 
 
-0.31 -0.31 
 
-0.56 -0.76 
  
(0.952) (1.152) 
 
(1.102) (1.308) 
Voice -1.68* 7.67* 8.71* -1.71* 7.20+ 7.85+ 
 
(0.679) (3.831) (3.922) (0.702) (4.156) (4.224) 
Gold price 0.35 -11.57*** -12.44*** 0.39 -11.16*** -11.85*** 
 
(0.682) (1.441) (1.571) (0.689) (1.507) (1.492) 
Possible ties 2.96** -61.39*** -64.35*** 2.80** -62.81*** -67.77*** 
 
(0.922) (9.828) (10.639) (1.050) (9.299) (9.855) 
Media major outlets 
   
0.36 3.46 6.16+ 
    
(0.955) (2.765) (3.187) 
Mine Status Construction 
& Production 
      
       Mine status (suspension) 
      
       NPV / GDP (log) 
      
       
       Observations 5,011 2,571 2,222 5,011 2,571 2,222 
Number of mine-
stakeholder groups 757 726 643 757 726 643 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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TABLE 2.8: NEW TIE FORMATION—POSITIVE TIES (cont’d) 
  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Firm structural holes 
(H1) 3.68* 
 
3.18 3.64* 
 
3.27 
 
(1.556) 
 
(2.787) (1.562) 
 
(2.325) 
Firm periphery core 
(H2) -11.06 
 
37.94** -11.40 
 
31.52** 
 
(8.522) 
 
(14.134) (8.601) 
 
(12.015) 
Stakeholder status (H3) 
 
1.15 19.75* 
 
2.92 26.15* 
  
(5.795) (10.049) 
 
(6.744) (11.520) 
Stakeholder 
cooperation-conflict 
(H4) 
 
7.43*** 8.29*** 
 
7.28*** 8.00*** 
  
(1.635) (1.798) 
 
(1.582) (1.686) 
Joint activity (H5) 
 
-0.01 0.44 
 
-0.23 0.06 
  
(0.960) (1.079) 
 
(1.114) (1.239) 
Voice -1.65* 7.01+ 7.73* -1.68* 6.70 7.23+ 
 
(0.668) (3.921) (3.925) (0.688) (4.155) (4.103) 
Gold price 0.27 -11.00*** -12.15*** 0.31 -10.73*** -11.78*** 
 
(0.763) (1.378) (1.385) (0.768) (1.475) (1.367) 
Possible ties 2.89** -58.20*** -60.69*** 2.73** -59.44*** -63.26*** 
 
(0.920) (9.423) (10.018) (1.052) (8.989) (9.508) 
Media major outlets 
   
0.37 2.55 4.78 
    
(0.963) (2.805) (3.060) 
Mine Status 
Construction & 
Production 0.35 -2.10*** -2.98*** 0.35 -1.98*** -2.71*** 
 
(0.310) (0.423) (0.728) (0.310) (0.443) (0.678) 
Mine status (suspension) -17.09*** -16.11*** -15.96*** -17.09*** -15.92*** -16.53*** 
 
(0.371) (0.882) (0.907) (0.374) (0.919) (0.946) 
NPV / GDP (log) 
      
       
       Observations 5,011 2,571 2,222 5,011 2,571 2,222 
Number of mine-
stakeholder groups 757 726 643 757 726 643 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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TABLE 2.8: NEW TIE FORMATION—POSITIVE TIES (cont’d) 
  Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
Firm structural holes 
(H1) 0.32 
 
0.13 -2.27 
 
0.61 
 
(1.533) 
 
(2.313) (2.153) 
 
(2.279) 
Firm periphery core 
(H2) 4.65 
 
-48.80* 12.83 
 
-88.14** 
 
(10.681) 
 
(20.933) (10.999) 
 
(29.980) 
Stakeholder status 
(H3) 
 
50.53* 33.74 
 
60.09+ 35.67* 
  
(23.274) (22.683) 
 
(33.515) (17.653) 
Stakeholder 
cooperation-conflict 
(H4) 
 
8.02+ 12.98** 
 
7.51 13.15** 
  
(4.297) (4.439) 
 
(4.809) (4.597) 
Joint activity (H5) 
 
5.53* 6.81*** 
 
5.69** 6.43** 
  
(2.186) (1.803) 
 
(2.031) (1.969) 
Voice 0.66 12.90+ 10.57 2.82 18.15+ -0.60 
 
(2.515) (7.231) (9.698) (2.543) (9.514) (10.919) 
Gold price -1.41 -9.46*** -9.74*** -1.91 -9.66*** -8.57** 
 
(1.183) (1.949) (2.506) (1.250) (1.947) (2.742) 
Possible ties -2.82 -15.64 -0.05 3.52 -13.36 1.89 
 
(4.146) (14.291) (14.670) (4.430) (12.063) (21.005) 
Media major outlets 
   
-6.27* -7.66 14.25+ 
    
(2.720) (6.878) (8.445) 
Mine Status 
Construction & 
Production 
   
-0.40 -1.02 2.41** 
    
(0.414) (1.257) (0.902) 
Mine status 
(suspension) 
   
-15.99*** -18.97*** -20.40*** 
    
(0.873) (1.166) (1.169) 
NPV / GDP (log) 11.05 
-
155.73*** 
-
200.34*** 7.98 
-
142.18*** 
-
248.40*** 
 
(6.934) (24.168) (28.132) (6.853) (27.334) (46.107) 
       Observations 1,689 1,052 941 1,689 1,052 941 
Number of mine-
stakeholder groups 425 361 324 425 361 324 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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TABLE 2.9: NEW TIE FORMATION—NEGATIVE TIES  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Firm structural holes 
(H1) 4.11* 
 
-0.27 4.37* 
 
0.04 
 
(1.969) 
 
(2.580) (1.969) 
 
(2.638) 
Firm periphery core 
(H2) -13.06 
 
-4.07 -14.59 
 
-5.55 
 
(17.851) 
 
(12.205) (18.795) 
 
(12.373) 
Stakeholder status (H3) 
 
-17.21 -15.24 
 
-14.70 -9.95 
  
(11.473) (11.606) 
 
(11.582) (11.096) 
Stakeholder 
cooperation-conflict 
(H4) 
 
-1.22 -1.58 
 
-0.90 -1.04 
  
(1.905) (2.011) 
 
(1.996) (2.141) 
Joint activity (H5) 
 
-2.24+ -2.67* 
 
-2.66+ -3.54* 
  
(1.205) (1.233) 
 
(1.477) (1.563) 
Voice -4.06** -2.82 -1.07 -4.15** -2.61 -0.68 
 
(1.287) (2.581) (2.403) (1.348) (2.630) (2.528) 
Gold price 1.80 -14.24*** -13.65*** 1.81 -13.92*** -13.57*** 
 
(1.744) (1.583) (1.822) (1.724) (1.487) (1.779) 
Possible ties 1.47 -72.52*** -68.80*** 0.74 -73.63*** -71.39*** 
 
(1.511) (14.509) (14.565) (1.644) (14.259) (14.241) 
Media major outlets 
   
2.05 3.76 6.70+ 
    
(1.773) (3.615) (3.654) 
Mine Status 
Construction & 
Production 
      
       
Mine status (suspension) 
      
       
Observations 2,093 1,345 1,021 2,093 1,345 1,021 
Number of mine-
stakeholder groups 307 355 279 307 355 279 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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TABLE 2.9: NEW TIE FORMATION (NEGATIVE TIES) (cont’d) 
  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Firm structural holes 
(H1) 2.72+ 
 
0.36 2.89+ 
 
0.38 
 
(1.510) 
 
(3.012) (1.516) 
 
(2.903) 
Firm periphery core 
(H2) -18.93 
 
7.86 -19.46 
 
5.32 
 
(14.545) 
 
(13.404) (14.717) 
 
(14.248) 
Stakeholder status (H3) 
 
-12.87 -11.21 
 
-11.15 -7.43 
  
(10.284) (11.468) 
 
(10.563) (9.697) 
Stakeholder 
cooperation-conflict 
(H4) 
 
-1.14 -1.55 
 
-0.86 -1.00 
  
(1.894) (2.062) 
 
(2.038) (2.229) 
Joint activity (H5) 
 
-1.95 -2.11+ 
 
-2.30 -2.92+ 
  
(1.208) (1.259) 
 
(1.496) (1.609) 
Voice -3.92*** -2.87 -1.46 -3.96*** -2.73 -1.11 
 
(1.116) (2.573) (2.407) (1.143) (2.621) (2.518) 
Gold price -0.14 -13.46*** -12.81*** -0.10 -13.26*** -12.90*** 
 
(1.606) (1.561) (1.783) (1.610) (1.579) (1.817) 
Possible ties 0.42 -71.00*** -66.77*** -0.12 -72.00*** -69.28*** 
 
(1.399) (14.597) (14.392) (1.648) (14.411) (14.284) 
Media major outlets 
   
1.42 2.94 5.73 
    
(1.537) (3.734) (3.729) 
Mine Status 
Construction & 
Production 1.46* -1.05 -1.27 1.44* -0.95 -1.05 
 
(0.714) (0.794) (0.967) (0.704) (0.830) (1.072) 
Mine status (suspension) -3.05** -14.07*** -14.92*** -3.03** -13.87*** -13.64*** 
 
(0.980) (0.524) (0.519) (0.997) (0.433) (0.526) 
Observations 2,093 1,345 1,021 2,093 1,345 1,021 
Number of mine-
stakeholder groups 307 355 279 307 355 279 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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FIGURE 3.1: OPEN AND CLOSED TRIADS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
i 
k 
j i 
j 
j 
Open Triad (undirected)      Closed Triad 
(undirected) 
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FIGURE 3.2: BALANCED AND IMBALANCED TRIADS 
  
 
 
 
Source: Doreian, 2002:96  
Positive relations     Negative relations 
p → o p → q o → q Triadic  
Configuration 
Corresponding Axiom 
+ + + Balanced the friend of my friend is my friend 
+ - - Balanced the enemy of my friend is my enemy 
- + - Balanced the friend of my enemy is my enemy 
- - + Balanced the enemy of my enemy is my friend 
+ - + Imbalanced  
+ + - Imbalanced 
- + + Imbalanced 
- - - Imbalanced 
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FIGURE 3.3: TRANSITIVE AND THREE-CYCLE TRIADS 
 
 
 
Source: Snidjers, 2010  
(a)  Transitive triad                                               (b) three-cycle triad 
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FIGURE 3.4: THE EIGHT DIFFERENT TYPES OF DIRECTED TRIADS FOR A 
TRIPLE OF ACTORS I, J, K 
 
ij,  jk,  ki 
ij,  jk,  ki 
ij,  jk,  ki 
ij,  jk,  ki 
ij,  jk,  ki 
ij,  jk,  ki 
ij,  jk,  ki 
ij,  jk,  ki 
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TABLE 3.1: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
  Number of observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
DV Closed Triads 1540262 0.125 0.330 0 1 
Access to Resource Difference 1539577 -0.018 0.258 -1 1 
Status Difference 1539577 -0.011 0.136 -0.588 0.5 
Likability Difference 1540262 -0.007 0.229 -1.129 1.209 
Popularity Difference 1540262 -11.725 160.933 -323 323 
Network Size 1540262 104.438 47.075 3 216 
Sign Difference Dyad 1 1540262 0.342 0.474 0 1 
Sign Difference Dyad 2 1540262 0.355 0.478 0 1 
Tie Strength Dyad 1 1540262 4.430 4.901 1 34 
Tie Strength Dyad 2 1540262 3.622 4.461 1 34 
Reciprocity Dyad 1 1540262 0.613 0.487 0 1 
Reciprocity Dyad 2 1540262 0.444 0.497 0 1 
Cooperation Dyad 1 1540262 0.050 0.353 -0.9 1 
Cooperation Dyad 2 1540262 0.055 0.359 -0.9 1 
Common Others Dyad 1 1540262 7.640 29.770 0 328 
Common Others Dyad 2 1540262 6.421 25.532 0 308 
Common Others Dyad 3 1540262 5.885 23.536 0 280 
Transitive Density T-1 1203722 0.000 0.000 0 0.042 
Possible Ties T-1 1203722 0.888 0.081 -0.333 0.972 
Voice 1521686 -0.345 0.969 -2.136 1.678 
Distance Toronto 1540262 4208.924 1935.706 2024 8779 
English Official Language 1540262 0.059 0.236 0 1 
Gold Price 1540262 446.695 181.468 272.67 972.9 
Ownership 1540262 94.588 8.730 40 100 
Mine Status Construction & Production 1540262 0.085 0.279 0 1 
Mine Status Suspension 1540262 0.008 0.089 0 1 
Likeability*Voice 1521686 -0.004 0.279 -1.921 2.208 
Sign Difference Dyad 1*Dyad 2 1540262 0.135 0.342 0 1 
Reciprocity Dyad 1 *Dyad 2 1540262 0.276 0.447 0 1 
Tie Strength Dyad 1 * Dyad 2 1540262 15.992 33.837 1 782 
Cooperation Dyad 1 *Dyad 2 1540262 0.018 0.144 -0.9 1 
Likeability Voice Squared 1521686 0.078 0.233 0 4.874 
Possible Ties (T-1) Squared 1203722 0.794 0.125 0 0.944 
Log NPV/GDP   498,033 -18.651 1.260 -23.032 -14.774 
Triad Type 1540262 0.252 0.901 0 6 
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TABLE 3.2: CORRELATIONS 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 DV Closed Triads 1 
        
2 Access to Resource Difference 0.0099 1 
       
3 Status Difference 0.0113 0.5375 1 
      
4 Likability Difference 0.0071 0.0501 -0.022 1 
     
5 Popularity Difference 0.0123 0.663 0.8067 -0.032 1 
    
6 Network Size -0.037 -0.03 -0.02 0.0113 -0.044 1 
   
7 Sign Difference Dyad 1 0.0045 -0.052 -0.072 -0.074 -0.068 0.0211 1 
  
8 Sign Difference Dyad 2 0.0038 0.0118 0 0.0022 
-3E-
04 0.0221 0.0583 1 
 
9 Tie Strength Dyad 1 0.202 0.038 0.0435 0.0211 0.0349 0.0516 -0.026 0.0018 1 
10 Tie Strength Dyad 2 0.238 -0.075 -0.043 -0.009 -0.059 0.0362 0.0053 -0.034 -0.002 
11 Reciprocity Dyad 1 0.1262 0.0818 0.0988 0.0444 0.082 -0.034 -0.082 
-5E-
04 0.4965 
12 Reciprocity Dyad 2 0.1625 -0.033 -0.015 -0.002 -0.019 -0.041 0.0001 -0.082 -0.001 
13 Cooperation Dyad 1 -0.057 0.0249 0.0284 0.0673 0.0248 -0.052 -0.368 -0.072 -0.056 
14 Cooperation Dyad 2 -0.057 0.0025 -0.002 -0.019 0.0016 -0.036 -0.069 -0.502 -0.001 
15 Common Others Dyad 1 0.6793 0.0149 0.0184 0.0084 0.0147 0.0673 -0.033 -0.003 0.3941 
16 Common Others Dyad 2 0.6653 -0.097 -0.045 0.0054 -0.078 0.0662 0.0037 -0.038 0.1498 
17 Common Others Dyad 3 0.6622 0.1124 0.0668 0.0053 0.0932 0.066 -0.009 -0.008 0.1616 
18 Transitive Density T-1 0.0315 0.005 -0.008 -0.007 0.0121 -0.306 -0.038 -0.044 -0.026 
19 Possible Ties T-1 -0.124 -0.019 -0.015 0.014 -0.034 0.6584 0.0209 0.0199 -0.02 
20 Voice -0.019 0.01 0.0052 -0.025 0.0039 -0.22 -0.047 -0.04 0.0475 
21 Distance Toronto -0.08 -0.014 -0.045 0.0052 -0.033 -0.142 0.0638 0.0533 -0.113 
22 English Official Language -0.002 0.0054 0.0005 -0.015 0.0106 -0.291 -0.022 -0.03 0.0003 
23 Gold Price -0.036 -0.005 -0.048 -0.02 -0.046 -0.194 -0.011 -0.016 -0.02 
24 Ownership 0.0329 0.0066 0.0276 0.0518 0.0278 0.1197 -0.02 -0.019 0.0049 
25 
Mine Status Construction & 
Production -0.035 0.0009 -0.004 -0.003 0.0027 -0.191 0.0131 0.0062 0.05 
26 Mine Status Suspension 0.0172 0.0102 0.0122 -0.002 0.0088 -0.116 -0.002 0.0019 -0.003 
27 Likeability*Voice 0.0029 -0.007 -0.02 -0.515 -0.026 -0.014 0.008 -0.009 0.0061 
28 Sign Difference Dyad 1*Dyad 2 -0.005 -0.019 -0.042 -0.037 -0.035 0.0037 0.5488 0.5332 -0.02 
29 Reciprocity Dyad 1 *Dyad 2 0.1997 0.0113 0.0248 0.0206 0.0164 -0.051 -0.041 -0.058 0.2348 
30 Tie Strength Dyad 1 * Dyad 2 0.3276 -0.029 -0.017 0.0069 -0.032 0.0413 -0.017 -0.023 0.5154 
31 Cooperation Dyad 1 *Dyad 2 -0.015 0.0116 -0.003 0.0231 0.006 -0.076 -0.062 -0.057 -0.042 
32 Likeability Voice Squared -0.067 0.0046 -0.008 0.0355 -0.014 0.0617 0.0798 0.0286 -0.157 
33 Possible Ties (T-1) Squared -0.126 -0.021 -0.02 0.0157 -0.038 0.6919 0.0241 0.0238 -0.026 
34 Triad Type 0.7398 -0.019 -0.009 0.0049 -0.01 -0.019 0.0003 -0.011 0.1695 
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TABLE 3.2: CORRELATIONS (cont’d) 
    10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
10 Tie Strength Dyad 2 1 
        
11 Reciprocity Dyad 1 -0.001 1 
       
12 Reciprocity Dyad 2 0.5654 0.015 1 
      
13 Cooperation Dyad 1 -0.005 -0.046 -0.005 1 
     
14 Cooperation Dyad 2 -0.058 -0.007 -0.049 0.1175 1 
    
15 Common Others Dyad 1 0.1794 0.1899 0.1306 -0.05 -0.041 1 
   
16 Common Others Dyad 2 0.4443 0.0972 0.2325 -0.043 -0.048 0.5405 1 
  
17 Common Others Dyad 3 0.2038 0.1142 0.1492 -0.039 -0.041 0.5653 0.5857 1 
 
18 Transitive Density T-1 -0.019 0.0002 0.0037 0.0532 0.0531 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 1 
19 Possible Ties T-1 -0.03 -0.071 -0.081 -0.021 -0.02 -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 -0.437 
20 Voice 0.0354 0.0163 0.0122 0.1436 0.1284 -0.011 -0.014 -0.015 0.0013 
21 Distance Toronto -0.098 -0.084 -0.078 -0.056 -0.059 -0.132 -0.129 -0.134 0.0477 
22 English Official Language 0.0034 -0.008 -0.002 0.0356 0.0402 -0.036 -0.035 -0.037 0.1935 
23 Gold Price -0.016 -0.026 -0.018 0.0862 0.0854 -0.062 -0.063 -0.064 0.0522 
24 Ownership 0.006 
-7E-
04 -0.002 -0.044 -0.041 0.0061 0.0083 0.0083 0.0216 
25 
Mine Status Construction & 
Production 0.0392 0.0008 0.0006 0.0156 0.0093 -0.036 -0.037 -0.039 0.032 
26 Mine Status Suspension -8E-04 0.0192 0.0192 -0.011 -0.011 -0.001 -0.001 0.0037 0 
27 Likeability*Voice 0.0092 0.0117 0.002 0.0002 0.0167 0.002 0.0018 0.0033 0.0018 
28 Sign Difference Dyad 1*Dyad 2 -0.021 -0.055 -0.051 -0.214 -0.28 -0.028 -0.029 -0.017 -0.032 
29 Reciprocity Dyad 1 *Dyad 2 0.382 0.4907 0.6918 -0.021 -0.033 0.23 0.2507 0.199 0.0062 
30 Tie Strength Dyad 1 * Dyad 2 0.5768 0.2595 0.3302 -0.032 -0.036 0.4773 0.4981 0.3597 -0.015 
31 Cooperation Dyad 1 *Dyad 2 -0.036 -0.034 -0.031 0.0673 0.0635 -0.028 -0.028 -0.018 0.0347 
32 Likeability Voice Squared -0.046 -0.165 -0.033 -0.2 -0.071 -0.07 -0.064 -0.065 -0.035 
33 Possible Ties (T-1) Squared -0.036 -0.077 -0.087 -0.024 -0.023 -0.049 -0.049 -0.05 -0.413 
34 Triad Type 0.2501 0.1163 0.2196 -0.045 -0.048 0.5495 0.5967 0.5327 0.0159 
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TABLE 3.2: CORRELATIONS (cont’d) 
    19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
19 Possible Ties T-1 1 
        
20 Voice -0.089 1 
       
21 Distance Toronto 0.1593 -0.497 1 
      
22 English Official Language -0.209 -0.108 0.425 1 
     
23 Gold Price -0.057 0.2527 0.2066 0.2534 1 
    
24 Ownership 0.0016 -0.165 -0.087 0.0915 -0.191 1 
   
25 
Mine Status Construction & 
Production -0.077 0.1494 0.1372 0.0754 0.2212 0.1215 1 
  
26 Mine Status Suspension -0.12 -0.013 -0.069 -0.019 0.1908 0.0031 -0.018 1 
 
27 Likeability*Voice -0.02 0.0101 -0.02 0.025 -0.002 -0.001 
-6E-
04 0.0029 1 
28 
 
Sign Difference 
Dyad1*Dyad2 0.0188 -0.043 0.0827 -0.018 -0.002 -0.035 0.0077 -0.007 -0.002 
29 Reciprocity Dyad 1 *Dyad 2 -0.098 0.0097 -0.085 0.0011 -0.017 -0.004 -0.002 0.0229 0.0045 
30 Tie Strength Dyad 1 * Dyad 2 -0.035 0.0335 -0.098 0.008 -0.018 0.0057 0.0539 -0.004 0.005 
31 Cooperation Dyad 1 *Dyad 2 -0.005 -0.01 0.0796 0.0299 0.0221 -0.007 -0.001 -0.011 -0.01 
32 Likeability Voice Squared 0.1479 -0.352 0.3432 0.0479 -0.068 0.1561 -0.037 -0.021 -0.026 
33 Possible Ties (T-1) Squared 0.9869 -0.098 0.1727 -0.238 -0.065 0.017 -0.093 -0.131 -0.022 
34 Triad Type -0.087 -0.01 -0.077 -0.009 -0.032 0.0227 -0.03 0.0162 0.0022 
 
  
 
 
 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 
28 
 
Sign Difference 
Dyad1*Dyad2 1 
      
29 Reciprocity Dyad 1 *Dyad 2 -0.056 1 
     
30 Tie Strength Dyad 1 * Dyad 2 -0.027 0.4453 1 
    
31 Cooperation Dyad 1 *Dyad 2 0.0558 -0.028 -0.034 1 
   
32 Likeability Voice Squared 0.0486 -0.097 -0.096 0.0216 1 
  
33 Possible Ties (T-1) Squared 0.0227 -0.107 -0.043 -0.005 0.1623 1 
 
34 Triad Type -0.014 0.2508 0.3285 -0.018 -0.054 -0.089 1 
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TABLE 3.3: RESULTS TRIADIC CLOSURE (1 Subperiod-Timepiece) 
VARIABLES  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 DV CLOSED TRIAD           
      
Access to Resource Difference 0.06 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.42*** 
 
(0.037) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.064) 
Status Difference 0.08 0.45*** 0.50*** 0.52*** 0.61*** 
 
(0.083) (0.101) (0.102) (0.102) (0.125) 
Likability Difference -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.05 
 
(0.031) (0.035) (0.040) (0.041) (0.061) 
Popularity Difference 1.97* -1.34 -3.85*** -4.06*** -6.44*** 
 
(0.874) (1.000) (1.014) (1.015) (1.501) 
Network Size -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.03*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Sign Difference Dyad 1 0.02 -0.06*** -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.04 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.027) 
Sign Difference Dyad 2 0.06*** -0.06*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.09** 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.028) 
Tie Strength Dyad 1 -0.02*** -0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Tie Strength Dyad 2 -0.02*** -0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Reciprocity Dyad 1 0.25*** 0.05** 0.20*** 0.17*** 0.09* 
 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.025) (0.025) (0.038) 
Reciprocity Dyad 2 0.20*** -0.06*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.07 
 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.028) (0.028) (0.043) 
Cooperation Dyad 1 -0.23*** -0.18*** -0.19*** -0.22*** -0.35*** 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.034) 
Cooperation Dyad 2 -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.24*** 
 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.035) 
Common Others Dyad 1 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Common Others Dyad 2 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Common Others Dyad 3 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Transitive Density T-1 
231.35*** 148.26*** 154.90*** 96.51*** 
-
660.83*** 
 
(9.095) (9.171) (9.151) (24.634) (51.770) 
Possible Ties T-1 5.13*** 3.58*** 3.76*** 0.60 116.91*** 
 
(0.191) (0.200) (0.201) (1.230) (9.229) 
Voice 0.41*** 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.56*** 0.67*** 
 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.029) 
Distance Toronto 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
English Official Language 1.18*** 1.54*** 1.50*** 1.50*** -1.67*** 
 
(0.036) (0.040) (0.041) (0.044) (0.103) 
Gold Price -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ownership 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Mine Status Construction & 
Production 0.72*** 0.94*** 0.90*** 0.90*** -0.11* 
 
(0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.052) 
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TABLE 3.3: RESULTS TRIADIC CLOSURE (1 Subperiod-Timepiece) (cont’d) 
VARIABLES  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 DV CLOSED TRIAD           
      
Mine Status Suspension -0.76*** 0.90*** 0.95*** 0.95*** -0.22 
 (0.174) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.188) 
Likeability*Voice 
  
0.10** 0.11** 0.10 
   
(0.034) (0.038) (0.103) 
Sign Difference Dyad 1*Dyad 2 
  
0.08** 0.08** 0.03 
   
(0.026) (0.026) (0.040) 
Reciprocity Dyad 1 *Dyad 2 
  
-0.30*** -0.29*** -0.38*** 
   
(0.031) (0.031) (0.047) 
Tie Strength Dyad 1 * Dyad 2 
  
-0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cooperation Dyad 1 *Dyad 2 
  
0.10+ 0.10+ -0.78*** 
   
(0.051) (0.052) (0.082) 
Likeability Voice Squared 
   
-0.57*** -3.50*** 
    
(0.056) (0.284) 
Possible Ties (T-1) Squared 
   
2.01** -69.33*** 
    
(0.741) (5.435) 
Log NPV/GDP 
    
0.24*** 
     
(0.011) 
Triad Type NO YES YES YES YES 
      Observations 2,488,628 2,488,628 2,488,628 2,488,628 966,146 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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TABLE 3.4: RESULTS TRIADIC CLOSURE (3 Subperiod-Timepieces) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
DV CLOSED TRIAD 
                 
Access to Resource Difference 0.06 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.40*** 
 
(0.037) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.064) 
Status Difference 0.07 0.47*** 0.52*** 0.55*** 0.58*** 
 
(0.083) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.125) 
Likability Difference -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.07 
 
(0.031) (0.035) (0.040) (0.041) (0.061) 
Popularity Difference 2.03* -1.54 -4.04*** -4.25*** -5.99*** 
 
(0.877) (0.999) (1.012) (1.013) (1.483) 
Network Size -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.03*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Sign Difference Dyad 1 0.03+ -0.06*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.03 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.027) 
Sign Difference Dyad 2 0.07*** -0.06*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.07* 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.027) 
Tie Strength Dyad 1 -0.02*** -0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Tie Strength Dyad 2 -0.02*** -0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Reciprocity Dyad 1 0.25*** 0.05** 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.09* 
 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.025) (0.025) (0.038) 
Reciprocity Dyad 2 0.21*** -0.06*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.06 
 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.028) (0.028) (0.043) 
Cooperation Dyad 1 -0.22*** -0.18*** -0.19*** -0.22*** -0.31*** 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.034) 
Cooperation Dyad 2 -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.20*** 
 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.035) 
Common Others Dyad 1 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Common Others Dyad 2 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Common Others Dyad 3 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Transitive Density T-1 218.17*** 136.75*** 143.64*** 83.49*** -458.77*** 
 
(9.103) (9.239) (9.208) (21.512) (47.080) 
Possible Ties T-1 4.65*** 3.17*** 3.36*** 0.09 82.87*** 
 
(0.188) (0.196) (0.197) (1.062) (8.279) 
Voice 0.43*** 0.60*** 0.61*** 0.59*** 0.80*** 
 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.028) 
Distance Toronto 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
English Official Language 1.08*** 1.42*** 1.38*** 1.37*** -1.59*** 
 
(0.036) (0.039) (0.040) (0.043) (0.099) 
Gold Price -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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TABLE 3.4: RESULTS TRIADIC CLOSURE (3 Subperiod-Timepieces) (cont’d) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
DV CLOSED TRIAD      
      
Ownership 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Mine Status Construction & 
Production 0.68*** 0.96*** 0.93*** 0.93*** -0.04 
 
(0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.051) 
Mine Status Suspension -0.85*** 0.72*** 0.77*** 0.76*** -0.46* 
 
(0.174) (0.175) (0.175) (0.175) (0.188) 
Likeability*Voice 
  
0.11** 0.12** 0.11 
   
(0.034) (0.038) (0.103) 
Sign Difference Dyad 1*Dyad 2 
  
0.08** 0.08** 0.02 
   
(0.026) (0.026) (0.040) 
Reciprocity Dyad 1 *Dyad 2 
  
-0.29*** -0.28*** -0.36*** 
   
(0.031) (0.031) (0.047) 
Tie Strength Dyad 1 * Dyad 2 
  
-0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cooperation Dyad 1 *Dyad 2 
  
0.11* 0.11* -0.67*** 
   
(0.051) (0.051) (0.084) 
Likeability Voice Squared 
   
-0.54*** -3.20*** 
    
(0.056) (0.282) 
Possible Ties (T-1) Squared 
   
2.07** -49.83*** 
    
(0.645) (4.906) 
Log NPV/GDP 
    
0.30*** 
     
(0.011) 
Triad Type NO YES YES YES YES 
      Observations 1,461,836 1,461,836 1,461,836 1,461,836 483,249 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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TABLE 3.5: RESULTS TRIADIC CLOSURE (5 Subperiod-Timepieces) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
DV CLOSED TRIAD 
     
      Access to Resource Difference 0.07+ 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.35*** 
 
(0.037) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.064) 
Status Difference 0.05 0.45*** 0.50*** 0.52*** 0.56*** 
 
(0.083) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.131) 
Likability Difference -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.07 
 
(0.031) (0.035) (0.039) (0.041) (0.061) 
Popularity Difference 2.28** -1.15 -3.70*** -3.90*** -5.81*** 
 
(0.879) (0.997) (1.010) (1.011) (1.493) 
Network Size -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Sign Difference Dyad 1 0.05*** -0.03* -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.04+ 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.027) 
Sign Difference Dyad 2 0.10*** -0.03* -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.06* 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.027) 
Tie Strength Dyad 1 -0.02*** -0.00** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Tie Strength Dyad 2 -0.02*** -0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Reciprocity Dyad 1 0.24*** 0.04** 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.09* 
 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.025) (0.025) (0.038) 
Reciprocity Dyad 2 0.20*** -0.07*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.06 
 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.028) (0.028) (0.043) 
Cooperation Dyad 1 -0.23*** -0.16*** -0.17*** -0.20*** -0.22*** 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.034) 
Cooperation Dyad 2 -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.16*** 
 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.035) 
Common Others Dyad 1 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Common Others Dyad 2 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Common Others Dyad 3 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Transitive Density T-1 197.69*** 137.09*** 143.97*** 101.30*** -218.34*** 
 
(9.034) (9.149) (9.107) (25.414) (44.878) 
Possible Ties T-1 3.79*** 2.99*** 3.16*** 0.82 78.88*** 
 
(0.185) (0.199) (0.199) (1.275) (8.116) 
Voice 0.41*** 0.57*** 0.58*** 0.56*** 0.68*** 
 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.027) 
Distance Toronto 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
English Official Language 1.08*** 1.36*** 1.32*** 1.30*** -1.17*** 
 
(0.035) (0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.102) 
Gold Price -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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TABLE 3.5: RESULTS TRIADIC CLOSURE (5 Subperiod-Timepieces) (cont’d) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
DV CLOSED TRIAD 
     
      Ownership 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Mine Status Construction & 
Production 0.59*** 0.83*** 0.79*** 0.79*** 0.03 
 
(0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.054) 
Mine Status Suspension -0.70*** 0.58*** 0.64*** 0.64*** 0.17 
 
(0.174) (0.175) (0.175) (0.175) (0.186) 
Likeability*Voice 
  
0.11** 0.12** 0.14 
   
(0.034) (0.038) (0.102) 
Sign Difference Dyad 1*Dyad 2 
  
0.08** 0.08** 0.02 
   
(0.026) (0.026) (0.040) 
Reciprocity Dyad 1 *Dyad 2 
  
-0.28*** -0.27*** -0.37*** 
   
(0.031) (0.031) (0.047) 
Tie Strength Dyad 1 * Dyad 2 
  
-0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cooperation Dyad 1 *Dyad 2 
  
0.09+ 0.09+ -0.56*** 
   
(0.051) (0.052) (0.086) 
Likeability Voice Squared 
   
-0.56*** -2.38*** 
    
(0.057) (0.277) 
Possible Ties (T-1) Squared 
   
1.52* -47.01*** 
    
(0.765) (4.807) 
Log NPV/GDP 
    
0.24*** 
     
(0.011) 
Triad Type NO YES YES YES YES 
      Observations 1,234,228 1,234,228 1,234,228 1,234,228 375,219 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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